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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the most significant changes in the law of products 
liability in Minnesota have occurred with respect to defenses, con-
tribution, and indemnity.' The law in these areas developed along 
traditional lines until 1977 when a series of Minnesota Supreme 
Court decisions radically altered the law.2 The first decision re-
jected settled rules governing indemnity between parties in the 
chain of distribution; the court favored contribution with responsi-
bility allocated according to the percentages of negligence of the 
parties.3 In the second decision, the court determined that the 
remedy of contribution would be available to a third party manu-
facturer against an injured plaintiffs employer. 4 The third opin-
ion applied the comparative negligence statute to claims based 
upon strict tort liability.5 
Although this trilogy of decisions has left many questions unan-
swered, at least some of the future problems of interpretation will 
be put to rest by the recently adopted comparative fault act.6 
Adoption of the act simplifies matters in some respects; however, it 
also raises new and different problems of interpretation. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the principles 
governing loss allocation are a function of the date the cause of 
action arises. Because of the position taken by the supreme court 
on the retroactivity of its civil decisions, 7 the recent changes in the 
law may have only prospective application. In addition, because 
the comparative fault act applies to causes of action arising after 
April 15, 1978,8 the possibility exists that there will be three groups 
of legal principles from which to choose in attempting to resolve 
1. Mt' Note, Contribution and Indmmlly--An examInation o/tht' Upht'alJalln M,nnt'sota Tort 
Loss Allocation Conct'pts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 109 (1979). 
2. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977), nott'd in 5 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 517 (1979); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 
1977); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). 
3. Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). 
4. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114,257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). 
5. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
6. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-41 (amending 
MINN. STAT. § 604.01-.02 (1976». 
7. For a recent analysis of the supreme court's position, see Note, Tht' Rt'troactluiljl 0/ 
M,nnt'Sota Suprt'mt' Court Pt'Tsonallnjury Dmsions, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 179 (1980). 
8. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 11, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 842. 
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questions relating to contribution, indemnity, and defenses.9 
This Article first analyzes the defenses to products liability 
claims.1O The Article then discusses contribution and indemnity. I I 
Building on these analyses, the next part suggests a method of loss 
allocation for products liability cases. 12 Finally the comparative 
fault act and its impact on the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1977 
loss allocation decisions are examined. 13 
II. DEFENSES 
The theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff will be deter-
minative of the available defenses. Different defenses, ranging 
from contributory negligence to assumption of the risk and misuse, 
may be applicable, depending on whether the plaintiffs claim is 
based on negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty. For 
purposes of sorting out the applicable defenses in products liability 
litigation, the defenses to each of these theories will be considered 
in the next three sections. 
A. Negligence 
Prior to the adoption of the comparative negligence statute in 
Minnesota,14 contributory negligence and secondary assumption 
of the risk were viewed as separate, complete defenses to a negli-
9. If the supreme court continues ·to adhere to the position it has recently taken on 
the retroactivity of its civil decisions, sec Note, supra note 7, at 190-99, the recent decisions 
concerning loss allocation would be given only prospective application. The new rules, 
however, will again be changed by the comparative fault act. If, for example, the court's 
decision in Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977) is applied only 
prospectively, one set of defenses would apply to cases arising before the date of decision in 
Busch, another set of defenses would apply after the effective date, and yet a third set of 
defenses would apply to cases arising on or after April 15, 1978, the effective date of the 
comparative fault act. S .... Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § II, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 842. 
The same would be true with respect to the court's decision in Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., 
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). For a discussion of Tolb .. rt, see notes 262-321 inpa and 
accompanying text. Because the comparative fault act should not change the basic rule 
established in Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977), 
the date of decision in Lambertson would be the only critical date. For a discussion of 
Lamb .. rtson, see notes 196-206, 225-37 inpa and accompanying text. 
10. S .... notes 14-188 inpa and accompanying text. 
11. Sa notes 189-321 inpa and accompanying text. 
12. S .... notes 322-51 i'!fta and accompanying text. 
13. Se .. notes 352-420 i'!fta and accompanying text. In addition, the Article discusses 
and extensively analyzes a new statute enacted by the Legislature on the last day of the 
1980 session. Set' notes 421-28 inpa and accompanying text. 
14. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (current version at MINN. 
STAT. § 604.01 (1978)). 
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gence action,15 whereas misuse was not considered as a defense in-
dependent from contributory negligence. 16 While the supreme 
court acknowledged the overlap of the defenses of contributory 
negligence and secondary assumption of the risk,17 the court con-
sistently maintained that the defenses had two distinguishable ele-
ments: contributory negligence consisted of the failure to exercise 
ordinary care for one's own safety; secondary assumption of the 
risk necessitated a showing that the plaintiff had knowledge and 
appreciation of the risk, a choice to avoid the risk or encounter it, 
and that he voluntarily chose to encounter it. 18 The reasonable-
15. Seeo, eo.g., Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 413-14,147 N.W.2d 561, 565-
66 (1966). 
16. Seoeo, eo.g., Johnson v. West Fargo Mfg. Co., 255 Minn. 19,22-23,95 N.W.2d 497, 
500-01 (1959). 
17. Su, eo.g., Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381,385,170 N.W.2d 
554,557 (1969); Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 412-13, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565 
(1966); Zuber v. Northern Pac. Ry., 246 Minn. 157, 172, 74 N.W.2d 641, 652 (1956). 
18. Su Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565-66 
(1966). 
To understand assumption of the risk, it is important to distinguish primary from 
secondary assumption of the risk. In Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 
826 (1971), the court said that: 
Primary assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the initial issue of 
whether a defendant was negligent at all-that is, whether the defendant had 
any duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm. It is not, therefore, an 
affirmative defense. The limited duties owed licensees upon another's prop-
erty, ... or patrons of inherently dangerous sporting events, ... are illustra-
tive. The classes of cases involving an implied primary assumption of risk are 
not many and, because this is not such a case, we have no occasion to determine 
the method by which such issue should be presented to a jury. 
Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827 (citations omitted). 
In Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979), a case involving the death 
of firemen resulting from the explosion of a large liquid propane storage tank, the court 
further elucidated the distinction: 
The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk technically is not a defense, 
but rather a legal theory which relieves a defendant of a duty which he might 
otherwise owe to the plaintiff with respect to particular risks. . . . The doctrine 
is sometimes confused with secondary assumption of the risk. Secondary as-
sumption of the risk occurs when the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known, 
appreciated risk wlihoul an attendant manifestation by the plaintiff that he con-
sents to relieve the defendant of his duty. . . . Primary assumption of the risk, 
therefore, is a doctrine which defines the limits of the defendant's duty. Its appli-
cation is dependent upon the plaintiff'S manifestation of consent, express or im-
plied, to relieve the defendant of a duty. Its application is not dependent upon 
the wisdom or reasonableness of the plaintiff's consent. 
Id. at 351 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk was applied to bar recovery against 
Mailand, the owner of the apartment complex where the LP storage tank was located, for 
the deaths of the firemen. It also applied to the plaintiffs' claims against the other defend-
ants in the suit, even though the theories of recovery were negligence per se, strict liability 
for an abnormally dangerous activity, and strict products liability. Seeo id. 
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ness of the plaintiff's conduct did not enter into the contributory 
negligence determination. 19 Either or both of these defenses could 
apply, depending on the case.20 
The harshness of contributory negligence as a complete defense 
was acknowledged in 1938 by the ¥innesota Supreme Court when 
it suggested that a comparative negligence statute would provide a 
more just approach.21 While the impact of the defenses was at 
times softened,22 it was not until 1969 that the Legislature enacted 
a comparative negligence statute.23 
With the enactment of the statute, contributory negligence was 
no longer a complete defense unless the plaintiff's negligence was 
equal to or greater than the negligence of the person against whom 
recovery was sought.24 Although the court had a pre-statute op-
portunity to merge the defenses of contributory negligence and 
secondary assumption of the risk,25 it preferred to wait for a case 
arising under the comparative negligence statute. That opportu-
nity came in Springrose D. Wtllmore,26 in which the court recast sec-
ondary assumption of the risk as an aspect of contributory 
negligence: "[T]he only question for submission in the usual case, 
we think, will be whether the particular plaintiff was, under the 
circumstances, negligent in regard to his own safety, for under that 
general issue counsel may fully argue that issue in all its re-
spects."27 A separate instruction on secondary assumption of the 
19. &~ Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971) (court 
abandoned 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG II, 136 G-S (2d ed. 1974), which instructed that 
"[a]ssumption of risk does not involve a failure to use reasonable care"). 
20. Su authorities cited note 17 supra. 
21. &~ Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425,431-32,281 N.W. 261, 263 
(1938). 
22. The court has indicated a willingness to consider inexperience of a product user in 
determining if contributory negligence exists. &I! Miller v. Macalester College, 262 Minn. 
418,431, 115 N.W.2d 666, 674 (1962). The doctrine of last clear chance would also avoid 
the defense of contributory negligence. Su Gardner v. Germain, 264 Minn. 61,64, 117 
N.W.2d 759, 761 (1962). In special situations in which the defendant has breached a 
statute designed to protect a specific class of individuals, contributory negligence will not 
be a defense. &~ Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 140,210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973) (selling 
glue to minors; case decided after enactment of comparative negligence statute, but court 
held the statute had no impact). 
23. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (current version at MINN. 
STAT. § 604.01 (1978)). 
24. Id. § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws at 1069. 
25. S~~ Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381,386, 170 N.W.2d 554, 
557-58 (1969) (cause of action arose prior to adoption of statute). 
26. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971). 
27. Id. at 26, 192 N.W.2d at 828. 
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risk should no longer be necessary. The only question should be 
whether, based upon what the plaintiff knew or should have 
known, he exercised reasonable care for his own safety.28 
28. The general statement, however, has to be qualified. The court said that in "the 
usual case" there would be no need to submit a separate question on assumption of the 
risk. Leaving open this possibility means that it could be expected to arise as a potential 
defense in the "unusual case." Furthermore, the Springros~ court stated that the standard 
jury instruction governing assumption of risk would remain an appropriate instruction. 
Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827. The instruction states: 
Assumption of risk is voluntarily placing (oneself) (one's property) in a posi-
tion to chance known hazards. To find that a person assumed the risk you must 
find: 
I. That he had knowledge of the risk. 
2. That he appreciated the risk. 
3. That he had a choice to avoid the risk or chance it and voluntarily chose 
to chance it. 
4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG II, 135 S (2d ed. 1974). 
The explanation offered in JIG indicates that when the defenses are to be submitted 
separately, "the percentage of fault attributable to plaintiff's secondary assumption of risk 
and the percentage of fault attributable to plaintiff's other negligence shall be added to-
gether and the total percentage compared with the percentage of fault attributable to the 
defendant." Id., 135 G, at 107. 
Just exactly how a jury could separate defenses that are indistinguishable is puzzling. 
The reason for the hedge in Springros~ is unclear and it has continued to raise appealable 
issues, with the court expressing an ambivalent attitude toward assumption of the risk as a 
defense. Three decisions of the court illustrate the problem. In Lambertson v. Cincinnati 
Corp., 312 Minn. 114,257 N.W.2d 679 (1977), a personal injury case arising out of injuries 
sustained by the plaintiff when his arm was caught in a press brake that double cycled, 
Cincinnati alleged error in the trial court's failure to submit assumption of the risk to the 
jury. The supreme court found no error. The court first stated that assumption of the risk 
would not have been submitted because the injury occurred after Springros~ was decided. 
Second, the court noted its prior approval of the instruction on assumption of the risk, 
finding that the elements of assumption of the risk had not been satisfied because of an 
absence of evidence in the record indicating that the plaintiff voluntarily chose to encoun-
ter a known risk. The court indicated that without such evidence "a line of recent deci-
sions of this court holds that submission of or a finding of assumption of risk is improper." 
Id. at 119, 257 N.W.2d at 683. 
The fact that the court indicated initially that assumption of the risk would not have 
been submitted as a separate defense in any event, yet went on to indicate that the stan-
dard jury instruction would still be an appropriate definition of assumption of the risk, but 
that the elements had not been met, is somewhat confusing. Perhaps the court was saying 
only that assumption of the risk should not have been submitted as a separate defense, but 
that even if it had, the elements would not have been met. If so, there is no problem with 
the court's decision. 
In Gaston v. Fazendin Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1978), the plaintiff was 
injured while installing telephone wires in a bedroom wall. The defendant alleged error in 
the trial court's failure to give jury instructions on assumption of the risk. The supreme 
court cited Springros~, holding that it was a proper application of the standard by the trial 
court. 
In Beckman v. V.J.M. Enterprises, Inc., 269 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1978), the plaintiff 
was injured when he fell down some stairs in the defendant's supper club. The jury found 
the plaintiff 68.4% negligent and the defendant 31.6% negligent. The trial court gave a 
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Fitting misuse into the defenses of contributory negligence and 
assumption of the risk should create no problem. Two of the po-
tential applications of the misuse concept relate to the elements of 
the plaintiff's case. If an unforeseeable misuse is made of a prod-
uct, the manufacturer will owe no duty to make the product safe 
for that use.29 Misuse may also be important in determining if a 
product is defective at the time it leaves the control of the manu-
facturer. 3o 
As a defense matter, misuse has not been treated separately from 
contributory negligence. The point is illustrated inJohnson lJ. West 
Fargo Manufacturing, Inc. ,31 a wrongful death action that arose out 
of the collapse ofa West go Auger Elevator, an auger-type portable 
grain elevator, while the plaintiff's decedent was assisting in 
changing a cable on the machine. The elevator collapsed because 
stop hooks on the elevator were being improperly used to support 
the elevator while the cable was being changed.32 The foreseeabil-
ity of the misuse related to the manufacturer's duty to anticipate 
and guard against that use and it also related to the defense of 
contributory negligence: "Whether the decedent in restringing the 
cable should have in the exercise of ordinary care found some 
other means of supporting the auger and tube and negligently as-
sumed that the stop hooks would serve the purpose of support was 
a question of fact for the jury."33 Even though the decedent may 
have misused the product, the court evaluated his conduct in 
terms of negligence, rather than treating misuse as a separate de-
separate instruction on assumption of the risk. The plaintiff argued that by submitting an 
instruction on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk his negligence was over· 
emphasized. The plaintiff urged the court to eliminate assumption of the risk in all jury 
instructions. The court did not respond to the argument, finding that the elements of 
assumption of the risk had not been satisfied. The court reiterated its statement in Spring. 
rose that JIG 135 remains an appropriate definition of assumption of the risk and that 
assumption of the risk must be unreasonable. 
Given the absence of any apparent justification for the retention of assumption of the 
risk terminology, further confusion could readily be eliminated by scrapping the concept 
as a separate defense. 
29. See, e.g., Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792,276 Minn. 1,7-8, 148 N.W.2d 312, 
.316 (1967); Hofstedt v. International Harvester Co., 256 Minn. 453,460-61,98 N.W.2d 
808, 813 (1959); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 
326, 79 N.W.2d 688, 693-94 (1956); Curwen v. Appleton Mfg. Co., 133 Minn. 28,32-33, 
157 N.W. 899, 901 (1916) (opinion couched in terms of proximate cause). 
30. See Hofstedt v. International Harvester Co., 256 Minn. 453, 98 N.W.2d 808 
(1959) .. 
31. 255 Minn. 19,95 N.w.2d 497 (1959). 
32. Id. at 22-23, 95 N.W.2d at 500-01. 
33. Id. at 24, 95 N.W.2d at 501. 
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fense. 34 In the defense context, therefore, the issue is not whether 
the plaintiff's use of the product can be labeled a misuse, but 
whether the plaintiff's use of the product was negligent. 
Thus, in post-Spnngrose negligence cases, the defenses of secon-
dary assumption of risk, misuse, and contributory negligence can 
be distilled to a single issue: did the plaintiff exercise reasonable 
care for his own safety? 
B. Stnet Liabilt"lj' 
At least as initially formulated, the defenses to strict tort claims 
deviated significantly from negligence defenses. The reason for the 
variance in treatment of defenses under the two theories is a func-
tion of the origins of strict tort liability. Superficially, the formula-
tion of a new theory with broad social and economic justifications 
seemed to warrant a different view of defenses, one consistent with 
other strict tort theories rather than negligence law. 35 This devel-
opment, coupled with an initial absence of a comparative fault 
mechanism to allocate loss in such cases, justified separation of de-
fenses that would not logically be separated under negligence 
law.36 
The position taken in the comments to section 402A in the Re-
statement (Second) 0/ Torts 37 (Restatement) has influenced the formu-
lation of defenses in most jurisdictions.38 Under the Restatement 
approach, contributory negligence in the sense of failure to dis-
cover a product defect or an unreasonable failure to guard against 
its existence is not a defense.39 . 
On the other hand, the Restatement makes assumption of the risk 
34. Id. at 22·24, 95 N.W.2d at 500-01. 
35. Su, e.g., Epstein, Plaintiff's Conduct in /toducts Liabllzty Actions: Comparative Negli-
gence, Automatic Division and Multiple Parties, 45]. AIR L. & COM. 87, 92-94 (1979); Prosser, 
The Fall of the Citadd (Strzct Liabzlzty to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791,838-40 (1966). 
36. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734-36,575 P.2d 1162, 1167-68, 
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385-86 (1978). The Da(y court rejected the concept of separation and 
merged the concepts of strict liability and comparative fault, thereby removing the bar to 
recovery in strict tort liability presented by negligent assumption of the risk. Id. at 738, 
575 P.2d at 1169-70, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88. 
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). 
38. See, e.g., Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 380 
(Iowa 1972); Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 704-05, 545 P.2d 1 \04, 1110 (1976); Hawkins 
Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546,566-67,209 N.W.2d 643, 655 (1973); Suter v. 
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.]. -, -,406 A.2d 140, 149 (1979); Ernest W. 
Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979); Morningstar v. Black & 
Decker Mfg. Co., - W. Va. -, -,253 S.E.2d 666, 683-84 (1979). 
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). 
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a complete defense.4o It requires a showing that the plaintiff vol-
untarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger.41 It re-
quires discovery of the defect, awareness of the danger, and 
unreasonable use of the product in spite of that awareness.42 
Although not specifically mentioned as a defense in the Restate-
ment ,43 misuse arose as a third potential defense in strict tort cases 
in reaction to the restrictive position on defenses taken by the Re-
statement.44 Judicial acceptance of the misuse defense has varied. 
Some courts, adhering to the Restatement position on defenses, have 
over generalized, refusing to consider anything other than assump-
tion of the risk as a defense to a strict liability claim.45 Other 
courts have considered misuse to be a defense, but only in the sense 
of negating a plaintiff's proof of defect or causation.46 Still others 
have accepted misuse as a defense, but without distinguishing it 
from contributory negligence.47 
With the enactment of comparative fault statutes,48 the judicial 
application o( comparative negligence statutes to strict tort 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. /d. 
43. Comment g of the Restatement states that a seller will not be liable if the product is 
delivered in a safe condition and "subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harm-
ful by the time it is consumed." Id., Comment g. The Comment makes it clear that the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof of showing that the product was defective when it left 
the hands of the seller. 
Comment h states that a product is not in a defective condition if it is safe for normal 
handling or consumption. Id., Comment h. 
44. See Vargo, The Dijenses To Strict Liabzlity In Tort: A New Vocabulary With An Old 
Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REV. 447, 457-59 (1978); Wade, Products Liabzlity and Plaintijf's 
Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 384 (1978). 
45. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.). -, -, -,406 A.2d 140, 
144-45, 147 (1979) (contributory negligence in strict liability may exist only when plaintiff 
"voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter the known risk"); Ernest W. Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 n.5 (Utah 1979). 
46. See McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying 
Texas law; misuse is a defense to strict liability action only when it constitutes a proximate 
cause of the injury). In Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980), the 
Iowa Supreme Court, reversing its earlier position that misuse is a defense, took the posi-
tion that misuse relates only to the elements of the plaintiff's case. The reversal was based 
on the court's recognition that misuse does not become an affirmative defense simply be-
cause the defendant offers proof on the misuse issue. Id. at 546. 
47. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 343, 298 N.E.2d 622, 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 
470-71 (1973); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974) (mis-
use constituted complete defense to motorist's action to recover on theory of strict liability 
in action against manufacturer for injuries sustained when seat collapsed and plaintiff fell 
backwards). 
48. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 253 1980
1980) THE ANATOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 253 
claims,49 and the judicial development of comparative fault proce-
dures,5o new pressures have been created to make strict tort de-
fenses conform to the treatment of negligence defenses.51 Even 
with the availability of comparative fault mechanisms, however, 
there is no clear uniformity in the treatment of strict tort defenses. 
This lack of consistency in strict tort defenses is reflected in the 
Minnesota cases. 
Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Busch lJ. 
Busch Construction, Inc.,52 in which the court applied the compara-
tive negligence statute to claims based on strict liability, the status 
of strict liability defenses in Minnesota was unclear, as the court 
itself acknowledged.53 The strongest indication was that the court 
would follow the lead of the Restatement. 
14, § 156 (1964); MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02 (1978); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 1411-1413 
(McKinney 1976). 
49. St-.. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393-94 (Minn. 1977); Baccelleri 
v. Hyster Co., - Or. -, -, 597 P.2d 351, 354-55 (1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 
459-62, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63-64 (1967). 
50. S .... , ... g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 
1976) (defense of comparative fault in products liability extends beyond cases involving 
use with knowledge of defect to those cases when plaintiff misuses product and misuse is 
proximate cause of injuries alleged), modifit'd, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 
871,890 (Alaska 1979) (under Butaw, consumer who uses product as it was intended can-
not be deemed to have misused product irrespective of knowledge of defect); Daly v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731-43, 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 
383-91 (1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); 
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.]. -, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); General 
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). 
51. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.]. -, -, 406 A.2d 140, 149 
(1979) (not reasonably fit for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes) and in Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977), the courts held that 
foreseeable misuse would not be a defense to a strict liability claim. Suter further held that 
only contributory negligence would be a defense subject to apportionment and that even 
contributory negligence would not be available in industrial accident settings. St-.. - N.J. 
at -, 406 A.2d at 148. 
In West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976), the court apparently 
took the position that misuse and assumption of the risk would be defenses, but that con-
tributory negligence in the sense of failure to discover a product defect would not be a 
defense. A similar position was taken by the Alaska Supreme Court in Caterpillar Tractor 
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), in which the court held that, "when the design 
defect is the lack of a safety device, the jury may be instructed that the plaintiff may be 
comparatively negligent in the knowing use of a defective product only if he voluntarily 
and unreasonably encounters the known risk." 593 P.2d at 892. In other situations, the 
court's decision in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 
(Alaska 1976), modifit'd, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), 
would control, with no distinction made between apportionable defenses. 
52. 262 N.w.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
53. St-.. id. at 393. 
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The court leaned toward the Restatement approach in Magnuson lJ. 
Rupp Manlffocturing, Inc. 54 In Magnuson, the plaintiff was injured in 
a snowmobile accident when his leg struck a spark plug protruding 
from the snowmobile engine. The plaintiff was an experienced 
mechanic, had worked on his snowmobile, and was well aware of 
the position of the spark plug. The evidence in the case did not 
establish, however, that the plaintiff was aware of the specific risk 
of injury arising from the defect. The supreme court reversed the 
trial court's order for a new trial and reinstated a jury verdict ad-
verse to plaintiff.55 Although a clear treatment of defenses is diffi-
cult to glean from the majority opinion,56 Justice Rogosheske, in a 
concurring opinion, concluded that the plaintiff should be barred 
from recovery as a matter of law because he should have been 
aware of the risk of injury.57 The elements of assumption of the 
risk as defined by the Restatement58 were present, except that de-
fendant had not shown that plaintiff was aware of the risk of in-
jury from the defect.59 Thus, the defense, which is subjective in 
the Restatement, was apparently made partially objective upon its 
application in Minnesota.60 
Although Justice Rogosheske intimated in Magnuson that the Re-
statement position on contributory negligence and assumption of 
the risk would be followed, no clear position was taken concerning 
misuse as a defense;61 it remains an open question. However, the 
Minnesota strict liability cases do illustrate the treatment of misuse 
in two of its applications, both relating to the elements of the strict 
liability case. 
First, in Ke" lJ. Coming Glass Works, Inc.,62 a case involving an 
exploding baking dish, recovery was denied because the plaintiff 
was unable to establish that the flaw in the baking dish that led to 
54. 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969). 
55. Id. at 46,171 N.W.2d at 210. 
56. In his concurring opinion, Justice Rogosheske said, "[w)hile I agree with the dis-
position reached, I fail to comprehend the basis thereof." Id. (Rogosheske, J., concur-
ring). 
57. Id. at 50,171 N.W.2d at 212 (Rogosheske,J., concurring). 
58. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text. 
59. See 285 Minn. at 50, 171 N.W.2d at 212 (Rogosheske, J., concurring). 
60. See id. (Rogosheske, J., concurring). 
61. Misuse was discussed in the majority opinion in connection with the elements of a 
strict liability case. The court stated that the plaintiff had the burden of proving proper 
use of the machine as part of his case, but, "being aware of the condition and voluntarily 
doing what he did, he has not sustained this burden .... " Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209. 
62. 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969). 
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the explosion existed at the time the product left the defendant's 
control. Because the dish had been out of the defendant's control 
from seven to forty-six months, the possibility of intervening mis-
use made it unlikely that the flaw existed at the time the dish left 
the defendant's control.63 In this context, it was necessary for the 
plaintiff to negate intervening misuses in order to create the infer-
ence that the baking dish was defective at the time it left the con-
trol of the defendant. Failure to do so resulted in a judgment for 
the defendant.64 
Second, to prove a defect it must be shown that the product in 
question is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
anticipated by the ordinary user or consumer or, to use the stan-
dard in Fa" lJ. Annstrong Rubber CO.,65 that the product is not safe 
for the uses to which a manufacturer should reasonably anticipate 
the product will be pUt.66 If the manufacturer has no reason to 
anticipate the use that is made of the product, it is not defective. 
To illustrate, in Olson lJ. Village qf Babbit,67 a child was injured 
while igniting an unexploded rocket from a Fourth of July fire-
works display. Because the use made of the product was not a use 
that the fireworks manufacturer was required to anticipate, the 
product was determined not to be defective.6B 
Another question relating to strict tort defenses concerned the 
applicability of Minnesota's comparative negligence act to strict 
tort claims. A matter of speculation since the comparative negli-
gence act was adopted in 1969, this question was answered by the 
supreme court in Busch lJ. Busch Construction, Inc.,69 in which the 
court took speCific positions on the defenses to strict tort claims, 
the applicability of the comparative negligence statute to strict 
tort claims, and the method of loss allocation in such cases. 
Busch arose out of a single vehicle accident involving a vehicle 
manufactured by defendant General Motors and driven by Lando 
Busch, plaintiff and codefendant in the action. The accident was 
caused in part by a plastic yoke of the turnsignal switch lodging in 
the steering column of the vehicle and in part by the negligence of 
Lando Busch in driving the vehicle. The jury found Busch to be 
63. Id. at 118-19, 169 N.W.2d at 589. 
64. Id. 
65. 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970). 
66. Su ld. at 89-90, 179 N.W.2d at 69. 
67. 291 Minn. 105,189 N.w.2d 701 (1971). 
68. Su ld. at 108-11, 189 N.W.2d at 704-05. 
69. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977), noti!d in 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 517 (1979). 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 256 1980
256 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
fifteen percent at fault and General Motors eighty-five percent at 
fault. 70 
Although Minnesota's comparative negligence statute did not 
mention strict tort liability, the court avoided the problem by rely-
ing on the presumption that Minnesota's adoption in 1969 of a 
comparative negligence statute patterned after Wisconsin's, in-
cluded Wisconsin judicial constructions of that statute up to the 
time of the Minnesota enactment. 71 Because Minnesota's adop-
tion of comparative negligence followed the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's 1967 decision in Dippelv. Sdano,72 applying the Wisconsin 
statute to strict liability claims, the presumption gave the Minne-
sota Supreme Court a ready basis for application of Minnesota's 
statute to strict liability claims. 73 
A brief but critical portion of the Busch opinion specifies the de-
fenses applicable to strict liability claims and provides a rough in-
dication of how loss will be allocated between a plaintiff and 
defendant in the strict liability context. 
1. The Defenses Under Busch 
To avoid eroding the policy of consumer protection underlying 
the adoption of strict tort liability, the Busch court held that "a 
consumer's negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard 
against defects is not a defense and thus may not be compared 
with a distributor's strict liability."74 This follows the position 
taken by the Restatement, but only to the extent that negligent fail-
70. /d. at 393. 
71. In a case involving multiple parties, Minnesota followed the lead of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in deciding that the plaintiff'S percentage of negligence should be com-
pared to the percentage of negligence of the defendants individually, rather than in the 
aggregate. See Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 246, 207 N.W.2d 
706, 709 (1973). The court in Olson v. Hartwig, 288 Minn. 375, 180 N.W.2d 870 (1970), 
although not cited by the Maner court, also used Wisconsin law to construe Minnesota's 
comparative negligence statute. 
72. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 
73. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court used the statutory presumption to justify 
application of the comparative negligence statute to strict liability claims, the court stated 
that, because no question of statutory construction was involved, it would not be bound 
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's approach to defenses to strict liability claims. In par-
ticular, the court emphasized that it did not adopt the Wisconsin approach indicating that 
a strictly liable distributor could avoid liability by proving it was not negligent. 262 
N.W.2d at 393 n.13. This refusal represents more of a disagreement with the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court's peculiar rationalization of strict tort theory than a disagreement over the 
application of other defenses. 
74. Id. at 394. 
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ure to discover a defect is removed from consideration as a de-
fense. 75 
The court then held that "[a]ll other types of consumer negli-
gence, misuse, or assumption of risk must be compared with the 
distributor's strict liability under the statute."76 
a. Contributory Negligence and Assumption of the Risk 
The Busch court's separation of these defenses for purposes of 
specifying what types of plaintiff misconduct will be legitimate de-
fense matters in strict liability cases does not mean that the de-
fenses should receive separate definition for submission to the trier 
of fact. Separation of the defenses to strict liability but not negli-
gence claims would create unnecessary practicaP7 and theoretical 
problems. 78 The Busch court did not specifically hold that the 
merger of secondary assumption of the risk and contributory negli-
gence in the negligence context, effected by Sprzngrose v. Willmore, 79 
would carry over to strict liability cases.80 In the subsequent case 
of Armstrong v. Mazland,81 however, it was made clear that the court 
intended such a result. 
The litigation in Armstrong arose out of the deaths of three West 
St. Paul firemen who were killed when an 11,000 gallon liquid pro-
pane tank exploded while they were attempting to extinguish a 
fire that had spread to· the tank from a fuel truck filling the tank. 
Suit was brought against multiple defendants, including the owner 
75. Following a suggestion made in Note, A Reappraisal 0/ Contributory Fault in Strict 
Products Liabzlllj! Law, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 235, 251 (1976), the court stated: 
[A]ny solution to this issue [of strict tort defenses] must be tailored to protect the 
consumer's reliance on the product's safety. To insure protection of this interest, 
we hold that a consumer's negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard 
against defects is not a defense and thus may not be compared with a distribu-
tor's strict liability. 
262 N.W.2d at 394. 
76. 262 N.W.2d at 394 (footnote omitted). 
77. In Busch a single theory of recovery, strict liability, was submitted to the jury. See 
ld. at 384. If both negligence and strict liability theories are submitted, attempts to distin-
guish between defenses are likely to lead to confusion. For an attempt to explain how 
both theories may be submitted without confusion, see Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
118 N.H. 802, 810-14, 395 A.2d 843, 848-50 (1978). 
78. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 94, 108-09. 
79. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971). 
80. In Busch the court cited Springrose, but only for the proposition that "[t]he use of 
the term 'negligence' in the [comparative negligence] statute is not a bar to its application 
in strict liability cases." 262 N.W.2d at 393 n.12. 
81. 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979) (in wrongful death action court held assumption of 
risk a bar to strict liability action). 
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of the property on which the tank was located, the seller and in-
staller of the tank, the company responsible for the delivery of the 
liquid propane at the time of the fire, and the companies responsi-
ble for an improperly installed meter and broken relief valve on 
the delivery truck. The theories of recovery ranged from negli-
gence and negligence per se to strict liability for an abnormally 
dangerous activity and strict products liability. 
The claims against all defendants were resolved on the basis of 
primary assumption of the risk.82 Because the firemen were famil-
iar with the possibility of explosion in such a situation, and be-
cause they had received training in fighting such fires, the court 
82. Id. at 350, 352-53. In Armstrong the court followed Springrose v. Willmore, 292 
Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971), in distinguishing between primary and secondary as-
sumption of the risk: 
In Springrose ll. Willmore. . . this court held that primary assumption of the 
risk remains an absolute bar to the plaintiffs recovery, whereas secondary as-
sumption of the risk becomes a question of comparative negligence. Primary 
assumption of the risk is not really an affirmative defense; rather, it indicates that 
the defendant did not even owe the plaintiff any duty of care. . . . On the 
other hand, secondary assumption of the risk is a type of contributory negligence 
where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known and appreciated hazard cre-
ated by the defendant without relieving the defendant of his duty of care with 
respect to such hazard. 
284 N.W.2d at 348-49. 
The use of primary assumption of the risk to bar the plaintiffs recovery on a strict 
liability claim may seem somewhat curious in light of the court's statement in Spnngrose 
that the cases involving primary assumption of the risk would be few in number. 292 
Minn. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827. In Sprlngrose, however, the court stated that cases involv-
ing owners' and occupiers' duties would be appropriate for use of the concept. See id. 
The use of primary assumption of the risk terminology in the strict products liability 
context should not by any means be taken as a general extension of the concept to all 
products liability cases. First, Armstrong involved a unique issue: the duty owed to 
firemen. The court's initial application of primary assumption of the risk was in the con-
text of the obligation owed by owners and occupiers of land to firemen. The court held 
that a property owner would not be liable except when "injury is caused by a hidden or 
unanticipated risk attributable to the landowner's negligence and such negligence is the 
proximate cause of the injury." 284 N.W.2d at 350. The court felt compelled to extend 
this holding to the other defendants in the case, including those against whom strict prod-
ucts liability claims were made. In so doing, the court adopted the reasoning of a dissent-
ing judge in an Illinois Supreme Court case, Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 152,379 
N.E.2d 281, 286 (1978) (Ryan, J., dissenting): 
The majority appears to be willing to apply the firemen's rule only in the 
'limited context of landowner/occupier liability.' This implies that the majority 
would not permit a fireman to recover for injuries he receives in extinguishing a 
fire in my automobile which I caused by negligently pouring gasoline on the hot 
manifold if the automobile is parked in my driveway, but that he would be per-
mitted to recover if my automobile is parked in the street. This appears to me 
not only to be extremely illogical but also to possibly present some constitutional 
questions .... 
. . . The majority opinion is in error. . . in equating assumption of risk as 
used in the firemen's rule with the affirmative defense in negligence and products 
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held that the landowner owed no duty to the firemen. 83 This hold-
ing was extended to the remaining defendants in the suit, even 
though the theories of recovery asserted against those defendants 
were based on negligence per se and strict liability.84 The court 
said, however: 
If the issue in this case concerned the applicability of secon-
dary assumption of the risk to strict liability actions, we would 
feel compelled to follow our decision in Sprz'ngrose lJ. Wzllmore 
... and Busch lJ. Busch Cons!., Inc . ... and hold that such con-
duct of the plaintiff should be treated as a type of contributory 
negligence and compared with the defendant's fault under our 
comparative fault statute .... 85 
liability cases. Under the fireman's rule assumption of risk is not an affirmative 
defense. It, instead, defines the duty that is owed to a fireman. 
It is not important in the application of the fireman's rule to determine 
what caused the particular danger which brought about the injury. Of critical 
importance is whether the particular danger is one that the fireman would antic-
ipate in the performance of his duties. 
284 N.E.2d at 352 n.2. 
Second, to the extent that a parallel is drawn between primary assumption of the risk 
as it is discussed in Armstrong, and the duty issue in products liability cases in general, it 
should be noted that establishing that a particular danger was obvious will not automati-
cally avoid the defendant's duty. s" .. Steenson, Th .. Anoto"!}' of Products Liabt"biy in Minnuota: 
Th .. Th .. on~sofR"colJery, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1,42 n.190 (1980). Obviousness, in the 
context of owners' and occupiers' duties, as in products liability cases, is not preclusive on 
the duty issue. Other decisions of the supreme court, such as Adee v. Evanson, 281 
N.W.2d 177 (Minn. (979) and Gaston v. Fazendin Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 
1978), make the point clear. In Adu, for example, the court held in a slip and fall case 
that the trial court erred in holding that the store owner had no duty to warn the plaintiff 
of risks of which the customer had present knowledge and realization. The trial court 
instructed the jury that there is "no duty to warn a customer who comes upon the store 
owner's premises of risks of which the customer himself or herself had present knowledge 
and present realization." 281 N.W.2d at 179. 
By contrast, section 343(A)(I) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), pro-
vides that "A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to 
them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, 
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." 
Id. Following this approach, the supreme court held that despite the obviousness of the 
danger, a defendant may nonetheless owe a duty to an invitee if harm should be antici-
pated, despite the obviousness of the danger. 281 N.W.2d at 179-80; su Gaston v. 
Fazendin Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn. 1978) (construction company liable 
to telephone installer for injuries sustained on company premises). 
The rule in products liability cases, although not ordinarily couched in terms of pri-
mary assumption of the risk, is directed to the duty element, just as primary assumption of 
the risk is in discussing negligence liability. The term should not be given undue meaning 
because of the court's decision in Armstrong. 
83. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d at 350. 
84. Id. at 352-53. 
85. Id. at 351. 
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The intent of the court to merge contributory negligence and as-
sumption of the risk as strict liability defenses is clear. 
b. Misuse 
In Busch the court took the position that all types of contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of the risk, and misuse would be valid 
strict liability defenses. However, because the court had not previ-
ously taken a clear position on misuse as a defense86 it is not clear 
exactly what the court meant in holding that misuse is a defense to 
strict liability claims. As a starting proposition, misuse as it relates 
to the elements of a plaintiff's strict liability claim can be elimi-
nated. If a plaintiff is unable to establish a product defect or a 
causal relationship between the defect and the injury, misuse as a 
defense becomes irrelevant. 
Assuming that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, 
the use made of the product may be highly relevant in determin-
ing if the plaintiff's recovery should be reduced or barred. Argua-
bly, it is inconsistent to find that a manufacturer should have 
made a product safe for a particular use and nevertheless allow the 
plaintiff's use to be the subject of an affirmative defense.87 Under-
standing the origins of the misuse defense, however, may be of 
assistance in understanding what it is that makes misuse proper 
defense matter. 
The origins of misuse demonstrate that when it is accepted as a 
defense it is simply contibutory negligence with a different label. 
A good example of the treatment of the defense of misuse in a 
comparative fault jurisdiction appears in Schuh v. Fox River Tractor 
CO.,88 a 1974 Wisconsin Supreme Court case. In Schuh the plain-
tiff, an experienced farm worker, suffered a traumatic amputation 
of his right leg in the fan of a crop blower. The plaintiff had 
climbed on top of the machine to make repairs after he had pulled 
the clutch lever disengaging the auger. The plaintiff assumed 
from the position of the clutch lever on the machine that the fan 
had also been disengaged. The fan was hidden from view by a 
housing and noise from tractors being used to run the crop blower 
and other machines made it difficult to determine by sound if the 
fan was running. 
Although the misuse, climbing on top of the machine, was fore-
86. S .... Steenson, supra note 82, at 15-19. 
87. S .... Vargo, supra note 44, at 460-611. 
88. 63 Wis. 2d 728,218 N.W.2d 279 (1974). 
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seeable and should have been anticipated and guarded against by 
the defendant, Schuh's misuse of the machine was also negligent 
because he should have been aware of the defect. The court in 
discussing the misuse question stated that "under certain circum-
stances misuse may constitute contributory negligence and thus be 
a factor in the comparison of negligence."89 Because Schuh's mis-
use of the machine apparently was a negligent misuse, the court 
determined as a matter of law that he was barred from recovery 
because his negligence equalled or exceeded the negligence of the 
defendant.90 
If properly viewed, the defense of misuse is simply another label 
for contributory negligence and has no meaning apart from con-
tributory negligence.91 If the plaintiff's use of the product is not a 
negligent use, labeling it a misuse is irrelevant. 
c. The Merger oJ Defenses 
With the adoption of comparative fault in Minnesota, the rea-
sons for making any distinction between the defenses of contribu-
tory negligence, secondary assumption of the risk, and misuse 
disappear. Both secondary assumption of the risk and misuse 
should be treated as aspects of contributory negligence. The 
supreme court's position following the merger of contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of the risk in Spnngrose is equally apposite 
to misuse: "The only question for submission in the usual case, we 
think, will be whether the particular plaintiff was, under the cir-
cumstances, negligent in regard to his own safety, for under that 
general issue counsel may fully argue that issue in all its re-
spects. "92 By making the treatment of strict tort defenses consis- . 
tent with the defenses to negligence claims, the pigeonholing 
tendencies prompted by the Restatement's restrictive position on de-
fenses are avoided and a more equitable allocation of loss will be 
achieved, consistent with the function of the comparative negli-
gence statute. 
d. The Busch Exception 
The exception established in Busch that excludes failure to dis-
cover a product defect from the contributory negligence determi-
89. Id at 741, 218 N.W.2d at 286. 
90. Id. at 744, 218 N.W.2d at 287. 
91. Set' Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 677, 518 P.2d 857, 860 (1974). 
92. 292 Minn. 23, 26, 192 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1971). 
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nation gives rise to several questions concerning the specific 
application of the exception, the scope of its application, and 
finally, its justification. 
The facts in Busch provide a good example of the problems in-
volved in applying the exception in specific cases. There was testi-
mony that Lando Busch, the driver of the vehicle, could have 
braked the vehicle but failed to do SO.93 Thus, the jury could have 
inferred that he was negligent in failing to avoid the accident after 
the danger created by the locked steering wheel became apparent 
to him.94 Although his misconduct may have included failure to 
discover the defect, it went further because of his additional failure 
to exercise reasonable care after the danger arose.95 
Another example, roughly similar to Schuh D. Fox River Tractor 
CO.,96 is Paries v. Allis-Chalmers COrp.97 Paries involved a farm ma-
chinery accident in which the plaintiff lost his right hand in a for-
age harvester while attempting to unclog corn stalks that had 
caught in the harvester. There were warnings on the machine tell-
ing the operator to "[k]eep hands, feet and clothing away from 
power-driven parts."98 The warnings and instructions were re-
peated in the operator's manual.99 
Because unclogging the machine with the power off took longer 
than unclogging while the power was connected, the plaintiff had 
been cleaning the machine with the power on. The plaintiff was 
familiar with the operation of the harvester and was aware of the 
warnings on the harvester and in the manual. On the day of the 
injury, the plaintiff had unclogged the machine four or five times 
with the power connected. On the last occasion, as he reached in 
to unclog the machine, he felt a quick jerk and had his arm drawn 
into the machine. 
The plaintiff's theory of the case was negligent design and fail-
ure to warn. The jury found the defendant fifty-one percent and 
the plaintiff forty-nine percent negligent. 1OO A hotly disputed issue 
in the case concerned the plaintiff's knowledge of the danger: 
Defendant argues that plaintiff "deliberately encountered a 
93. 262 N.W.2d at 390. 
94. S~~ id. at 394. 
95. Se~ id. 
96. 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974). 
97. 289 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1979). 
98. Id. at 458. 
99. /d. 
100. Id. at 457. 
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known and obvious risk in conscious disregard of defendant's 
warnings." The evidence does not prove that alleged fact as a 
matter of law. There was credible testimony that plaintiff did 
not know that the speed of the rolls could vary and might sud-
denly increase so that he could not let go of a stalk before his 
hand was in the rollers. His prior use of the machine had not 
made him aware of that danger. 101 
263 
Although Paries was a pre-Busch negligence case, it is interesting 
to speculate on the impact of Busch had it been applied. It seems 
clear that reasonable minds could differ on the classification of the 
plaintiff's conduct. The plaintiff's conduct seemed to stop short of 
secondary assumption of the risk because he was not aware of the 
specific danger created by the harvester. He may have misused 
the machine in attempting to unclog it without disconnecting the 
power, but his misuse, like that of the plaintiff in Schuh, cannot be 
considered apart from his negligence, which may have consisted 
solely of a failure to discover the defect. 
Even assuming that the plaintiff was negligent in some respect 
other than in failing to discover the defect, obvious difficulties 
would be presented in attempting to distill the plaintiff's miscon-
duct into separate categories of misconduct, and then assess a per-
centage of negligence to the plaintiff after Restatement section 402A 
comment n 102 contributory negligence is excised. 
These problems of application may be illustrated, but it is not 
101. Id. at 460 (footnotes omitted). A large portion of the briefs was devoted to a 
discussion of the impact of the plaintiff's awareness. See Brief and Appendix of Appellant 
Allis-Chalmers Corporation at 10-12, 18-23; Brief of Respondent Dwight Parks at 3-21. 
102. A final example of the confusion over the application of the Busch exception arises 
in the court's recent decision in Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 
1980). In Wegscheider plaintiff was injured when he fell from a tanker trailer owned by 
defendant, while using a piece of new clothesline rope to lift a flexible chute used to trans-
fer plastic pellets from a truck to a tanker on which he was working. Although plaintiff 
was generally aware of the risks in the procedure, the record contained little evidence 
concerning plaintiff's knowledge that jagged edges on the tanker could sever the rope. He 
knew that the ropes could become frayed through such use, but there was no evidence that 
he knew a new rope would be so severed. The jury found plaintiff 10% negligent, defend-
ant 90% negligent, and that plaintiff assumed the risk. 
The supreme court held in this case, which arose prior to Springrose v. Willmore, 292 
Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971), that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
of assumption of the risk. Plaintiff also argued that the trial court should have instructed 
the jury on strict liability and that plaintiff's only negligence consisted of failing to inspect 
the tanker for jagged edges, misconduct that could not be considered under Busch. The 
supreme court found, however, that the jury could have decided plaintiff's negligence 
consisted of more than failure to inspect. "It could have found he was negligent in using a 
clothesline to hoist the heavy chute or in continuing to pull upon the chute when he felt 
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likely that they can be cured. The best that can be done is to set 
forth clearly the excepted type of conduct in a jury instruction and 
leave it to the trier of fact to apply the standard.103 
Aside from the problems of classification, Parks also prompts 
questions concerning the scope of the Busch exception. The princi-
pal question is whether it will apply to negligence as well as strict 
liability claims. A certain irony would exist in not applying the 
exception to negligence claims, whether the plaintiff's claim is 
based on a manufacturing or design defect or failure to warn. 104 If 
the cause of action involves negligent design or warning, the close 
similarity if not exact duplication of the elements of strict liability 
would logically compel the same application of defenses to the 
negligence theories. lOS If the case involves a manufacturing defect, 
in which the difference between negligence and strict liability is 
more pronounced, the illogic of making a strictly liable defend-
ant's exposure greater than a negligent defendant's is apparent. 
This potential lack of symmetry in products liability defenses 
should be addressed and resolved in order to promote conceptual 
consistency in the treatment of defenses, thereby avoiding the con-
the rope scraping against the struts on the tanker." Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 
N.W.2d at 170. 
As with the conduct of the plaintiff in Schuh, it is difficult to separate plaintiff's failure 
to discover the defect from his other conduct. If the Busch exception is avoided this easily 
it will become largely meaningless, given the ability to find some plaintiff misconduct 
going beyond the mere failure to discover the defect. Short of completely passive behav-
ior, it is difficult to imagine situations in which the Busch exception might apply. 
In Wt!gscht!irl" the court found that even if Busch applied it would not have affected 
the outcome of the case. Even assuming plaintiff's misconduct consisted solely of failure 
to discover the defect, plaintiff failed to request an instruction based on Busch. The court 
thus found no reversible error in the trial court's refusal of the plaintiff's strict liability 
instruction. Set! irl. 
103. For an examination of how the loss allocation question may be submitted to ju-
ries, see notes 120-59 iT/pa and accompanying text. 
104. Su Epstein, supra note 35, at 108·09. If separate defenses to negligence and strict 
liability theories are allowed, with comment n contributory negligence a legitimate de-
fense to negligence but not strict liability claims, it would be necessary for the jury to 
assign a separate percentage of fault to the plaintiff's failure to discover the defect. As-
suming that the jury finds the plaintiff 40% at fault (with 10% of that fault consisting of 
failure to discover the defect) and the defendant 60% at fault, the plaintiff would be enti-
tled to recover 60% of his damages on the negligence claim. On the strict liability claim, 
however, Rl!Statl!11ll!Tlt section 402A comment n negligence cannot be considered. This 
would call for a reassignment of the 10% fault assigned to the plaintiff for failure to dis-
cover the defect. Because the fault determination must total 100%, that 10% would have 
to be reassigned to the defendant, making the defendant 70% at fault on the strict liability 
claim and 60% at fault on the negligence claim. Such a result would seem indefensible. 
105. For a discussion of the similarity between theories, see Steenson, supra note 82, at 
14-63. 
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fusion that necessarily will arise if separate defenses are established 
for strict liability and negligence claims. A single set of defenses 
for both theories will then avoid the problems that otherwise will 
result when a jury is instructed on both theories lO6 or when a case 
is submitted on negligence theory alone. 
In addition, if the Busch exception is applied to negligence 
claims in the products liability context, there seems to be no reason 
why it should not be applied in other negligence contexts. 107 If the 
negligent failure of a consumer to discover a product defect is not 
taken into consideration in the contributory negligence determina-
tion, then no reason appears why the failure of a shopper to dis-
cover the icy condition of a merchant's sidewalk should be 
considered in the contributory negligence determination of a basic 
negligence case. 108 
A final question concerns the conceptual justification for the 
Busch exception. The exception is subject to question for a variety 
of reasons, including the weakness of the historical antecedents 
supporting the exception and the policies supporting the excep-
tion. 
The exception is based in part on analogies to strict tort liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities and dangerous animals,109 as 
106. One possibility is that of an inconsistent verdict, in which a jury might find negli-
gence, but not strict liability. q. ld. at 38-49. 
It could be argued that even though the defenses to strict tort liability and negligence 
are distinct, only the strict defenses should be submitted to a jury, even if a jury is in-
structed on both negligence and strict liability theories. Because the strict tort defense 
position is more favorable to the plaintiff than the negligence defense position, the findings 
on the strict tort defenses would necessarily control. This would not cure the problem, 
however, when the jury arrives at an inconsistent verdict by finding a defendant negligent 
but not strictly liable. 
107. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 102. 
108. See ld. 
109. Professor Prosser justified the strict liability position on defenses as follows: 
It frequently is said that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a 
defense in cases of strict liability. This involves the seemingly illogical position 
that the fault of the plaintiff will relieve the defendant of liability when he is 
negligent, but not when he is innocent. The explanation must lie in part in the 
element of wilful creation of an unreasonable risk to others by abnormal conduct 
which is inherent in most of the strict liability cases; and in part in the policy 
which places the absolute responsibility for preventing the harm upon the de-
fendant, whether his conduct is regarded as fundamentally anti-social, or he is 
considered merely to be in a better position to transfer the loss to the community. 
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 79, at 522 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes 
omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 515, Comment b, § 524, Comment a 
(1977). 
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well as warranty law. 110 The analogy to abnormally dangerous 
activities and animals seems particularly inappropriate given the 
justification for the elimination of the defense of ordinary contrib-
utory negligence (failing to discover the defect) in those contexts. 
Based at least in part upon the presumption that an individual 
who is subjected to a risk of injury from an unusual or highly dan-
gerous activity or vicious animal should not have to bear the con-
sequences of failing to discover that risk, it is arguably fair to place 
the burden of the unexpected on the defendant who engages in 
that activity or harbors the animal. III The risks created by prod-
uct distributors, while not insubstantial, hardly seem to be in the 
same category with the activities such as blasting. In addition, the 
direct contact the consumer or user has with the product provides 
him with a better means of self protection than an individual sub-
jected to a risk of injury from an abnormally dangerous activity. 
The analogies to warranty law, while appropriate, raise the 
question whether the initial justification for refusing to consider 
ordinary contributory negligence has been overextended. Formu-
lation of the exception in cases involving the sale of food and drink 
may have been justifiable, given the expectation of the consumer 
that such products would be safe for consumption without exami-
nation. 112 Application of the exception to all products liability 
cases extends the justifiable reliance concept to situations in which 
it is not warranted. The basis for extending the exception, that 
consumers and users of products are less likely to be able to cope 
with increasingly sophisticated products,113 does not satisfactorily 
explain why consumers and users should not bear the burden of 
discovering product hazards that, with the exercise of reasonable 
care, would be discoverable. 
In effect, the argument in favor of excepting ordinary contribu-
tory negligence as a defense rests upon the inconsistency that 
would be involved in first finding a product defective because it 
failed to protect against user inadvertence, yet allowing the de-
110. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Cliade/ (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE 
L.J. 1099, 1147-48 (1960); Prosser, supra note 35, at 838-40. 
Ill. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § SIS, Comment a, § 524, Comment a 
(1977); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,542-43 (1972). 
112. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 92-93. 
113. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977). The excep-
tion seems to flow logically from the policies justifying the adoption of strict tort liability 
in Minnesota. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154 N.W.2d 488, 
500 (1967). 
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fendant to use that inadvertence as a defense. Allowing such a 
defense would arguably dilute the manufacturer's duty.114 
In a jurisdiction in which the plaintiff wins all or nothing, the 
argument carries greater weight than in a comparative fault juris-
diction. Once a comparative fault mechanism exists, however, it is 
no longer necessary to separate plaintiff misconduct into discrete 
categories. Because of comparative fault, responsibility can be 
shared, without the danger that a manufacturer will consistently 
avoid liability through use of the complete defense of contributory 
negligence. 
Although the Busch exception could have been drawn more nar-
rowly,115 it is questionable, given the general unpredictability of 
114. Su Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 891 (Alaska 1979); Suter v. San 
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., - N.]. -, -, 406 A.2d 140, 148 (1979). 
115. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach Co., - N.J. -, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, in the context of an industrial accident, held the New Jersey 
Comparative Negligence Act applicable to strict liability actions. Id. at -, 406 A.2d at 
147. However, the court limited its application to contributory negligence that constitutes 
assumption of the risk as defined in Comment n to the R~statmlmt. 
Even assumption of the risk may be limited, depending on the circumstances. The 
Suter plaintiff was injured when he inadvertently tripped the gear lever of a metal rolling 
machine while he was attempting to remove a piece of slag from the machine. Suter had 
purchased the machine for his company and had operated it numerous times over a period 
of eight years. He was familiar with the operation of the machine and knew that pushing 
the lever would activate the rollers. In spite of this knowledge, the court held that his 
conduct would not constitute assumption of the risk: 
The imposition of a duty on the manufacturer to make the machine safe to 
operate whether by installing a guard or. . . by making it inoperable without a 
guard, means that the law does not accept the employee's ability to take care of 
himself as an adequate safeguard of interests which society seeks to protect. The 
policy justification for B~xiga [referring to Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.]. 
402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972)] is sound. We see no reason to depart from Bexiga's 
elimination of contributory negligence where an employee is injured due to a 
defect (whether design or otherwise) in an industrial accident while using a 
machine for its intended or foreseeable purposes. The defendant manufacturer 
should not be permitted to escape from the breach of its duty to an employee 
while carrying out his assigned task under these circumstances when observance 
of that duty would have prevented the very accident which occurred. 
- N.]. at -, 406 A.2d at 148 (footnote omitted). 
In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), a case arising out of 
the death of the decedent due to the lack of a roll-over protective shield on a front-end 
loader manufactured by defendant, the court held as follows: 
We do not believe that a consumer who uses a product as it was intended to 
be used, and who knows or should know of the lack of a safety device, can be 
deemed to have misused the product within the meaning of Butaud II. If the jury 
finds that a product is defective by virtue of its lack of a safety feature, plaintiff's 
failure to install such a device will not reduce his recovery based upon his mere 
knowledge of the inadequate safety features on the product. 
Id. at 890-91. The court used the following reasoning to justify its decision: 
First, the general policy of strict liability demands that responsibility for placing 
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comparative fault determinations, whether any additional deter-
rence will be achieved or that a manufacturer's duty will be di-
luted if ordinary contributory negligence becomes a legitimate 
defense matter. The problems involved in identifying ordinary 
contributory negligence and isolating it in any meaningful way 
from other plaintiff misconduct heightens the unpredictability of 
products liability law. In addition, given the difficulties that will 
arise in attempting to classify plaintiff misconduct, it is questiona-
ble whether any determination that plaintiff misconduct consti-
tutes ordinary contributory negligence or some other type of 
misconduct is likely to lead to an increase in product safety. 116 
When the exception is applied, the result may be deemed to be 
substantially unfair from the manufacturer's perspective. In a case 
such as Paries, the jury's apportionment of forty-nine percent of the 
negligence to the plaintiff is an obvious indication of disapproval 
of the plaintiff's conduct in that case. Application of the Busch 
exception would erase that determination, allowing the plaintiff to 
recover 100% of his damages. In terms of the desirabilty of com-
pensating a seriously injured individual, the result is perhaps justi-
fiable, but the law of products liability has not yet moved to the 
point in which the fact of injury is sufficient to jusify compensa-
tion. 
Finally, the very inability to logically limit the Busch exception 
to strict liability claims in the products liability context subjects 
the exception to question. There seems to be no discrete justifica-
tion for confining the exception to strict products liability 
the defective product on the market should not be shifted to those in no position 
to realistically assess the danger. If the focus is on the nature of the product as 
defective, and the jury has found the lack of safety device to render the product 
defective, it is inconsistent to turn around and reduce the user's recovery merely 
because he bought and used the product as marketed. . . . Second, accidents 
are inevitable costs, and it is better to place the burden of such costs on the party 
best able to spread the losses. Third, the public interest in reducing the level of 
accidents makes it reasonable to put the cost burden on the party best able to 
prevent accidents. 
Id. at 891 (citation omitted). 
Bed differs from Suter in that secondary assumption of the risk as defined by the 
Restatemmt would be a defense. Both decisions have in common, however, a limitation on 
the range of defenses available in a strict tort action. Both suggest that it is inconsistent to 
hold a manufacturer liable for failing to incorporate a safety device, yet allow the manu-
facturer to use the very conduct that it should have anticipated as an affirmative defense. 
The cases suggest one potential application of the Busch exception. 
116. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736-37,575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978); Epstein, supra note 35, at 106. 
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claims. 117 Once it is recognized that there is no logical limitation 
on the exception, however, the weaknesses of the underpinnings of 
the exception are exposed. 
In summary, assuming the continued existence of the Busch ex-
ception, it will be critical to determine whether it applies to negli-
gence claims as well as to claims based on strict liability theory. 
Resolution of these scope problems will determine the proper 
reach of the exception, but problems involved in its application 
will not be resolved. The price of the Busch exception is the result-
ing difficulty of application, even given a clear definition of the 
standard by which the trier of fact must decide whether the plain-
tiff's conduct consists of a negligent failure to discover a product 
defect or something more. 
As a final matter, it should be noted that the life of the Busch 
exceptions depends on the 'position the supreme court takes on the 
retroactivity of its decision. I 18 If Busch is prospective only, then it 
will be applicable only to causes of action arising after December 
9, 1977, the date of decision, but before April 15, 1978,119 the effec-
tive date of the comparative fault act, which overrides the Busch 
exception. 
e. A Suggested Jury Instruction 
A proposed jury instruction recognizing the merger of contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse, and including the 
Busch exception is as follows: 
The defendant has raised the defense· of contributory fault. 
Fault consists of a failure on the part of the plaintiff to exercise 
117. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 102. 
118. It is not clear what position the court will take on the retroactivity of Busch. In 
Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1980), discussed in note 102 supra, 
the supreme court seemed to assume the applicability of Busch to a cause of action that 
arose prior to Busch. Assuming this to be the case, a curious result arises. Assumption of 
the risk, which would have been a complete defense to a negligence action in this case, 
because the cause of action arose prior to the court's decision in Springrose v. Willmore, 
292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971), would not be a complete defense to the strict 
liability claim, because of the merger of contributory negligence and assumption of the 
risk accomplished in Busch. The odd result is that in cases arising before Springrose, as-
sumption of the risk would be a complete defense to negligence actions, but not to strict 
liability actions arising before Spnngrose and coming to trial after Busch. See Note, supra 
note 7, at 198 n.99. 
Curious as the result might be, the retroactivity problem should not be aggravated by 
making Busch prospective only. To insure future consistency in the law, Busch should be 
applied to all cases coming to trial after the date of decision in that case. 
119. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 11, 1978 Minn. Laws 836,842. 
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reasonable care for his own safety. You are to determine 
whether under all the circumstances, the plaintiff exercised rea-
sonable care for his own safety. In order to find the plaintiff to 
be at fault, you must find that the plaintiffs fault was a direct 
cause of his injuries. 
You are instructed that you may not take into consideration 
the fault of the plaintiff if it consists of a failure to discover the 
defect or an unreasonable failure to guard against its existence. 
To find the plaintiff at fault you must find that his fault went 
beyond a failure to discover the defect or an unreasonable fail-
ure to guard against its existence. 
The instruction appropriately simplifies what could otherwise 
be a confusing inquiry if specific instructions were given covering 
each potential type of plaintiff misconduct. 120 The instruction al-
lows for a full consideration of the contributory fault of the plain-
tiff yet makes it clear that contributory fault consisting of a failure 
to discover a defect may not be considered. Finally, because the 
instruction is consistent with negligence defenses and the Busch ex-
ception, no differentiation between strict tort and negligence de-
fenses need be made in cases in which the plaintiff relies upon both 
theories. 121 
120. One suggested special verdict form would separate the defenses into a number of 
categories: 
Was the plaintiff negligent with respect to his own safety with respect to: 
(a) Using the product despite full knowledge of its condition? 
ANSWER ----
(b) Failure to discover "a condition rendering the product unsafe? 
ANSWER ___ _ 
(c) Using the product in the manner or for a purpose other than it was 
intended to be used? 
ANSWER ___ _ 
(d) Abuse of the product? 
ANSWER ----
(e) Alteration of the product? 
ANSWER ----
(I) 
Kir~her, The Impact of Comparatille Negligence on Products Liabilz?J', app. A, at 55, in PROD-
ucrs LIABILITY ... COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (Minn. Continuing Legal Education 
1970). Following these questions, the illustrative special verdict form asked other ques-
tions regarding the causation of plaintiff's negligence, again separating plaintiff miscon-
duct into the same categories. See id. 
121. In Busch a single theory of recovery, strict liability, was submitted to the jury. See 
262 N.W.2d at 384. Ifboth negligence and strict liability theories are submitted, attempts 
to distinguish between defenses are likely to lead to confusion. For an attempt to explain 
how this confusion might 'be avoided, see Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 
811-12,395 A.2d 843, 849 (1978). 
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2. The Method oJ Loss Allocation 
Merging strict tort defenses and making those defenses consis-
tent with the treatment of negligence defenses will resolve some of 
the problems of interpretation that might be created by Busch. 
One problem remains: that of determining the method of loss allo-
cation. 
Unlike the situation in negligence cases, in which the common 
denominator for comparison is the negligent conduct of the plain-
tiff and defendant, application of the comparative negligence stat-
ute to claims based on strict liability alters the comparison, in 
effect requiring plaintiff negligence to be compared to defendant 
strict liability. The question of whether comparative negligence 
principles should be applied in strict liability cases has generated 
substantial controversy.122 Much discussion of the question is de-
voted to an analysis of the difficulties involved in making such a 
comparison, or, if the application of comparative negligence prin-
ciples is accepted, what the best method of loss allocation is. 123 
Two related policy goals operate as a framework for determin-
ing the most appropriate method of loss allocation: the conceptual 
means of resolving the "apples and oranges" problem of compar-
ing incomparables,124 and developing the clearest method of sub-
mitting the complicated apportionment question to a jury. 125 To 
this might be added a third factor, the need for adopting an ap-
proach that will encompass not only strict tort theory, but negli-
gence as well. 126 
122. Su, e.g., Brewster, Comparatille Negligmce in Strict Liability Cases, 42 j. AIR. L. & 
COM. 107, 109-17 (1976); 'Epstein, Products Liability: Dijenses Based on Plaintijj's Conduct, 
1968 UTAH L. REV. 267, 284; Feinberg, The Applicabzlzty 0/ a Comparatille Negligmce Dijense 
in a Strict Products Liabzlzty Suit Based on Section 102A 0/ the Restatemmt 0/ Torts 2d, 42 INS. 
COUNSEL]' 39,52 (1975); Fischer, Products Liabzlzty-Applicabzlzty o/Comparatille Negligence, 
43 Mo. L. REV. 431 (1978); Levine, BU)'er's Conduct as A..Iftcting the Extmt 0/ Manufacturer's 
Liabzlzty in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 662-63 (1968); Levine, Stnet Products Liabilzty 
and Comparatille Negligmce: The Collision 0/ Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 
346-51 (1977); Noel, Dijectille Products: Abnonnal Use, Contnoutory Negligmce, and Assumption 0/ 
Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 117-18 (1972); Schwartz, Stnet Liabzlzty and Comparatille Negli-
gmce, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171, 179-81 (1974); Twerski, The Use and Abuse 0/ Comparatzve 
Negligmce in Products Liabzlzty, 10 IND. L. REV. 797 (1977); Wade, supra note 44. 
123. Some authors have had difficulty with the application of comparative principles 
to strict tort claims. Su, e.g., Fischer, supra note 122, at 443. Others have recognized the 
dilemma but assumed that the comparison problems should be ignored. See, e.g., Twerski, 
supra note 122, at 805-06. 
124. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 443-44; Wade, supra note 44, at 376-79. 
125. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 443-44. 
126. Cf. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 811-12, 395 A.2d 843, 849 
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There are three major approaches to the allocation of loss in 
strict liability cases under comparative type statutes: 127 the com-
parative cause approach,128 the comparative fault approach,129 
and what might be termed the equitable reduction aproach. 130 
The first compares the relative contributions, in a causal sense, of 
the parties to the litigation. The second compares the plaintiffs 
fault to the defendant's. The third attempts to avoid the problem 
involved in comparing incomparable conduct by ignoring the 
comparison process and, focusing solely on the plaintiffs miscon-
duct, reducing the plaintiffs recovery according to the jury's per-
ception of the degree to which the plaintiffs misconduct 
contributed to his injuries. A closer examination of these ap-
proaches, and some of the criticisms directed toward them, raises a 
(1978) (indicating the problems involved when both strict liability and negligence theories 
are used). 
127. The Draft Uniform Product Liability Law contained a comparative fault provi-
sion, but it did not consider" 'the extent of the causal relationship between the conduct 
and the damages claimed' ... in apportioning responsibility." U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE DRAfT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § Ill, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. 
Reg. 2995, 3011 (1979). Su generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE MODEL UNIFORM PROD-
UCT LIABILITY ACT §§ 100-122, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-50 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as MODEL ACT] (successor to Draft Uniform Product Liability Law). This position 
was presumably based upon a reaction to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which 
considers both fault and causation in apportioning responsibility. See UNIFORM COMPAR-
ATIVE FAULT ACT § l(a). The apparent problem was based upon a perception that cause-
in-fact would be apportioned. Su Twerski & Weinstein, A Cniique of the Unifonn Product 
Liabtlity Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221,247-48 (1978-1979). 
The Model Act considers both fault and causation, following the approach of the 
Uniform Comparative Fault Act: "In determining the percentages of responsibility, the 
trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis, both the nature of the conduct of each 
person or entity responsible and the extent of the proximate causal relation between the 
conduct and the damages claimed." MODEL ACT § III (B)(3), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 
62,735. 
Following the adoption of the Law Reform Act of 1945, which adopted comparative 
negligence, the English courts promptly recognized the need for considering both fault 
and causation in determining how much a plaintifrs damages should be reduced. See R. 
DIAS & B. MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH LAw OF TORTS 241 (1976); P. JAMES, GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORTS 199-200 (3d ed. 1969). 
128. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. 
Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law); Jensvold, A Modem Approach to Loss Allocation Among 
Tortftasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 725 (1974). 
129. Su Wade, supra note 44, at 376-81. 
130. Su Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 
1139 (9th Cir. 1977) (recovery reduced in proportion to plaintifrs contribution to loss); 
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45-47 (Alaska 1976) 
(same), modifod, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Daly v. 
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 
(1978) (court uses term "equitable apportionment or allocation of loss"); Fischer, supra 
note 122, at 449. 
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question of whether there is, in theory or practice, any significant 
distinction among the approaches. 
The comparative cause approach has been criticized for a vari-
ety of reasons. The arguments against comparative cause seem to 
be predicated on the irrationality and inaccuracy of the compari-
son that comparative cause requires. Because it does not take into 
consideration all of the causes of a particular accident, it is argued, 
any allocation of cause will necessarily be distorted because it will 
take into consideration only the contributions of the parties to the 
lawsuit. 131 Comparative cause has also been criticized because it 
does not focus on any particular causal element that would pro-
vide a valid basis for comparison. 132 
Comparative causation, however, requires more than a compari-
son of causation in the abstract. In Sun Valley Al'rlines~ Inc. lJ. AlJco-
Lycoming Corp.,133 which has been cited as adopting a comparative 
cause approach, the United States District Court for the District of 
Idaho evaluated the comparison process as follows: "Upon a find-
ing of blameworthy conduct, the jury in this case was asked, con-
sistent with Idaho law, to assign a percentage to the causative 
conduct of the parties to this lawsuit. "134 In an explanatory foot-
note, the court made the following statement: 
Once culpability, blameworthiness or some form of fault is 
determined by the trier of fact to have occurred, then the labels 
denoting the "quality" of the act or omission, whether it be 
strict liability, negligence, negligence per se, etc., becomes un-
important. Thus, the underlying issue in each case is to analyze 
and compare the causal conduct of each party, regardless of its 
label. 135 
Taken in context, the Sun Valley Air/ines~ Inc. court was concerned 
about the difficulty in comparing different types of misconduct of 
a plaintiff and a defendant. To avoid the conceptual problems in 
the comparison, the court adopted a comparative cause approach. 
This does not mean that fault is ignored or that the conduct of a 
party giving rise to that fault is irrelevant. The court's statement 
means that the labels are unimportant once a fault basis of liabil-
ity is established for a plaintiff and a defendant. 
Recognizing the nature of the comparison advocated by the Sun 
131. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 444-47. 
132. Su id. 
133. 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) .. 
134. '!d. at 603. 
135. Id. at 603 n.5. 
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Vaffry Azdznes) Inc. court may resolve part of the criticism of com-
parative causation since cause in the abstract is not being com-
pared; the comparison is between causally related conduct. 136 
Other criticisms remain, however. Even assuming that causal con-
duct is being compared, the approach has been criticized because 
the wide-open inquiry engendered by comparative conduct bears 
no relationship to the policies strict liability is meant to serve. 137 
The comparative fault approach attempts to avoid the compari-
son of conduct or cause problem by recognizing that fault is being 
compared. Professor Wade, in justifying the comparative fault ap-
proach adopted in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, has ar-
gued that the sale of a defective product, like breach of a statute, 
constitutes a kind of fault. In his opinion, the closeness of the rela-
tionship to negligence per se, which is apportionable under a com-
parative negligence statute points up the lack of distinction 
between comparative fault and comparative negligence, and the 
ability of a fact finder to apportion such conduct. 138 
Because marketing a defective product is conduct that can prop-
136. q: Fischer, supra note 122, at 446 (criticizing comparative causation because 
there is no relationship between physical causation and personal culpability). 
137. The argument is based on the assumption that if conduct other than negligence is 
considered, the amount of the loss a defendant is required to bear will not be rationally 
related to his fault, thereby undermining the risk spreading and deterrence functions or 
making them more difficult to achieve. It also raises the question whether or not non-
negligent conduct of the plaintiff should be considered. See id. at 446-47. 
138. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, Comment; Wade, supra note 44, at 
377-78. The discussion of the application of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act to strict 
liability claims is instructive in indicating the difficulty some of the Commissioners had 
with the concept. The following exchange between Professors Wade and Dickerson from 
the transcript of the proceedings of the Committee of the Whole is instructive: 
Mr. Dickerson: I wonder if the chair would indulge me by allowing me to 
refer briefly to subsection (b). 
Now, you may have answered this question in connection with Section 1, 
and in that regard I apologize for missing that discussion. But what I'm wonder-
ing about is how you determine percentages of fault, which suggests to me de-
grees of fault in a case where the fault does not involve any sort of culpability, 
but consists of strict liability. 
Now, we have been speaking, I think, most of the time about fault in its 
conventional sense of culpability, and we can compare the carelessness of the 
plaintiff with the defendant's, but suppose one of them has done nothing that 
would subject him to any possible criticism, but nevertheless he is liable under 
some such doctrine as negligence per se, or noncompliance with a warranty of 
wholesomeness or merchantability. 
Now, I have difficulty comparing greater or lesser; let's say, a plaintiff is 
grossly negligent, but the only thing you can say about the defendant is that he is 
liable otherwise because he violated a food statute not requiring mens rea, where 
no one could possibly criticize him or criticize any employee. 
In other words, how do you compare heavy carelessness on the part of the 
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erly be labeled fault, it is conduct that can be considered in mak-
ing the fault apportionment. Factors such as the degree of danger 
presented by the product and the likelihood that it will cause in-
jury will be relevant in making the apportionment of fault. 139 The 
conduct of a manufacturer leading up to the marketing of a prod-
uct would also be relevant in Wade's analysis. 140 In developing 
plaintiff with an either lor situation of a defendant, who either is strictly liable or 
isn't? There can't be degrees of strict liability, can there? 
Mr. Wade: There is some logical difficulty here, but the fact of the matter is 
that in many states today this is being done. It is being done, for example, in 
Wisconsin, which has more experience than most states in this regard, and it has 
not given trouble in connection with the actions of the jury. 
In a measure, saying that this is strict liability really doesn't eliminate the 
aspect of fault, because what is happening is that the manufacturer is putting 
out on the market an article which is unreasonably dangerous, which will be 
dangerous to a good number of people. And when that comes to the jury for its 
consideration, the experience in three or four states that have had this is that it 
can be handled, and is handled properly, by the jury. 
The only state I think of right off that has disagreed with this is Colorado, 
and Colorado has said that their Comparative Fault Act will not apply to strict 
liability. It is a decision of the Court of Appeals, rather than the Supreme Court. 
Mr. Dickerson: What kind of a percentage can you put on strict liability? 
Do you make it 25%, or can you go all the way and make it 50%, is it automati-
cally 50, or what? 
Mr. Wade: It is not automatically 50. It is appropriate to consider how 
dangerous this thing is, how many people would be jeopardized, matters of that 
sort. And the juries have been able to work it out. 
Mr. J;>ickerson: I don't want to press on this too far, but I am mystified, 
because it goes not only to the quality of the product which you referred to, but 
the quality of the conduct, and I can't see how, if they are doing it, it would 
remain a mystery to me how you can make a comparison there. 
Now, it's interesting to know that it's being done, but can you give any 
understandable explanation of how you can do it, how you can instruct the jury 
on it? 
Mr. Wade: What we are doing is speaking of the conduct of the manufac-
turer-
Mr. Dickerson: Right. 
Mr. Wade: [Continuing] ... in putting this on the market, when it is in 
this unreasonably dangerous condition. So it's conduct against conduct. 
Mr. Dickerson: Well, there's no way-
Mr. Wade: One other thing I would like to say in this connection-
Mr. Dickerson: I'll stop now, but I think the Conference ought to know that 
this Act stretches-and it's all right; I won't quarrel with that-the concept of 
fault into the area which we associate with a lack of fault. And I think we have 
to take account of the fact that this is going to be applied in the more difficult 
cases, where you don't have these much easier chances to make nice horseback 
distinctions about degrees of carelessness. 
Uniform Comparative Fault Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Law, Proceedings in Committee of the Whole 66-69 (Aug. 3-4, 1977). 
139. &~ UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, Comment; Wade, supra note 44, at 
378. 
140. According to Professor Wade: 
On the matter of inspecting the products as they come off the assembly line, for 
example, even though a system of spot-checking may be regarded as sufficiently 
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guidelines for analyzing the defendant's conduct, the same stan-
dards used to determine whether a product is defective would be 
relevant. 141 
The comparative fault approach differs little, if at all, from the 
comparative cause or conduct approach. Comparative fault may 
facilitate the avoidance of the theoretical criticisms of the applica-
tion of comparative principles to strict liability cases by establish-
ing that it is really fault that is being compared. But comparative 
fault is still subject to the same criticisms as the comparative con-
duct approach. 142 
Some courts have suggested that the best approach to allocation 
is to ignore the comparison problem and focus on the plaintiff's 
misconduct, asking a jury to determine how much the plaintiff 
contributed to his own injury. This is the equitable reduction 
method. The Ninth Circuit decision in Pan-Alaslca Fisheries) Inc. lJ. 
Marine Construction & Design Co. 143 is illustrative. 
[W]hether we use the term comparative fault, contributory 
negligence, comparative causation, or even comparative blame-
worthiness, we are merely beating around the seman tical bush 
seeking to achieve an equitable method of allocating the re-
sponsibility for an injury or loss. It comes down to this: the 
defendant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defec-
tive product, except that the award of damages shall be re-
duced in proportion to the plaintiffs contribution to his own 
loss or injury}44 
This approach presumably avoids the comparison problem be-
cause the focus is on the plaintiff's misconduct measured against 
the objective reasonable prudent person standard, without requir-
ing a comparison of that conduct to a defendant's conduct. 145 
The equitable reduction method at first glance appears to avoid 
the comparison problem. In reality, however, it is difficult to un-
derstand how a jury will be able to decide how much the plaintiff's 
thorough to keep the manufacturing process from being characterized as negli-
gent, if the particular product was dangerously defective, the nature of the spot-
checking would still be relevant in determining the respective percentages of 
fault. 
Wade, supra note 44, at 378. 
141. s.-~ Steenson, supra note 82, at 28 n.131. 
142. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 444-45. 
143. 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A and comparative fault in the context of an admiralty claim). 
144. Id. at 1139. 
145. Su Fischer, supra note 122, at 449. 
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recovery should be reduced without taking into consideration the 
conduct of the other parties involved in the lawsuit. Invariably, a 
jury would be prompted to think that the more egregious a de-
fendant's conduct, the less a plaintiffs recovery should be reduced. 
If the equitable reduction method prohibits taking a defendant's 
misconduct into consideration it takes from a jury a means of plac-
ing the plaintiff's misconduct in the proper context. If the defend-
ant's misconduct is considered, the equitable reduction method is 
a comparative conduct or fault approach without labeling it as 
such. 
Designed to avoid the comparison problem when strict tort lia-
bility is involved, the equitable reduction method has the disad-
vantage of failing to take into account a defendant's negligence or 
strict liability.146 This creates a potential problem if two distinct 
methods of loss allocation are adopted in cases in which a plaintiff 
relies on both negligence and strict liability theories. The poten-
tial for confusion should be apparent. 147 
Overall, one has difficulty in escaping the conclusion that 
whatever method is chosen the differences between the approaches 
are insubstantial, both in the nature of the comparison that must 
be made and in the clarity of the approaches. The real advantage 
of the comparative fault or conduct approaches, in relationship to 
the equitable reduction method, is that the former approaches are 
broad enough to encompass other theories of liability, including 
negligence, so that consistency may be achieved in the method of 
loss allocation irrespective of the plaintiff's theory of recovery. 
In Busch the court used varying terms, such as "comparative 
cause" and "comparative fault" to describe the loss allocation 
process. 148 In fact, there seem to be no significant distinctions 
flowing from the use of those terms as they are used in the court's 
opInIOn. 
146. It seems clear that the equitable reduction method is designed to overcome the 
problem of lack of a basis for comparing plaintiff negligence with strict liability. &.r id. 
147. &.r Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 811-12, 395 A.2d 843, 849 
(1978). Given the fact that negligence is ordinarily pleaded along with strict liability, 
there would be difficulty in instructing a jury on separate standards for loss allocation as 
to each of the theories. Because of the continued and justifiable use of negligence theory 
along with strict liability theory, and because of the impact a finding of negligence will 
have on loss al!ocation, s.r.r Owen, Th.r High(y Blam.rworthy A-Ianzifacturn-: Implications on Rul.rs 
if Liability and D¢ns.r in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769, 788-89 (1977), the 
assumption should not be made in considering methods ofloss allocation that cases will be 
decided solely on a strict liability basis. 
148. &.r 262 N.W.2d at 393-94. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 278 1980
278 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
In discussing loss allocation, the court first made reference to a 
law review article advocating the use of comparative principles in 
allocating loss: "[T]he comparative negligence statute becomes 
more than a comparative negligence or even a comparative .fault 
statute; it becomes a comparative cause statute under which all in-
dependent and concurrent causes of an accident may be appor-
tioned on a percentage basis."149 Although the portion of the 
Article cited by the court seems to indicate that something more 
than fault is being compared, the analysis in that Article is consis-
tent with the comparative fault approach suggested by Professor 
Wade. 150 The only difference is that conduct that Wade would 
label "fault" is called "faultless· conduct" by the Article's au-
thor. 151 
Further indications that causal fault is being compared are 
found in the Busch court's reference to Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. ll. 
149. Id. at 394 (quoting Jensvold, supra note 128, at 725). 
150. The rule advocated by Jensvold was intended to apply specifically to determine 
loss allocation among multiple defendants, although the suggested standards could be 
used just as easily as guidelines for determining how loss should be allocated between a 
plaintiff and defendant. 
The rule advocated by Jensvold is as follows: 
One held liable for personal injury resulting from a defective product manu-
factured or sold by him in the ordinary course of business may not recover in-
demnity from anyone if: 
(a) he was negligent with respect to the product, breached an express 
warranty or misrepresented, intentionally or innocently, the product and 
such conduct was a direct cause of the injury; or, 
(b) his independent conduct with respect to the product, apart from 
any conduct directly related to the defect itself, was a direct cause of the 
injury. 
A party so denied indemnity may recover contribution from all other per-
sons legal(y responsible for the injury, contributions to awards being in proportion 
to the percentage of causal conduct attributable to each such person responsible. 
Jensvold, supra note 128, at 741 (emphasis in original). In making the determination 
whether a party's "independent conduct" is a direct cause of the injury suffered by the 
plaintiff, Jensvold suggests the following criteria would be relevant: 
(a) the extent to which conduct of a defendant induced the plaintiff to purchase 
the product which caused his injury; (b) the extent to which the conduct of the 
defendant was motivated by a justifiable reliance upon the proper conduct of 
others; (c) the economic gain derived by each defendant as a result of his conduct 
in comparison to such gains derived by other defendants; and (d) the likelihood 
of the accident not happening at all in the absence of the defendant's conduct. 
Id. at 742. Of these factors, the first and second seem clearly to be "fault" criteria. See 
Wade, supra note 44, at 377-78. The fourth factor makes it clear that causation is re-
quired. The only potential distinction is in the third factor, requiring a consideration of 
the economic gain derived by each defendant from the sale of the product. Any considera-
tion of economic gain would seem to inject a largely collateral issue into the lawsuit, a 
factor that has a significant possibility for improperly influencing a jury's verdict. 
151. See Jensvold, supra note 128, at 741. 
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AlJco-qcoming COrp. 152 and Winge lJ. Minnesota Transfer Raz/way,153 a 
Minnesota Supreme Court case. In Winge the plaintiff was injured 
when the vehicle he was driving collided with a train that had 
come to rest on a grade crossing.154 The plaintiff's contributory 
negligence would have been a complete defense absent a compara-
tive negligence statute because of prior supreme court decisions 
holding that failure to observe a train at a crossing constitutes con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. With the advent of com-
parative negligence, however, the Winge court indicated that the 
plaintiff would be entitled to have his negligence compared with 
the causal negligence of the defendant railroad: 
While the statute speaks of a comparison of negligence, in 
application what is really compared, upon a consideration of 
all relevant facts and circumstances, is the relative contribution 
of each party's negligence to the damage in a causal sense. 
Thus, while cases bearing on the liability issue decided before 
the enactment of § 604.01 may continue to have precedential 
value where the railroad's failure to give statutory warnings is 
not a proximate cause of the collision, recovery is not barred by 
plaintiff's contributory negligence and he is now entitled to 
have such negligence compared with any other causal negli-
gence of defendant railroad. 155 
The emphasis on causally related negligence apparently was made 
to ensure that no misunderstandings would arise over the impact 
of the comparative negligence statute. In cases involving grade 
crossing accidents, the plaintiff would still be required to establish 
that the negligence of the railroad is causally related to the acci-
dent. 156 
It becomes quite clear that the court is not advocating compara-
tive causation in the abstract, but rather is requiring a comparison 
of negligence, emphasizing the need for establishing a causal rela-
tionship between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's in-
jury.157 Thus, both fault and causation must be considered in 
determining liability and in comparing fault. 158 In asking a jury 
152. 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976), ctied in Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 
N.W.2d at 394. 
153. 294 Minn. 399, 201 N.W.2d 259 (1972), ctid in Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 
N.W.2d at 394. 
154. 294 Minn. at 400, 201 N.W.2d at 261. 
155. Id. at 403-04, 201 N.W.2d at 263. 
156. Id. at 404, 201 N.W.2d at 263. 
157. See id. at 405-06, 201 N.W.2d at 264. 
158. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides that "the trier of fact shall con-
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to make a fault determination, the term "fault" should be defined. 
Instructing a jury that "fault" consists of both failure to exercise 
reasonable care (negligence), and placing a defective or unsafe 
product on the market (strict liability), provides a jury with the 
basic factors to consider in making the fault apportionment. At-
tempts to provide further definition of the term involve the same 
problems that exist in attempting to give a jury detailed instruc-
tions to assist them in deciding if a product is defective. 159 An 
instruction that fault consists of placing a defective product on the 
market as well as the negligence if any, surrounding the manufac-
ture and sale of the product, establishes a framework for the fault 
determination, but it does not overload the jury with unquantified 
factors to be considered in making the determination. As is the 
case with the comparative negligence determination, much is left 
to the jury. Use of comparative principles in the strict liability 
context, however, necessitates recognition of the latitude jurors 
will have in apportioning fault according to their subjective judg-
ments. The determination may be neither precise nor predictable, 
but it is the logical outcome of applying comparative fault princi-
ples in strict liability cases. 
C. Warranlj' 
If strict tort instructions are given it should be unnecessary to 
instruct on implied warranty of merchantability. If implied war-
ranty is used as an alternative theory of recovery in cases to which 
strict tort applies, however, the defenses should be the same as the 
defenses to strict liability, a conclusion supported by the supreme 
court's consistent recognition of the common conceptual bases of 
strict tort and implied warranty theories. 1OO 
In Nelson lJ. Anderson, 161 a case involving property damage caused 
by a defective furnace, the Minnesota Supreme Court took the po-
sition that contributory negligence would be a defense to a war-
sider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal 
relation between the conduct and the damages claimed." UNIFORM COMPARATIVE 
FAULT ACT § 2(b). The Comment explains that "[d]egrees of fault and proximity of cau-
sation are inextricably mixed, as a study of last clear chance indicates." Id., Comment. 
159. Su Steenson, supra note 82, at 57 n.218. 
160. See notes 161-81 infta and accompanying text. In Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964), the court stated that the action for breach of 
implied warranty has its roots in tort law, and that contributory negligence is a defense to 
such an action. Id. at 511, 127 N.W.2d at 562. 
161. 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.w.2d 861 (1955). 
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ranty action. The court recognized the conflict in the authorities 
but took the position adopted by New York in Razey lJ. J.B. Colt 
Co. 162 as stating the relevant law for Minnesota. 163 The Razey 
court stated: 
Where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for a breach of a 
general warranty, which are usually the difference between the 
value of the thing as it is in fact and as it was warranted to be, 
the question of negligence does not enter, but where he seeks to 
recover consequential damages he should not be permitted to 
recover for his own negligence. It has frequently been said that 
such damages are recoverable as may reasonably be said to 
have been within the contemplation of the parties. Warranty is 
not insurance, and there is nothing in this contract to indicate 
that either party supposed the defendant was to answer for the 
plaintiff's carelessness. If it is impossible to separate the conse-
quences of the plaintiff's negligence from the consequences of 
the defendant's breach of warranty, then the plaintiff must be 
limited to general damages, for otherwise he is permitted to re-
cover for his own fault. We can discover no reason why he 
should be permitted to recover any damages which his own 
negligence has contributed to produce, and no authority has 
been cited by the respondent in support of such a proposi-
tion. l64 
The Razey court also indicated that the seller would not be liable 
for consequential damages if the buyer continues to use the prod-
uct after he has discovered it is not functioning properly.165 
In Coblzrsch lJ. Western Land Roller CO.,166 the Minnesota court 
held that secondary assumption of the risk, which in a pre-Spnng-
rose case would be a complete defense to a negligence action, was 
also a defense to a breach of implied warranty action. Again em-
phasizing the tort origins of implied warranty, the court concluded 
that the defenses to implied warranty should be the same as the 
defenses to negligence. 167 Because the case arose prior to Spnngrose, 
162. 106 A.D. 103, 94 N.V.S. 59 (1905). 
163. 245 Minn. at 450-51,72 N.W.2d at 865. 
164. 106 A.D. at 106,94 N.V.S. at 61, quot~d in Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. at 451, 
72 N.W.2d at 865. 
165. &~ 245 Minn. at 451, 72 N.W.2d at 865 (citing Razey v. J.B. Colt Co., 106 A.D. 
103, 94 N.V.S. 59 (1905». 
166. 310 Minn. 471, 246 N.W.2d 687 (1976). 
167. &~ id. at 477, 246 N.W.2d at 691 (citing Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 
Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964»; if. Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 451, 72 
N.W.2d 861, 865 (1955) (allowing contributory negligence defense to breach of warranty 
action). 
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the court was not required to decide whether the comparative neg-
ligence statute would be applied to implied warranty claims in 
post-Springrose cases. 
That question was presented in two recent cases, Wenner Y. Gulf 
Oil Corp .168 and Cha{fold Y. Sherwin- Williams Co., 169 but the court 
declined to reach the issue. Wenner involved a claim against a her-
bicide manufacturer based upon damage to a farmer's wheat crop 
caused by application of the herbicide.17° The defendant's re-
quested comparative negligence instruction was denied by the trial 
court. l7l On appeal, following entry of judgment for the plaintiff, 
the supreme court agreed that the evidence supported the defend-
ant's request for an instruction on comparative negligence, but it 
found no error because an instruction less favorable to the plaintiff 
was actually given. 172 The instruction stated that if the plaintiff's 
reliance on Gulf Oil's representations was unreasonable the plain-
tiff would be entitled to no recovery whatsoever. 173 
Cha{fold involved an action by a painter against Sherwin-Wil-
liams for direct and consequential damages caused by the fading 
of paint purchased from Sherwin-Williams and applied by the 
plaintiff on a number of jobs. 174 The trial court gave a compara-
tive fault instruction to the jury. 175 Although the jury found the 
plaintiff to be fifteen percent and the defendant eighty-five percent 
at fault, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff for the 
full amount of direct and consequential damages awarded by the 
jury.176 The supreme court declined to decide whether Busch 
would be applicable to implied warranty actions because the ques-
tion had been raised for the first time on appeal. 177 
The difficulty in continuing the trend toward full assimilation of 
tort defenses in the implied warranty context is a function of the 
type of loss involved in those cases coupled with the lack of statu-
tory authority for applying comparative negligence to such cases. 
Crop losses of the type sustained in Wenner traditionally have been 
168. 264 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1978). 
169. 266 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam). 
170. 264 N.W.2d at 376. 
171. & .. id. at 377. 
172. S .... ld. at 383. 
173. S .... ld. 
174. S .... 266 N.W.2d at 172-73. 
175. S .... ld. at 174. 
176. Id. at 173. 
177. Id. at 176. 
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litigated in Minnesota under implied warranty theory,178 and the 
economic loss sustained in Chaijield would seem clearly to fall 
outside the coverage of strict liability theory as applied in Minne-
sota. 179 
In Busch the supreme court relied on Wisconsin judicial con-
structions of its comparative negligence statute to mold Minne-
sota's comparative negligence statute to strict liability cases, but 
the statute applies only to "damages ... resulting in death or in-
jury to person or property."180 The application of the comparative 
negligence statute to claims involving economic loss does not fit 
within the statute. 
Although the statute does not apply to cases that ordinarily fit 
within the Uniform Commercial Code, the Code seems to provide 
latitude for the adoption of comparative principles to apportion 
loss. 181 The motivation for adopting a comparative negligence 
statute, the desire to avoid the all-or-nothing common-law ap-
proach to defenses, applies equally to cases involving economic 
loss. 
Even if comparative fault is not applied to warranty claims in-
volving economic loss, there should be no impediment to its appli-
cation in cases involving personal injury and property damage 
that traditionally fall within the scope of negligence and strict tort 
liability. The very closeness of negligence, strict liability, and war-
ranty in these cases mandates such a result. 182 
D. Summary 
The defenses to a negligence cause of action were merged in the 
supreme court's decision in Springrose v. Wzllmore .183 Following 
Sprzngrose, the sole issue is whether the plaintiff exercised reason-
178. St-"', .,..g., Kleven v. Geigy Agricultural Chems., 303 Minn. 320, 227 N.W.2d 566 
(1975). 
179. S.,..,. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 90-94, 179 N.W.2d 64, 69-71 
(1970) (discussing distinction between strict liability in tort and breach of express or im-
plied warranty). 
180. Act of May 23,1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069-70 (current ver-
sion at MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978». 
181. Candid recognition of the judicial power to formulate comparative fault in strict 
tort cases should compel the conclusion that comparative principles can readily be applied 
in the economic loss context. S.,..,. Fischer, supra note 122, at 449. 
182. St-.,. Levine, BZ!JIff's Conduct as Ajfocting th.,. Extmt qf Manu.lactum·'s Liabilz?y in War-
ranljl, supra note 122, at 662-63. 
183. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971). 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 284 1980
284 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
able care for his own safety.184 In the strict liability context, de-
fenses have become more complicated. New terminology and 
classification problems have created difficulties that do not exist 
under negligence law. 185 The court's decision in Busch, applying 
the comparative negligence statute to claims based on strict liabil-
ity, should resolve much of the confusion. 
Busch has substantially standardized the defenses in products li-
ability cases. By applying the comparative negligence statute to 
strict liability claims, the treatment of negligence and strict liabil-
ity defenses becomes uniform, with the single exception carved out 
by Busch-negligence consisting of a failure to discover the defect 
or an unreasonable failure to guard against its existence. 
Although the exception is subject to criticism for a variety of 
reasons, and although it will be difficult to administer in practice, 
the exception should be uniformly applied to both negligence and 
strict liability claims to avoid the inconsistencies that will other-
wise occur in consideration of defenses. The defenses to warranty 
actions should also be subject to Busch, at least when the claim is 
for property damage or personal injury. The rationale of the 
court's decisions commencing with Nelson lJ. Anderson 186 seems to 
mandate a tort treatment of warranty defenses in such cases. 
Although the exact method of loss allocation is not as important 
as acceptance of the concept of comparative fault, the fault alloca-
tion procedure adopted in Busch seems to require a comparison of 
conduct labeled as fault. Fault consists of negligence, strict liabil-
ity, and breach of warranty; conduct giving rise to liability under 
any of those theories will be compared to the plaintiff's contribu-
tory fault. 
Fault allocation creates some potential for confusion. Several 
alternatives have been suggested for allocating fault in products 
liability cases,187 but it appears that no matter which method is 
suggested, all methods will invariably involve a comparison of the 
conduct of the involved parties, if that conduct can be labeled 
"fault." "Fault" includes failure to exercise reasonable care as well 
as the conduct of a product seller in placing a defective product on 
the market. 188 
184. Su notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text. 
185. See notes 35-121 supra and accompanying text. 
186. 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955). 
187. Su notes 127-30 supra and accompanying text. 
188. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(b) & Comment. 
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The fault allocation process is not a predictable one, but com-
parative fault should be no more unpredictable or difficult to ad-
minister than the comparative negligence procedure administered 
in Minnesota over the last ten years. 
III. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY 
In addition to the problems in determining how loss will be allo-
cated between a plaintiff and defendant, similar problems arise in 
determining how to allocate loss among multiple defendants. 
Questions concerning contribution or indemnity 189 may arise in 
several contexts. One party in the chain of manufacture and dis-
tribution may seek contribution or indemnity from another party 
in the chain, or a party in the chain may seek contribution from a 
party outside the chain. This may arise when the seller seeks con-
tribution from a product user or consumer whose negligence con-
tributed to the plaintiff's injuries or the claim may arise in the 
context of workplace injuries when the product seller seeks contri-
bution from a negligent employer. 
A. Contrzoution Outside the Chazn 0/ Distrzoutlon 
I. Non- Workplace Injury Contrzoutlon Claims 
Contribution outside the workplace injury context may involve 
claims by product users or consumers who seek contribution from 
a product seller. Conversely, a party in the chain of distribution 
may seek contribution from the user or consumer or other contrib-
uting party. 
In cases involving contribution claims between negligent users 
or consumers, contribution would seem to present no problem. 
The question seems to be more complicated, however, when a 
strictly liable party in the chain seeks contribution from a negli-
gent user or consumer.l90 As a matter of common sense it would 
seem that the result should not differ. If contribution is available 
to a negligent party in the chain it should also be available to a less 
culpable party, one held liable solely on the basis of strict liabil-
ity.191 
189. For an explanation of how the theories of contribution and indemnity operate, see 
Note, supra note I, at 110-18. 
190. See II U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY: FINAL REPORT OF LEGAL STUDY 142-44 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL 
STUDY]. 
191. q: Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 738, 742-43, 575 P.2d 1162, 
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In Busch D. Busch Construction, Inc. ,192 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that contribution would be available to General Mo-
tors Corporation against Lando Busch, the driver of the vehicle, 
even though Busch's liability was predicated on negligence and 
General Motor's on strict liability.193 There was one qualification 
on the right of contribution, however: "[A] user or consumer who 
fails to discover a defect cannot be liable for contribution to a 
strictly liable distributor." 194 Because Lando Busch was a plaintiff 
as well as a codefendant in the suit, the court held that consistency 
dictated that the negligent failure to discover a defect, which was 
not a legitimate defense matter, could not be the basis for the man-
ufacturer's contribution claim. 
Because of the special qualification in Busch, when a contribu-
tion claim is asserted against a product user or consumer, the as-
sumption can be made that Busch would be inapplicable to 
prevent contribution claims asserted against parties other than 
users or consumers. For example, in cases in which an individual's 
intoxication is a contributing factor, a contribution claim against 
the dram shop would lie without the Busch restriction,195 as would 
a contribution claim against a negligent intervening party, such as 
a driver of another involved motor vehicle. 
In addition, although the particular concern of the court in 
Busch was the contribution claim of the manufacturer against the 
product user, contribution would also work against the manufac-
turer. Thus, any party from whom contribution could be claimed 
by a manufacturer should be able to assert a contribution claim 
against the manufacturer. 
1169-70, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,387-88,390 (1978) (merger of strict liability into com-
parative fault obviates absurd result allowing plaintiff who assumed risk to recover under 
negligence theory but not strict liability). 
192. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
193. Su id. at 393-94. 
194. Id. at 394 n.17. 
195. Although comOlon liability will be necessary to support a claim of contribution, 
the basis of liability may differ. Su Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Village of Rose Creek, 302 
Minn. 282, 284-85, 225 N.W.2d 6, 8-9 (1974). Busch was not specifically concerned with 
dram shop claims, but legislative application of comparative negligence to dram shop 
claims, see MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1978), coupled with Busch, should make comparative 
fault principles applicable to contribution claims between dram shops and manufacturers. 
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2. The Workplace l1ljury 
a. The Polif')! 
287 
Until the supreme court's 1977 decision in Lambertson D. Cincinnati 
COrp.,196 the right of a third party to claim contribution from a 
plaintiff's employer was barred because of the lack of common lia-
bility between the employer and the third party, based on the em-
ployer's immunity from suit by an injured employee granted by 
the workers' compensation act. 197 The only remedy available to a 
third party to shift loss to an employer was a limited right to in-
demnity.198 At one point, the Legislature amended the workers' 
compensation act to circumscribe even the right to indemnity,199 
but the supreme court found the amendment unconstitutional. 2oo 
Although the court had questioned the fairness of the no-contribu-
tion rule,201 it remained intact until Lambertson was decided. 
In deciding whether contribution should be allowed, the Lam-
bertson court delineated the conflicting interests involved: 
196. 312 Minn. 114,257 N.w.2d 679 (1977). 
197. The workers' compensation act is the exclusive source of the employee's right to 
recover against his employer. s",t' MINN. STAT. §§ 176.021(1), .031 (1978). Because the 
employer is not liable to the employee in tort there can be no common liability of the 
employer and third party to the employee, thus precluding a contribution claim by the 
third party against the employer. s",t' Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 
Minn. 368, 371-72, 104 N.W.2d 843,847-48 (1960), olJt'TTUled in part on other grounds, Tolbert 
v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977). 
198. s",t' Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91,100,193 N.W.2d 305, 310-11 
(1971) (general contractor held vicariously liable allowed indemnity against subcontrac-
tor); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349,364-65,63 N.W.2d 355, 365 (1954) (automo-
bile owner held liable on basis of financial responsibility act allowed indemnity against 
employer). In Lambertson Cincinnati Corporation sought indemnity from Hutchinson, the 
plaintiff's employer, on the basis that had Hutchinson purchased the safety devices offered 
to it by Cincinnati the accident would have been avoided. The supreme court found 
indemnity to be inappropriate: 
The difficulty with this argument lies in the jury's unchallenged finding that 
Cincinnati was 25-percent negligent in the first instance, when it placed its press 
brake in the stream of commerce without certain kinds of safety devices. Since 
the independent acts of negligent manufacture and sale by Cincinnati and re-
fusal of safety devices by Hutchinson combined to produce plaintiff's injury, lia-
bility should be apportioned between them, not shifted entirely to one or the 
other. 
312 Minn. at 127, 257 N.W.2d at 688. 
Given the fact that active fault will always be involved when a manufacturer places a 
defective product into the stream of commerce, the remedy of indemnity would be partic-
ularly restricted in the products liability context. 
199. s",t' Act of June 4,1969, ch. 936, § 4, 1969 Minn. Laws 1804, 1806 (repealed 1976). 
200. s",t' Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362,369,215 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1974). 
201. s",t' Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 382-83, 201 N.W.2d 
140, 144-45 (1972). 
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If contribution or indemnity is allowed, the employer may be 
forced to pay his employee-through the conduit of the third-
party tort feasor-an amount in excess of his statutory workers' 
compensation liability. This arguably thwarts the central con-
cept behind workers' compensation, i.e., that the employer and 
employee receive the benefits of a guaranteed, fixed-schedule, 
nonfault recovery system, which then constitutes the exclusive 
liability of the employer to his employee. . . . If contribution 
or indemnity is not allowed, a third-party stranger to the work-
ers' compensation system is made to bear the burden of a full 
common-law judgment despite possibly greater fault on the 
part of the employers. This obvious inequity is further ex-
. acerbated by the right of the employer to recover directly or 
indirectly from the third party the amount he has paid in com-
pensation regardless of the employer's own negligence. . . . 
Thus, the third party is forced to subsidize a workers' compen-
sation system in a proportion greater than his own fault and at 
a financial level far in excess of the workers' compensation 
schedule.202 
Stating the varying interests of the parties served to identify the 
problem, but two questions remained: whether contribution 
should be allowed in spite of the commOn liability impediment 
and if so, how much contribution? 
The Lambertson court disposed of the commOn liability impedi-
ment on two bases. The court first noted that although there is no 
common liability between the employer and third party in tort, 
both are responsible for the employee's injuries, the employer 
through the workers' compensation system and the third party 
through the tort system.203 More importantly, relying on the flex-
ibility and equitable nature of the remedy of contribution, the 
court held that contribution "should be utilized to achieve fairness 
on particular facts, unfettered by outworn technical concepts like 
common liability."204 
The court perceived the second problem, deciding just how far 
202. 312 Minn. at 120,257 N.W.2d at 684 (citations omitted). 
203. Id. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688. The court's ready disposition of the common lia-
bility impediment gave rise to speculation that common liability would no longer be an 
impediment to contribution in any case. The court has subsequently made clear, how-
ever, that common liability is still a requirement for contribution. Se~ Conde v. City of 
Spring Lake Park, 290 N.W.2d 164, 165-66 (Minn. 1980); Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 
N.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Minn. 1979), discuss~d in Comment, Intnvmtion,Joind~r, and Issu~ Pr~­
c/usion: A New Look at Tort Claim Procedures, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 361 (1980). Su 
gl!1lnally Note, supra note 1, at 146-49. 
204. 312 Minn. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688. 
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to extend the right of contribution, to be the most difficult. The 
court recognized the superiority of a legislative solution to the 
problem,205 but it nonetheless decided to allow limited contribu-
tion by the third party against the employer: 
. While the opinions of other jurisdictions must be read with 
caution on this issue because of different statutes and concepts 
of recovery in negligence cases, we have found direction in the 
approach taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. That 
court has allowed contribution from the employer up to the 
amount of the workers' compensation benefits. This approach 
allows the third party to obtain limited contribution, but sub-
stantially preserves the employer's interest in not paying more 
than workers' compensation liability. While this approach may 
not allow full contribution recovery to the third party in all 
cases, it is the solution we consider most consistent with fairness 
and the various statutory schemes before US. 206 
Following the decision in Lambertson, a petition for rehearing and 
clarification was filed by one of the defendants. The rehearing was 
denied, leaving open the question of the exact formula for loss ap-
portionment. 
b. The Method oJ Allocation 
Although there a're several potential methods for allocating loss 
among an employer, employee, and third party, the supreme court 
ended speculation on the matter when it decided Johnson lJ. Raske 
Budding Systems, Inc. 207 In Johnson the court established a three-
step procedure for allocating loss. The procedure requires the 
third party to first pay the full amount of the verdict to the plain-
tiff. 208 Second, the employer is required to contribute to the third 
party tort feasor an amount proportionate to its fair share of the 
judgment, as determined by its percentage of negligence, but not 
to exceed its workers' compensation liability.209 Third, the em-
ployee is required to reimburse the employer according to the 
scheme set out in section 176.061, subdivision 6(c) of the Minne-
sota Statutes.210 
205. Id. at 129, 257 N.W.2d at 688. 
206. Id. at 130, 257 N.W.2d at 689 (citations omitted). 
207. 276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979). 
208. Id. at 81. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. It is possible that the employer's reimbursement right could be completely 
avoided in a settlement. In Naig v. Bloomington Sanitation, 258 N.W.2d 891 (Minn. 
1977), the supreme court established that: 
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Because this procedure hinges in large part on the method of 
If an employee settles only those claims not subject to subrogation by the em-
ployer, the employer in no way is prejudiced by the settlement. It possesses not 
only the right to intervene in the employee's suit but also the right to maintain 
actions in its own name to enforce its subrogation rights and recover expenses for 
medical treatment. . . . Crediting part of such a settlement to the employer 
effectively precludes the employee from seeking a settlement of his own claims. 
So long as the employer is notified of negotiations leading to such a settlement so 
that it can appear or intervene to protect its interest and so long as the employee 
demonstrates that the settlement concerns only damages not recoverable under 
workers' compensation, or allocates the settlement into recoverable and 
nonrecoverable claims, the employer cannot credit the nonrecoverable portion of 
the settlement against compensation payments. By pursuing this course, how-
ever, the employee waives his statutory right to one-third of the employer's net 
recovery from the third-party. 
Id. at 894 (footnote and citations omitted); if. Sutley v. North Central Airlines, 30 Minn. 
Workers' Compo Dec. 294 (1978) (employer can settle its claim against third party, avoid-
ing employee's statutory claim). 
If the claim against the third party is settled only for those losses not recoverable in 
workers' compensation, the third party should be unable to claim contribution from the 
employer. Although the employer, if negligent, is responsible in part for causing the inju-
ries giving rise to the claim against the third party, the third party's contribution claim 
exists only to the extent of the employer's workers' compensation liability. If the contribu-
tion claim by the third party is allowed against the employer, the employer, deprived of 
any reimbursement right under section 176.061, subdivision 6, would be held liable for an 
amount far exceeding its workers' compensation liability. Given the evil the supreme 
court wished to avoid in Lamb~rtson, disallowing the contribution claim while allowing a 
negligent employer reimbursement, the contribution remedy should not exist when the 
employer has no reimbursement right in the proceeds of the tort settlement. 
If the claim is settled pursuant to Naig, however, the possibility exists that the em-
ployer will have a separate claim against the third party. Even without the Naig release, 
the employer retains a separate cause of action against the third party for medical ex-
penses paid to the employee. S~~ Travelers Ins. Co. v. Springer, 289 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 
1979) (action created by MINN. STAT. § 176.061(7) (1978)). This right creates the possibil-
ity that the at-fault employer may seek to obtain reimbursement from the at-fault third 
party who would ordinarily have a contribution claim against the employer. There are at 
least two possible solutions to this problem. First, the employer could be allowed reim-
bursement, with the amount reduced by the employer's percentage of negligence. How-
ever, this would allow the employer to be reimbursed in situations in which the third party 
claim, if asserted following the statutory distribution of the proceeds of a tort judgment or 
settlement, would completely avoid the employer's claim for reimbursement. This makes 
the second alternative preferable: the employer should be allowed reimbursement only to 
the extent that the amount of reimbursement would exceed the employer's fair share of 
the judgment as determined by its percentage of negligence. 
The Naig case also raises the possibility that, aside from settlement, the same formula 
could be applied to a judgment, if the special verdict form distinguishes between workers' 
compensation and non-workers' compensation losses. In effect, Naig rewrites the statute 
insofar as the employer's reimbursement right can be avoided by specifying that a settle-
ment is for non-workers' compensation losses. There would seem to be no reason why the 
same could not be done with a judgment. If the special verdict form provides for breaking 
the tort award into losses recoverable and non-recoverable under workers' compensation, 
the statutory method of distribution would be altered. While the exact amount of money 
a'vailable for distribution would depend on how attorney's fees and costs are assessed as to 
each type ofloss, su Bradt, Third Party Actions, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION, SKILLS AND 
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allocating the proceeds of a third party action established in sec-
tion 176.061, subdivision 6,211 that section must be examined 
before the impact of the procedure set out inJohnson can be under-
stood. Both Lambertson andJohnson were decided under a version 
of the workers' compensation statute that did not provide for the 
proportionate sharing of fees and expenses by the employer. In 
1976 the statute was amended to require the employer to share a 
proportionate amount of fees and expenses.212 Once both versions 
are understood, the statute may be integrated with the procedures 
established inJohnson to determine how the contribution claim will 
be enforced and what its impact will be on the rights of the em-
ployer and third party.213 
1. The Pre-/976 Statute 
Prior to the 1976 amendment the statute read as follows: 
The proceeds of all actions for damages or settlement thereof 
under section 176.061, received by the injured employee or his 
dependents or by the employer as provided by subdivision 5, 
shall be divided as follows: 
PRACTICE 74-75 (Minn. Continuing Legal Education 1979), the apportionment could 
have an impact on the third party's claim against the employer. The amount might be 
more or less than if no differentiation between types of losses is made. 
211. MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (1978 & Supp. 1979). 
212. Act of Apr. 3, 1976, ch. 154, § 2, 1976 Minn. Laws 449, 449-50 (current version at 
MINN. STAT. § 176.061 (6) (1978 & Supp. 1979». 
213. A 1979 amendment to the workers' compensation act raises yet further complica-
tions: 
(b) If an employer, being then insured, sustains damages due to a change in 
workers' compensation insurance premiums, whether by a failure to achieve a 
decrease or by a retroactive or prospective increase, as a result of the injury or 
death of his employee which was caused under circumstances which created a 
legal liability for damages on the part of a party other than the employer, the 
employer, notwithstanding other remedies provided, may maintain an action 
against the other party for recovery of such premiums. This cause of action may 
be brought either by joining in an action described in clause (a) or by a separate 
action. Damages recovered under this clause shall be for the benefit of the em-
ployer and the provisions of subdivision 6 shall not be applicable to such dam-
ages. 
MINN. STAT. § 176.061 (5) (b) (Supp. 1979). 
One can only speculate how the employer's right relates to the third party's contribu-
tion claim. If the employer's negligence has contributed to his employee's injuries, along 
with the negligence or fault of the third party, the employer could have a claim for in-
creased premiums against the third party while the third party will have a contribution 
claim against the employer. The only way the two rights could be balanced is to offset the 
amount of the employer's claim from the third party's claim. To the extent that the em-
ployer's claim exceeds the third party's claim, the third party would have an additional 
obligation to pay the employer for the amount the employer's claim exceeds the third 
party's contribution claim. 
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(a) After deducting the reasonable cost of collection, includ-
ing but not limited to attorneys fees and burial expense in ex-
cess of the statutory liability, then 
(b) One-third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to 
the injured employee or his dependents, without being subject 
to any right of subrogation. 
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer shall be re-
imbursed for all compensation paid under Minnesota Statutes, 
Chapter 176. 
(d) Any balance remaining shall be paid to the employee or 
his dependents, and shall be a credit to employer for any com-
pensation which employer is obligated to pay, but has not been 
paid, and for any compensation that such employer shall be 
obligated to make in the future. 214 
The following hypothetical illustrates the operation of the sec-
tion: 
ILLUSTRATION I 
Employee receives $ J 00,000 as the proceeds oj a tort judgment against the 
Third Party. The foes and costs are $1~00o. The Employee has prevz'-
ous(y received $20,000 in workers' compensation benefits. 
The statute requires the following steps: 
a. $100,000 (Proceeds) - $40,000 (Fees and Costs) = $60,000. 
b. One-third (Employee's share) X $60,000 = $20,000. 
c. $40,000 (remainder) is available for reimbursement of the 
employer. Because the employer has paid $20,000 in bene-
fits, it will be reimbursed in full. 
d. The balance remaining, $20,000, is a credit to the employer 
for future compensation benefits. 
The employer would have no additional obligation to pay workers' 
compensation benefits until the credit is exhausted. 
There are situations, however, in which the employer will not be 
fully reimbursed for workers' compensation benefits paid. To il-
lustrate assume the following hypothetical: 
ILLUSTRATION II 
Employee receives $100,000 as the proceeds oj a tort judgment against the 
Thzrd Party. The foes and costs are $1~000. Workers' compensation 
benefits have been paid in the amount oj $6~000. 
The statute would dictate the following distribution: 
a. $100,000 (Proceeds) - $40,000 (Fees and Costs) = $60,000. 
b. One-third (Employee's share) X $60,000 = $20,000. 
214. Act of Apr. 25, 1969, ch. 199, § 2, 1969 Minn. Laws 307, 309 (current version at 
MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6) (1978 & Supp. 1979». 
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c. $40,000, the remainder, is available for reimbursement. 
d. Because the full $40,000 is taken up by the employer's re-
imbursement right, there is no credit. 
The employer has thus paid $60,000 in workers' compensation 
benefits to the employee, but has been reimbursed only in the 
amount of $40,000. 
ll. The Post-/9J6 Statute 
The statute was amended in 1976 to remedy the inequity in-
volved in allowing an employer to be reimbursed for workers' com-
pensation benefits paid without sharing the fees and costs 
expended in obtaining that recovery. The amendment reads as 
follows: 
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer shall be re-
imbursed in an amount equal to all compensation paid under 
chapter 176 to the employee or his dependents by the employer 
less the product of the costs deducted under clause (a) divided 
by the total proceeds received by the employee or his depen-
dents from the other party multiplied by all compensation paid 
by the employer to the employee or his dependents.215 
The statutory formula for sharing fees and expenses is as follows: 
Fees and Costs 
P d X Benefits = Employer's share. rocee s 
As applied to the first illustration, the employer's share of the fees 
and expenses would be $8,000: 
$40,000 (Fees and Costs) X $20000 (W C b fit) = $8000 
$100,000 (Proceeds) ,. . ene s ,. 
With the amendment the statutory apportionment yields a differ-
ent result: 
ILLUSTRATION III 
Employee receives IJO~OOO as the proceeds of a tort judgment agaz1zst the 
Third Party. The foes and costs are 11~00o. The Employee haS previ-
ously received 120,000 in workers' compensation benefits. 
The statute requires the following distribution: 
a. $100,000 (Proceeds) - $40,000 (Fees and Costs) = $60,000. 
b. One-third (Employee's share) X $60,000 = $20,000. 
c. $40,000 remains. Out of this amount the employer is reim-
bursed in an amount equal to its workers' compensation 
benefits paid ($20,000) less its proportionate share of fees 
215. Act of Apr. 3, 1976, ch. 154, § 2, 1976 Minn. Laws 449, 449-50 (current version at 
MINN. STAT .. § 176.061(6)(c) (1978 & Supp. 1979». 
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and costs (forty percent of $20,000 = $8,000). The em-
ployer thus receives $12,000. 
d. $20,000, the balance remaining, constitutes a credit against 
future benefits.216 
Before the amendment, the employer would have been reimbursed 
in full for workers' compensation benefits paid. After the amend-
ment, the right of reimbursement is reduced by the employer's 
proportionate share of fees and expenses. 
ILLUSTRATION IV 
Employee receives $100,000 as the proceeds of a tort judgment against the 
Third Party. The foes and costs are $40,000. Workers' compensation 
benefits have been paid in the amount of $60,000. 
The following distribution would result: 
a. $100,000 (Proceeds) - $40,000 (Fees and Costs) = $60,000. 
b. One-third (Employee's share) X $60,000 = $20,000. 
c. $40,000 remains. Out of this amount the employer is reim-
bursed in an amount equal to either: (1) workers' compen-
sation benefits paid less its proportionate share of fees and 
costs (forty percent of $60,000 = $24,000) or $36,000, or (2) 
the amount remaining for reimbursement, $40,000, less its 
proportionate share of fees and costs based on the amount 
remaining for reimbursement (forty percent of $40,000 = 
$16,000) or $24,000.217 
d. No credit remains. 
216. The employer's share of the fees and costs should not become part of the credit. 
Because the employer is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $20,000, less its pro-
portionate share of fees and costs, making the fees and costs part of the credit would 
enable the employer to avoid its statutory obligation. A contrary position is taken in 
Bradt, supra note 210, at 73. 
217. The illustration establishes two potential ways of computing the employer's obli-
gation to bear a portion of fees and costs. If the employer's obligation to bear a portion of 
the fees and expenses is tied to the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid, irre-
spective of the amount actually available for reimbursement, the net result is that when-
ever the workers' compensation benefits paid exceed the remainder available for 
reimbursement, the employer will be entitled to reimbursement in a greater amount than 
if the employer's obligation were based on the amount left for reimbursement. 
This question arose in a recent workers' compensation court of appeals case, Kealy v. 
St. Paul Hous. & Redev. Auth., No. 475-66-5184 (Minn. Workers' Compo Ct. App. Feb. 
15, 1980). The accident involved took place on December 10, 1976, after the effective date 
of the 1976 amendment to the workers' compensation act providing for the sharing of fees 
and expenses by the employer. The relevant facts upon which the distribution of the 
proceeds of the tort settlement was made were as follows: 
Compensation paid prior to third 
party recovery $30,283.49 
Third party proceeds (settlement) $49,000.00 
Legal costs $16,787.69 
.see iri., slip op. at 2. The statutory method of apportioning the proceeds of the tort settle-
ment yielded the following results: 
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Irrespective of which method of computing the employer's share of 
fees and costs is used, the problem of the employer receiving less 
than the workers' compensation benefits paid is aggravated. 
I. $49,000 (settlement) - $16,787.69 Oegal costs) = $32,212.31 
2. One-third (employee's share) X $32,212.30 = $10,737.44 
3. Remainder = $21,474.87 
S .... id. The principal issue in the case concerned the treatment of attorney's fees and costs. 
If the statute were adhered to strictly, the employer would be entitled to reimbursement in 
the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid ($30,283.49) less its share of the legal 
costs 
( 
$16,787.69 ) 
$ 9 
X $30,283.49 = $10,375.03 . 
4 ,000.00 
The employer would thus be entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $19,908.19, an 
amount close to the amount of the remainder of $21,474.87. See la. Instead of following 
this method, the workers' compensation division made the statutory obligation to bear a 
percentage of the fees and costs turn on the amount available for reimbursement, rather 
than on the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid. The method of computation 
utilized by the Division was as follows: 
I. Legal Costs 
Total Third Party Recovery 
$16,787.69 
$49,000.00 = 34.2606% 
2. $21,474.87 less (34.26% X $21,474.87) = $14,117.58 
The Division then held that the total and maximum reimbursement to the in-
surer was the sum of $14,117.58 and that the insurer would in the future have to 
pay to the employee 100% of the compensation benefits that might be payable in 
the future beyond the $30,283.49 previously paid and utilized in its determina-
tion. Thus, the Division in its computation held that the dollar amount of the 
"balance remaining" less the insurer's proportionate share of attorney's fees was 
a limiting factor or "cap" or a "ceiling" on the dollar amount of "all compensa-
tion paid" in applying paragraph c of Subd. 6. 
Id. (footnote omitted). The court also noted that: 
An implied corollary to the Division's formula, of course, was that if the figures 
had been such that after an application of their formula technique, the insurer 
would have been left with a credit of "any balance remaining" under Subd. (d) 
the insurer would have had to pay to the employee a proportionate share of 
attorneys fees as their future compensation liability accrued. 
Id., slip op. at 5 n.2 (citing Cronen v. Wegdahl Coop. Elevator Ass'n, 278 N.W.2d 102 
(Minn. 1979». 
If adhered to, the court of appeals' opinion establishes a number of critical points in 
the interpretation of Lambertson. First, it makes clear that the computation of the em-
ployer's share of attorney's fees and expenses ultimately depends not on workers' compen-
sation benefits paid, but rather on the amount of the remainder available to satisfy the 
employer's reimbursement right. To avoid disadvantage to either the employee or em-
ployer, the statutory percentage of fees and costs 
( 
Fees and costs) 
Benefits paid 
should be applied to the workers' compensation benefits paid, unless the amount available 
for reimbursement is less. In that event, the statutory formula would be applied to the 
amount of the remainder, with the fees and costs subtracted from the remainder. In effect, 
subdivision 6(c) would read as follows: 
Out of the balance remaining the employer shall be reimbursed in an 
amount equal·to all compensation paid (or, if the amount is less, the balance 
remaining) to the employee or his dependants by the employer less the product 
of the costs deducted under clause (a) divided by the total proceeds received by 
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Although in absence of the provision requiring sharing of fees 
and expenses by the employer the employer might not be reim-
bursed in an amount sufficient to cover workers' compensation ex-
penses, in cases to which the amendment applies insufficient 
reimbursement will be the usual result. 
The final question that arises in the construction of section 
176.061, subdivision 6 concerns the impact of the amendment on 
future losses. In the third illustration, the employer received a 
credit in the amount of $20,000 against workers' compensation 
benefits that otherwise would be payable but for the credit. If the 
assumption is made that following the apportionment, the em-
ployee incurs additional expenses for which workers' compensation 
benefits would have been paid but for the credit, a problem arises 
with respect to the employer's obligation to share fees and costs. 
While section 176.061, subdivision 6(d) gives the employer a credit 
for proceeds of the tort judgment or settlement, it does not provide 
for any future sharing of fees and costs by the employer. To illus-
trate, assume the same facts as in the third illustration except that 
the workers' compensation benefits paid at the time of the judg-
ment were $40,000, rather than $20,000. If $40,000 in benefits had 
been paid, the employer's share of the fees and costs would have 
been $16,000: 
$40,000 (Fees and Costs) X $40000 (Benefits) = $16000. 
$100,000 (Proceeds)·' , 
In contrast, under the third illustration, only $20,000 in workers' 
compensation benefits had been paid at the time of judgment; the 
employer would have paid $8,000 as its share of fees and costs, and 
the employer would receive a credit of $20,000. Assume that the 
employee then incurs additional expenses in the amount of 
$20,000, for which workers' compensation benefits would be paid 
but for the credit. The statute does not directly provide for the 
sharing of fees and costs by the employer. Thus, if the employer's 
credit is not reduced by the same percentage of fees and costs used 
to determine the "price" to the employer of reimbursement in the 
case in which $40,000 in benefits had been paid at the time of 
judgment, an arbitrary result occurs. The advantage to the em-
the employee or his dependents from the other party multiplied by all compensa-
tion paid by the employer to the employee or his dependents (or, if it is less, the 
balance remaining). 
Second, the opinion establishes that the employer's share of the fees and costs does not 
become part of the credit, but rather is paid to the employee. 
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ployer is the same as if reimbursement were available for the full 
$40,000, but the "price" for the benefit is only one-half. 
To avoid the arbitrary result that would occur if the employer's 
obligation to bear a proportionate share of fees and costs does not 
extend to the credit, the supreme court, in Cronen v. Wegdahl Cooper-
atzve Elevator Assocz"atzon ,218 held that the employer's credit will' be 
reduced by the same formula used to determine the employer's 
share of fees and expenses at the time of judgment.219 In illustra-
tion three, that figure is forty percent. 
If the full credit of $20,000 were reduced by forty percent, how-
ever, the credit would still be $12,000. The employer would thus 
avoid bearing any additional portion of the fees and costs until 
that credit was exhausted. To avoid this result and to ensure that 
the employer continues to bear a proportionate share of fees and 
expenses, the reduction should be applied as expenses are incurred 
by the employer.22o For each dollar of expenses for which workers' 
compensation benefits would be payable, the employer should re-
ceive a one dollar credit. That credit of one dollar should be re-
duced by forty percent, requiring the employer to pay forty cents 
to the employee for each dollar of expenses incurred by the em-
ployee, until the credit is exhausted. 
c. Contrzoutzon 
Having established the method of allocating the proceeds of a 
judgment or settlement between an employee and employer, the 
discussion can proceed to a consideration of the third party's con-
tribution claim against the employer. To illustrate the impact of 
218. 278 N.w.2d 102 (Minn. 1979). 
219. Id. at 105. In Cronm the plaintiff's decedent died in a car-truck collision. At the 
time of the accident, the workers' compensation insurer for Wegdahl Cooperative paid to 
the decedent's wife 52,345.80, including benefits for statutory burial expenses and ten 
weeks of dependency benefits, covering the period from October 31, 1977 to January 8, 
1978. In early January of 1978, the wrongful death claim against the estate of the driver 
of the automobile was settled for 5100,000. The case was submitted to the Workers' Com-
pensation Division for calculation of the credit. The attorney's fees were agreed upon at 
the rate of 24%. 
The distribution resulted in a credit to the employer of 547,272.49. The Workers' 
Compensation Division determined that the insurer would be required to "pay 24% of the 
benefit entitlement until additional fees and costs in the sum of 511,345.40 in relation to 
additional benefit entitlement in the sum of 547,272.49 shall have been paid, at which 
time the insurer shall pay 100% of all subsequent benefit entitlement." Relator's Brief and 
Appendix at A-13, Cronen v. Wegdahl Coop. Elevator Ass'n, 278 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 
1979) (reprinting Workers' Compensation Division determination of third-party credit). 
220. Su 278 N.W.2d at 105. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 298 1980
298 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 
Johnson, the right of contribution must be considered in each of the 
contexts previously discussed. 
I. Contnoutlon Pnor to the 1976 Amendment 
First, as to illustration one, assume the employer is twenty per-
cent at fault and the third party is eighty percent at fault. Graphi-
cally,221 the result would be as follows: 
Plaintiff-Employee +--$1 00,000 ------Third Party 
(Proceeds) i 
$20,000 
$20,000 
(Contribution) 
(W.C. Benefits) 
$20,000 
(Reimbursement) ~ 
. ~ Employer 
The employer's liability is limited by its workers' compensation 
liability or its fair share of the judgment as determined by its per-
centage of negligence. In the hypothetical both figures are the 
same. If, however, the third party was sixty percent negligent and 
the employer forty percent negligent, the employer's contribution 
liability would still be limited to $20,000, the amount of its work-
ers' compensation liability, even though its fair share of the judg-
ment according to its percentage of negligence would be $40,000. 
If the facts of illustration two are utilized, and it is assumed that 
the employer is sixty percent and the third party forty percent neg-
ligent, the following result would be achieved: 
Plaintiff-Employee - $100,000 ------ Third Party 
~
prOCeedS) t 
$60,000 
(W.C. Benefits) 
$40,000 
(Reimbursement) 
~ 
$60,000 
(Contribution) 
Employer 
221. The method of illustration is borrowed from Professor Davis. See Davis, Third-
Party Tortftasors'Rights Where Compensation-ColJered Employers are Negligmt-Where Do Dole 
and Sunspan Lead? 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571 (1976). 
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The employer has paid $60,000 in workers' compensation benefits, 
and $60,000 in contribution to the third party. However, the em-
ployer has been reimbursed only in the amount of $40,000. The 
employer's total liability thus exceeds its workers' compensation 
liability by $80,000. 
tt. Contnoutlon afler the 1976 Amendment 
In virtually all cases decided after the effective date of the 1976 
amendment, the impact on the employer will be the same as in the 
last example, insofar as the employer will have to pay the third 
party an amount equal to its workers' compensation liability, but 
will not be reimbursed in an amount equal to its workers' compen-
sation liability. To illustrate, assume the facts in illustration three, 
in which the tort judgment is $100,000, fees and costs are $40,000, 
and workers' compensation benefits paid are $20,000. Also assume 
that the third party is eighty percent and the employer is twenty 
percent negligent. The following result would be achieved: 
Plaintiff-Employee_$100,000 ------Third Party 
. (Proceeds) r 
$12,000 
(Reimbursement) 
$20,000 
(Contribution) 
The employer's total liability is thus $40,000, consisting of 
$20,000 in workers' compensation benefits and $20,000 on the con-
tribution claim. The employer is only reimbursed in the amount 
of $12,000. The net loss to the employer is thus $28,000, which is 
$8,000 more than its workers' compensation liability. As applied 
to the second illustration, in which the reimbursement right with-
out the 1976 amendment does not equal workers' compensation 
benefits paid, the right to reimbursement would be reduced fur-
ther with the sharing of fees and costs, making the employer's total 
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exposure even greater.222 
The court inJohnson recognized in a footnote to its opinion that 
by operation of the amendment the employer would not be reim-
bursed in an amount equal to its workers' compensation liabil-
ity.223 Even though the total loss exposure of the employer exceeds 
its workers' compensation liability, this result occurs only by pay-
ment of its fair share of the fees and costs expended in obtaining 
the tort judgment. 
The third illustration raises a problem concerning the em-
ployer's credit. Assuming that the employer is forty percent and 
the third party sixty percent negligent, application of the facts in 
illustration three would require the employer to pay to the third 
party $20,000, the amount of its workers' compensation liability as 
of the time of judgment. The employer's fair share of the judg-
ment is $40,000, but its liability on the contribution claim is lim-
ited to $20,000, its workers' compensation liability. The problem 
arises when additional expenses are incurred by the employee for 
. which benefits would have been paid by the employer, but for the 
credit. 
When additional expenses are incurred by the employee, Cronen 
has established that the employer bears a continuing obligation to 
pay to the employee an amount equal to its percentage of fees and 
expenses, until the credit is exhausted. The question is whether 
the principle established in Cronen should also require the em-
ployer to bear a continuing obligation to the third party on the 
contribution claim. 
Because there is no additional workers' compensation liability 
on the part of the employer until the $20,000 credit is exhausted, it 
could be argued that the employer would owe no additional obli-
gation to the third party. If there is no additional workers' com-
pensation liability, there can be no additional contribution. 
Application of this reasoning, however, would lead to the same 
arbitrary result that the supreme court sought to avoid in Cronen. 
The third party's right to contribution would be dependent on the 
222. In situations such as illustration four, the problem is aggravated. Not only is the 
amount remaining for reimbursement insufficient to reimburse the employer, but applica-
tion of the sharing provision further reduces the amount available. This, in turn, increases 
the employer's loss exposure on the third party contribution claim. See note 217 supra and 
accompanying text. 
223. "In future cases the amount of reimbursement will not equal the benefits actually 
paid because of the 1976 amendment to § 176.061, subd. 6 (c)." Johnson v. Raske Bldg. 
Sys., Inc., 276 N.W.2d at 81 n.S. 
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benefits paid at the time of judgment. If $40,000 in workers' com-
pensation benefits had been paid at the !ime of judgment, rather 
than $20,000, the third party's contribution claim would have 
been fully satisfied. If Cronen is not applied, however, and the em-
ployer has paid only $20,000 in benefits at the time of judgment, 
the third party's contribution claim would be limited to $20,000, 
even though additional expenses in the amount of $20,000 are 
later incurred by the employee. 
Just as the employer's obligation to share in fees and costs 
should not depend on workers' compensation benefits paid as of 
the time of judgment, the right of contribution should not be con-
trolled by the benefits paid at the time of judgment, but should 
extend to the credit. To be consistent with Cronen, the employer 
should have continuing liability to the third party on the contribu-
tion claim. For each dollar of expenses incurred by the employee 
for which workers' compensation benefits would be payable but 
for the credit, the third party should be entitled to one additional 
dollar of contribution. Therefore, the result in Cronen appears to 
mandate a continuing obligation on the part of the employer to 
share fees and expenses with the employee and a continuing obli-
gation to respond to the third party's contribution claim. Assum-
ing the facts in the third illustration, with the additional fact that 
the employee has incurred one dollar of expenses after judgment, 
the employer's obligation would be as follows: 
Employee Third Party 
$1.60 ~$.40 
(Employer's share (Contribution) 
of fees and expenses)__ I 
Employer 
Presently, the employer's obligation to respond to the contribution 
claim is not dependent on the benefits paid at the time of judg-
ment. To achieve such a result, the term "workers' compensation 
liability" should, for purposes of the contribution claim, be con-
strued to include the credit when expenses are incurred for which 
workers' compensation benefits would be payable but for the 
credit. 
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It could be argued that this result does not necessarily flow from 
the Cronen decision, because Cronen involved a statutory construc-
tion while extending the contribution claim to the credit does not. 
The distinction is of potential significance because the statutory 
obligation to pay fees and expenses as the "price" of the credit is 
covered by coverage A of the workers' compensation insurance 
policy, whereas the payment on the contribution claim would be 
covered only by coverage B, the employer's liability portion of the 
policy, if it is covered at al1.224 
However, that factor would not seem to be critical given the 
court's decision in Johnson. If there is no difficulty in creating a 
new liability for the employer in situations in which the employer's 
reimbursement does not equal the workers' compensation benefits 
paid because of the employer's obligation to pay a portion of the 
plaintiff's attorney's fees and expenses, there should be no problem 
in extending the third party's right of contribution to the em-
ployer's credit. In principle, it is difficult to distinguish the two 
situations from a policy perspective. 
d. Implz"cations and Alternatives 
Following the procedures established in Johnson and Cronen to 
their logical conclusion creates the possibility that the liability of 
the employer may in fact exceed its workers' compensation liabil-
ity. This can occur in several ways: when the 1976 amendment 
applies so that reimbursement will not equal workers' compensa-
tion benefits paid; when the amount of workers' compensation 
benefits paid approximates the amount of the tort recovery; or 
when the employer has a credit and the employee incurs addi-
tional expenses after settlement or judgment. In addition, new 
costs in the form of attorney's fees incurred in defending contribu-
tion claims will be added to the employer's costs. The new liabil-
ity is likely to be significant in terms of the expected frequency and 
magnitude of third party claims.225 The difficulty is in determin-
224. See 4 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 94.40 (1980). 
225. A closed claims study by the Insurance Services Office covering 1976 and the 
early part of 1977 has indicated that in slightly more than one-half of the claims for which 
payment was made to employees, insureds would have impleaded the employer but for 
the sole source remedy rule. In terms of dollars of payment, the percentage was 56%. Su 
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY 64-65 
(1977). In cases in which the employer would have been impleaded, the economic loss 
tended to be greater than in those cases in which there would have been no impleader. See 
id. at 66. 
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ing if the new liability and costs can be justified. 
Given the variety of interests involved in structuring a method 
of distributing losses flowing from workplace injuries it is apparent 
that no simple solution exists. A number of proposals for modifica-
tion of the existing system have been made, and some have been 
accepted. The proposals range from complete abolition of the 
third party action,226 to allowing contribution to the full extent of 
the employer's fair share of the judgment or only to the extent of 
the employer's workers' compensation lien,227 to a limitation or 
elimination of the employer's subrogation interest in the em-
ployee's claim against the third party. The method of reallocation 
adopted in Lambertson and refined inJo.hnson and Cronen has char-
acteristics of the last two proposals. 
The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability considered a 
variety of such proposals in its survey of products liability law.228 
226. The proposals for elimination of third party actions are varied. They may range 
from elective no-fault insurance, see O'Connell, Harnessing the Liabzlziy Lottery: Elective First-
Parlj' No-Fault Insurance Financed 0/ Third-Parlj' Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. V.L.Q. 693, to 
elimination of the third party suit, with the savings used to finance higher workers' com-
pensation benefits, su Bernstein, Third Parlj' Claims in Workers' Compensation: A Proposal to 
Do More With Less, 1977 WASH. V.L.Q. 543, to the elimination of the third party claim 
without making any adjustments in the system at all, as was proposed by Senator Davies 
in the 1978 tort reform bill. 
Section I of H.F. 338, as introduced by Senator Davies, would have amended Minne-
sota Statutes section 176.061, subdivision 4 to read as follows: 
The provisions of subdivision I, 2, and 3 apply only where the employer 
liable for compensation and the other party legally liable for damages are in-
sured or self-insured and engaged in the due course of business, (a) in further-
ance of a common enterprise, or (b) the accomplishment of the same or related 
purposes in operation on the premises where the injury was received at the time 
thereof. For purposes of this subdivision a person is deemed to be engaged in 
furtherance of a common enterprise with an employer if the person is in the 
chain of manufacture and distribution of a product sold to used or consumed by 
an employer in the due cOurse of business and if the liability of the person to the 
employee arises from the manufacture sale use or consumption of that product. 
H.F. 338, § I, 70th Minn. Legis. 1978 Sess. (underscoring in original). The effect would 
have been to eliminate third party suits, but without any quzd pro quo to the employee. 
Section I of the bill was stricken in the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on 
Judicial Administration. See Minutes of Meeting on HF. 338 Be.fore the Minnesota SenateJudici-
ary Subcommittee onJudlcial Administration, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 3, 1978). 
For other analyses of these proposals, see VI LEGAL STUDY, supra note 190, at 65-71; 
Comment, A Cniique of the Justijications .for Emplqyu SUlis In Stnd Products Liabllziy Agaznst 
Third Parlj' Manufacturers, 25 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 125 (1977). 
227. See V.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY, FINAL REPORT VII-92 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT); Comment, The 
Effict of Workers' Compensation Laws on the Right of a Third Parlj' Liable to an I'!}ured Emplqyu to 
Recover Contn"bution or Indemllliy ftom the Emplqyer, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 238, 300-03 
(1978). 
228. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 227, at VII-85 to -113. 
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Surprisingly, the Final Report of the Task Force lacks any clear 
information concerning the impact of the proposals. There is no 
indication that allowing third party claims will have any real im-
pact in the cost of products liability insurance.229 There is no indi-
cation that employer incentives to provide greater safety in the 
workplace will be increased if contribution is allowed or subroga-
tion is disallowed.230 It is also questionable whether imposition of 
liability in excess of an employer's workers' compensation liability 
will be covered by the employer's liability insurance coverage in 
the workers' compensation insurance policy.231 If there is cover-
age, it is questionable whether the amount will be sufficient to in-
sure an employer in cases in which the tort judgment and workers' 
compensation benefits paid are high.232 Even assuming coverage is 
provided, the likelihood of increased claims against employers 
make it likely that the cost of insurance will be increased. 
Based in part on the Task Force Report, the Department of 
Commerce has proposed a Model Uniform Product Liability 
229. See zd. at VII-90. 
230. See zd. at VII-90 to -91; VI LEGAL STUDY, supra note 190, at 56-57. A major 
question concerns whether the rating structure for workers' compensation insurance will 
be able to reflect the increased liability of the employer, whether through the contribution 
claim by the third party or through elimination of the employer's interest in the third 
party recovery by the employee. If experience rating does not exist, it is questionable 
whether either remedy will have any impact on the employer's incentive to make the 
workplace safer. The theory underlying experience rating "states that the more immedi-
ate economic stake the employer has, the greater is the incentive for that employer to 
reduce his employees' exposure to injury." MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
STUDY COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE AND GoVERNOR 152 
(1979). 
The Study Commission Report points out that in Minnesota, nearly 50,000 employ-
ers, constituting 70% of Minnesota employers, are not experience rated. Id. at 153. In 
order to be experience rated, the annual policy premium must be larger than 5750. See zd. 
at 153. The figure might be misleading, however, since only small employers would not be 
experience rated. The proportion of employees working for businesses that are experience 
rated would constitute the vast majority of employees in the state. 
The critical question, even assuming experience rating, is whether the mechanism 
will be able to take into consideration an employer's losses in the form of contribution 
claims or through elimination of the employer's reimbursement right. For a discussion of 
workers' compensation insurance rating in Minnesota, see zd. at 136-91. 
Based upon the study the commission made, a number of recommendations, several 
of which related to insurance rating, were made. &t' zd. at 42-49. Many of the recommen-
dations were enacted by the Legislature in 1979. See Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, 1979 
Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1256 (amending scattered sections of MINN. STAT. chs. 79, 176 
(1978)). 
231. &t' 4 A. LARSON, supra note 224; FINAL REPORT, supra note 227, at VII-92 to -93. 
232. Coverage B is written in the standard amount of 5100,000 per occurrence. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 305 1980
1980] THE ANATOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 305 
Act233 (Model Act). Section 114 of the Model Act, dealing with 
the problem of workplace injuries, provides for an offset from the 
tort recovery of any workers' compensation benefits paid or paya-
ble and, in addition, eliminates any right of subrogation by the 
employer.234 There would be no need to have the employer in-
volved in the lawsuit, thus avoiding the increase in transaction 
costs that would be produced by the litigation of third party 
claims.235 According to the Department of Commerce: "The pur-
pose of the solution adopted in Section 114 is to sharpen employer 
incentives to keep workplace products safe without undermining 
233. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT §§ 100-
122, uprintd in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-50 (1979). 
234. Id. § 114,44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740. The section reads as follows: 
(A) In the case of any product liability claim brought by or on behalf of 
an injured person entitled to compensation under a state Worker Compensation 
statute, damages shall be reduced by the amount paid as Worker Compensation 
benefits for the same injury plus the present value of all future Worker Compen-
sation benefits payable for the same injury under the Worker Compensation stat-
ute. 
(B) Unless the product seller has expressly agreed to indemnify or hold an 
employer harmless for harm caused to the employer's employee by a product, 
the employer shall have no right of subrogation, contribution, or indemnity 
against the product seller when the harm to the employee constitutes a product 
liability claim under this Act. Also, the employer's Worker Compensation insur-
ance carrier shall have no right of subrogation against the product seller. 
(C) When final judgment in an action brought under this Act has been 
entered prior to the determination of Worker Compensation benefits, the prod· 
uct seller may bring a subsequent action for reduction of the judgment by the 
amount of the Worker Compensation benefits, or for recoupment from the em· 
ployee if the product seller has paid a judgement [SIC] which includes the amount 
·of such benefits. 
235. According to the Analysis: 
The principal benefit of the approach adopted in Subsections (A) and (B) is 
a reduction in litigation transaction costs. Subrogation actions are not allowed. 
Furthermore, proceedings under this Act will be streamlined because in cases of 
employer negligence, there will be no three-party litigation as to the relative 
percentages of fault of employers and manufacturers. 
Id. Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,741. 
The approach taken by the supreme court in Lambertson was considered but rejected: 
The court in that case held that the product manufacturer would be allowed 
limited contribution up to the amount of the Worker Compensation lien. This 
reduces the inequity against the product manufacturer, but preserves the em-
ployer's interest in not paying more than its Worker Compensation liability. 
The principal disadvantage of the "Lambertson" approach, as compared with 
Section 114, is that "Lambertson" does not reduce transaction costs. 
Id. Although approving the result of Lambertson, if not the method, the drafters of the 
Model Act made the assumption that the employer's liability would be limited to its work-
ers' compensation lien, an erroneous assumption in light of the court's subsequent decision 
in Johnson v. Raske Bldg. Sys., Inc., 276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979). 
The Model Act also differs from the Minnesota procedure in that third parties will be 
able to reduce their liability for workplace injuries even when the employer is not at fault. 
See MODEL ACT, Analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,741. 
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the limited-liability concept that is central to the Worker Compen-
sation system. "236 
In light of the uncertain impact of allowing a contribution claim 
in excess of workers' compensation liability, the cautious approach 
of the Model Act is instructive. The critical point in the proposal 
appears to be the preservation of the limited liability that lies at 
the heart of workers' compensation acts. Contribution is allowed 
to the extent it is consistent with that principle. Although the 
Model Act may adopt a more streamlined procedure than the 
more cumbersome method adopted by the supreme court inJohn-
son, the Johnson procedure ensures that the employee will receive 
the full benefit to which he is entitled by the Act. 
In order to bring the Minnesota procedure into line with the 
balance achieved by the Model Act, however, only a slight modifi-
cation of the Minnesota procedure adopted in Johnson would be 
necessary. This could readily be accomplished by adhering to the 
apparent intent of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lambertson to 
limit the liability of the employer to that imposed on it by the 
workers' compensation act. The best way to achieve that result is 
to limit the third party's contribution claim not to the workers' 
compensation liability of the employer but by the reimbursement 
right of the employer. This would ensure that the basic workers' 
compensation insurance "bargain" would not be disrupted, yet it 
would limit the right of the employer to obtain reimbursement for 
workers' compensation benefits paid to the injured employee. The 
suggested approach seems most consistent with the apparent intent 
of the court in Lambertson to do the least violence possible to the 
statute, while allowing a limited form of contribution by the third 
party against the employer. 
The result of limiting the third party's contribution claim would 
be to preclude contribution in any situation in which the net effect 
on the employer would be to increase its loss exposure beyond its 
workers' compensation liability. It would mean that in the four 
illustrations mentioned at the beginning of this section, no contri-
bution would exist for the excess liability of the employer. In any 
case in which the employer is reimbursed in an amount less than 
the workers' compensation benefits paid, or in which the employer 
is granted a credit and the employee incurs additional expenses for 
236. MODEL ACT, Analysis, r~pnnti!d in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,741. 
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which benefits would be payable but for the credit, no additional 
liability on the contribution claim would exist. 
There may, arguably, be arbitrary results with respect to the 
credit because the employer's liability will depend on the benefits 
actually paid at the time of the tort recovery. Although the results 
may be characterized as arbitrary, there is a significant distinction 
between making an employer statutorily liable to the employee for 
a continuing proportion of the fees and expenses and creating a 
new nonstatutory liability to the third party that may not be cov-
ered by workers' compensation insurance. 
In addition, in cases in which the employer is required to bear a 
proportionate share of the plaintiff-employee's fees and expenses, it 
is arguable that the third party should not be required to bear 
those expenses by having its contribution claim limited. It must be 
remembered, however, that it is the function of the statute to en-
sure that the employee is reimbursed for the share of fees and ex-
penses properly attributable to the potential or actual benefit 
received by the employer. If the employer's share of fees and ex-
penses are not paid to the employee it becomes clear that the re-
covery the statute intends to guarantee to the employee will be 
reduced. 
Under the circumstances, the preferable approach appears to be 
the cautious approach; the superiority of a legislative solution to 
the problem becomes apparent given the uncertainty of the impli-
cations of a judicially created contribution remedy that expands 
the liability of the employer. Until greater certainty exists, or until 
the implications of such an approach are better understood, a limi-
tation of contribution so as to do the least violence possible to the 
statutory scheme seems advisable. 
e. Applzcatlon to Stnct Liability Claims 
In Lambertson both the employer and third party were negligent. 
A final question is whether the third party's claim for contribution 
would extend to cases in which the third party is held strictly lia-
ble, but not negligent. Because of the court's decision in Busch ll. 
Busch Construction, Inc. ,237 there seems to be no reason why a strictly 
liable manufacturer would be precluded from obtaining contribu-
tion from a negligent employer. Although the basis for fault allo-
cation may change, application of comparative fault in Busch 
237. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
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cannot logically be limited to contribution claims against product 
users or consumers. 
f Summary 
As a result of the supreme court's decision in Lambertson, a negli-
gent third party may obtain contribution from an employer. Fol-
lowing the court's decision in Busch, the right would also extend to 
a strictly liable third party. 
Lambertson was grounded in the court's desire to avoid requiring 
the third party to bear the full burden of the tort judgment in 
situations in which the employer's negligence has contributed to 
the employee's injury, and to avoid the employer's statutory right 
to obtain reimbursement in spite of its fault. The basic approach 
adopted in Lambertson thus allows contribution, limited by the 
workers' compensation liability of the employer. Although the ex-
act manner of allocating loss among the parties in a third party 
action was not specified in Lambertson, the supreme court subse-
quently clarified the method of allocation in Johnson, which re-
quires the third party to pay the full tort award to the plaintiff, the 
employer to pay to the third party the amount of the employer's 
fair share of the judgment limited by its workers' compensation 
liability, and the employee to reimburse the employer according to 
the statutory method for apportioning tort proceeds between em-
ployer and employee. 
The basic policy of Lambertson seems sound. As a result of the 
formula the court adopted for allocating loss in a third party ac-
tion, however, it becomes possible for an employer to be subjected 
to liability that is actually in excess of its workers' compensation 
liability. This can occur in a number of ways, with varying de-
grees of impact on the employer. In such cases, however, the in-
creased liability of the employer does not flow from the workers' 
compensation act. Because this raises unresolved questions of in-
surance coverage and costs, with only a speculative increase in de-
terrence, the approach advocated in this section has simply been a 
return to the fundamental position taken by the supreme court in 
Lambertson-that the employer's net liability should not exceed its 
workers' compensation liability. To ensure that result, the third 
party's right to contribution should be limited to the value of the 
employer's reimbursement interest. 
Any further modification of the right to contribution in work-
place injuries should, ideally, be a matter for legislative solution, a 
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preference that the Lambertson court indicated. Although the con-
tribution right established in Lambertson, if appropriately limited, is 
probably not the best approach, it is the one that, given creation of 
the right to contribution, does the least violence to the workers' 
compensation act pending legislative resolution of the problem. 
B ContributIon and Indemmljl in the Chain of Distnoutlon 
When a party in the chain of distribution is held liable for a 
product defect, the preferred remedy is to seek indemnity from the 
party next highest in the chain.238 Indemnity provides superior 
relief from a retailer's perspective because it results in a full shift-
ing of the loss, whereas contribution shifts only part of the loss.239 
In Hendriclcson D. Minnesota Power & Light Co. ,240 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court explained the circumstances under which indem-
nity would be appropriate: 
(1) Where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or 
vicarious liability for damage caused by the one sought to be 
charged. 
(2) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability 
by action at the direction, in the interest of, and in reliance 
upon the one sought to be charged. 
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability 
because of a breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to 
be charged. 
(4) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability 
merely because of failure, even though negligent, to discover or 
prevent the misconduct of the one sought to be charged. 
(5) Where there is an express contract between the parties 
containing an explicit undertaking to reimburse for liability of 
the character involved.241 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in its attempts to do substantial 
justice in individual cases without being bound by "any hard-and-
fast rules," has expanded indemnity as an equitable means of real-
locating losses beyond the basic rules established in HendnClcson. 242 
238. See 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 44.02[2] at 15-16 to 
-17 (1979). 
239. See zd. at 15-10. 
240. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), olJeTTlI/ed in parI, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., 
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. 1977) (abrogating rule 4). 
241. Id. at 372-73, 104 N.W.2d at 848. The five Hendni:lcson rules are also examined in 
Note, supra note I, at 135-40, 150-58. 
242. Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 361, 216 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974). 
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A few examples will illustrate the operation of the indemnity 
concept in Minnesota products liability cases. In Fa" lJ. Armstrong 
Rubber Co. ,243 plaintiffs were injured when the truck in which they 
were riding overturned after one if its tires blew out. Plaintiffs 
brought suit against the manufacturer of the tire, Armstrong, and 
the retailer, Elmer N. Olson Company. The case was submitted to 
the jury on theories of breach of warranty as to Olson only, strict 
liability in tort as to Olson and Armstrong, and negligent failure to 
warn as to Armstrong only. The jury returned a general verdict 
against both defendants.244 
The trial court awarded Olson indemnity from Armstrong.245 
In upholding the indemnity award, the supreme court emphasized 
the derivative nature of Olson's liability and the lack of any active 
misconduct by Olson: 
In the instant case, Olson's liability is predicated on or de-
rived from Armstrong's wrongful act. According to the court's 
instructions, Olson could be found liable only if it breached an 
express or implied warranty, or if it were strictly liable in tort. 
There is no evidence of an express warranty given by Olson. 
The only statement made by the agent of Olson is that the tires 
would be adequate, and this statement is nothing more than a 
reaffirmance of what is required under an implied warranty of 
merchantability, that is, fitness for the ordinary purposes for 
which such goods are used. 
Thus, Olson was found liable either on the grounds of breach 
of implied warranty or of strict liability in tort. In neither in-
stance did Olson perpetrate any active wrong upon plaintiffs. 
Olson could not have found the defect with reasonable inspec-
tion, and it was not Olson's responsibility to alter the product 
in any way before it was sold. Thus ... Olson's liability stems 
solely from its passive role as the retailer of a defective product 
furnished to it by the manufacturer, and it therefore is entitled 
to indemnity.246 
Indemnity may have been appropriate even in cases in which 
the retailer was negligent. In Bjorklund lJ. Hantz, 247 the plaintiff sus-
tained injuries in a snowmobile accident due to a defective throttle 
243. 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.w.2d 64 (1970). 
244. Id. at 87, 179 N.W.2d at 67. 
245. !d. at 87, 179 N.W.2d at 68. 
246. Id. at 96-97, 179 N.W.2d at 72 (footnote omitted). 
247. 296 Minn. 298, 208 N.W.2d 722 (1973) (per curiam), overruled in parI, Tolbert v. 
Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.ll (Minn. 1977). 
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on the snowmobile248 that struck the snowmobile on which the 
plaintiff was riding. The jury attributed forty-five percent of the 
negligence to Bombardier, the snowmobile manufacturer, thirty 
percent of the negligence to Grover Marine Sales, the retailer, and 
twenty-five percent of the negligence to Hantz, the operator of the 
snowmobile that struck the plaintiff's snowmobile. The trial court 
then granted Grover indemnity from Bombardier. Because 
Grover's negligence consisted solely of a failure to discover the de-
fect in the snowmobile, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined 
that the trial judge's award of indemnity was appropriate.249 
In cases in which the retailer's negligence consists of more than 
failing to discover the defect, however, indemnity might not be 
appropriate, unless the retailer's negligence could be labeled pas-
sive as compared to the active negligence of the party against 
whom indemnity is being sought. In Kenyon lJ. F.M C Corp. ,250 the 
plaintiff was injured in a riding lawnmower accident caused by a 
malfunction of the lawnmower's clutch mechanism. The jury 
found both the retailer and the manufacturer of the lawnmower 
negligent. The sole question on appeal was based upon the trial 
court's denial of the retailer's claim for indemnity against the man-
ufacturer.25I Because the record supported a finding that the re-
tailer's negligence consisted of more than a failure to discover the 
defect, in particular, a failure to warn of dangers of which he was 
aware and a failure to properly lubricate the lawnmower prior to 
delivery, the court determined that the retailer's acts of negligence 
were independent of and concurrent with the manufacturer's neg-
ligence, justifying the denial of indemnity.252 
Even in cases in which the retailer's or distributor's conduct goes 
beyond a failure to inspect a product, indemnity might be appro-
priate, as in Sorenson lJ. Safety F/ate~ Inc. 253 Sorenson sustained inju-
ries when the rim of a tire he was changing flew off a tire changing 
apparatus, striking him. At the time, the plaintiff was using a de-
vice called a "Safety-Flater" which was designed to prevent just 
such an occurrence. The device was marketed by Safety Flate, 
Inc., a corporation that was formed to market the device. The 
248. Id. at 299-300, 208 N.W.2d at 723. 
249. See Id. at 301, 208 N.W.2d at 724. 
250. 286 Minn. 283, 176 N.W.2d 69 (1970). 
251. Id. at 285, 176 N.W.2d at 70. 
252. See Id. at 287,176 N.W.2d at 71-72. 
253. 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974). 
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device was fabricated by Standard Metal and was distributed and 
sold by Hennessey-Three Star. The Safety-Flater in question was 
purchased by Standard Oil from Hennessey-Three Star and was 
ultimately purchased from Standard Oil by plaintiff's employer.254 
Hennesey-Three Star, in making its sales presentation to Stan-
dard Oil, used a fiyer that illustrated and described the Safety 
Flater. It contained the following language: 
Whether you change one or fifty tires a day, the danger of 
exploding lock rings always exists. Everyone knows the damage 
or serious injury that may occur. It only has to happen once. 
THE THREE STAR SAFETY FLATER will protect your 
. man and enable you to meet insurance underwriters specifica-
tions for safety.255 
The plaintiff's employer had seen and relied upon the fiyer ill 
making the purchase of the Safety Flater.256 
At the close of the trial, the trial judge ruled that Safety Flate, 
Inc. and Standard Metal were manufacturers of the product and 
that Hennessey-Three Star and Standard Oil were distributors. 
The jury found all defendants to be strictly liable. Standard 
Metal and Safety Flate were also found to be negligent. Hennes-
sey-Three Star and Standard Oil were determined to have made 
and breached an express warranty. The jury apportioned seventy-
five percent of the fault to Safety Flate, five percent to Standard 
Metal, and ten percent each to Hennessey-Three Star and Stan-
dard Oil. The trial court awarded indemnity to Hennessey-Three 
Star and Standard Oil from Safety Flate and Standard Metal. 
The primary question on appeal concerned the propriety of the 
trial court's award of indemnity to Hennessey-Three Star and 
Standard Oil.257 
Because the express warranty in the brochure made no represen-
tations encouraging the use of the Safety-Flater in a manner other 
than for which it was intended, the supreme court concluded that 
the conduct of the distributors was secondary (passive) in relation 
to the primary (active) conduct of the manufacturers.258 Indem-
nity was thus determined to be appropriate.259 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in Tolbert ll. Gerber In-
254. Id. at 355, 216 N.W.2d at 860-61. 
255. Id. at 355, 216 N.W.2d at 861. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 357, 216 N.W.2d at 861. 
258. Id. at 360-61, 216 N.W.2d at 863-64. 
259. Id. at 361,216 N.W.2d at 864. 
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dustnes) Inc. 260 and Frt(JIlJ. Montgomery Ward & Co. 261 require a re-
consideration of the indemnity principles established in cases such 
as Farr) Bjorklund, and Sorenson. The next sections of this Article 
will examine the Minnesota court's decisions in Tolbert and Frt(JI to 
determine their impact on the law of indemnity in the products 
liability context. 
I. Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc. 
In Tolbert the plaintiff was injured when a tracks ide loading leg 
on which he was working collapsed, causing him to fall to the 
ground.262 The grain handling equipment, of which the loading 
leg was a part, was ordered by Schuler, plaintiff's employer, from 
Voldco, Inc., a corporation engaged in the construction of grain 
elevators and the installation of grain handling equipment. Schu-
ler specified its needs to Voldco and Voldco decided what equip-
ment was necessary, selected Gerber as the supplier, and obtained 
and installed the equipment. Based on information supplied by 
Voldco, Gerber determined the specific components necessary for 
the system.263 
One of the components, an A-valve, which was designed to 
carry the grain out toward a hopper car at an angle below horizon-
tal. to allow for the gravity loading of grain, was designed to be 
installed at a thirty-five degree angle. Gerber's shipping depart-
ment sent a forty-seven degree angle A-valve by mistake. The im-
proper angle of the A-valve allowed the loading leg to slip out and 
falJ.264 
The jury found Gerber and Voldco liable on theories of strict 
liability, implied warranty, and negligence; 100% of the negligence 
was attributed to Gerber and Voldco jointly.26 .... The trial court, 
relying on two Minnesota Supreme Court cases in which the court 
had held that submission of the comparative negligence question 
to the jury under such circumstances would be improper, awarded 
Voldco full indemnity from Gerber.266 
260. 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). 
261. 258 N.w.2d 782 (Minn. 1977). 
262. 255 N.W.2d at 365. 
263. Id. at 364. 
264. Id. at 365. 
265. /d. at 364. 
266. /d. The trial court relied on Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 
N.W.2d 859 (1974) and Hillman v. Ellingson, 298 Minn. 346, 215 N.W.2d 810 (1974). 
Hillman involved a suit against a school bus driver and two students whose negligent acts 
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a. The Majoriry Opinion 
The Minnesota Supreme Court commenced its opinion with an 
analysis of the indemnity rules established in HendriCkson D. Mzizne-
sota Power & Light Co. 267 The court determined that the facts fell 
within category four of HendricKson, "Where the one seeking in-
demnity has incurred liability merely because of failure, even 
though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct of the one 
sought to be charged."268 
The Tolbert court isolated categories one through three of Hen-
dricKson .269 Those categories involve derivative or vicarious liabil-
ity imposed on the person seeking indemnity270 when the person 
seeking indemnity has incurred liability "by action at the direc-
tion, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be 
charged,271 and where the person seeking indemnity has incurred 
liability because of a breach of a duty owed to him by one sought 
to be charged. "272 The basis for the separation was as follows: 
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's right eye was injured when a length of 
plastic tubing that was being stretched by the two students broke, striking the plaintiff in 
the eye. The trial judge submitted the apportionment question to the jury. The jury 
found the school bus driver to be 76% at fault and the students each 12% at fault. Because 
the school bus driver's negligence was determined to be passive or secondary in relation-
ship to the active, primary negligence of the students, the supreme court determined that 
indemnity rather than contribution was the appropriate form of relief for the driver. 298 
Minn. at 352, 215 N.W.2d at 814. The interesting aspect of the decision is the contrast 
between the jury's perception of loss allocation under which the bus driver would have 
borne the greatest share of the judgment, and the court's, under which the entire loss 
would be shifted to the students. Se~ id. 
267. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), olJerruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., 
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. 1977) (abrogating rule 4); SI!i! text accompanying 
notes 240-41 supra. 
268. Id. at 373, 104 N.W.2d at 848. 
269. 255 N.W.2d at 366. 
270. Id. This category of indemnity encompasses cases in which an automobile owner 
is held liable for the negligent conduct of a user, S~~ Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 
349,63 N.W.2d 355 (1954), or in which a general contractor is held liable for the negligent 
acts of a subcontractor. See Keefer v. AI Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 
305 (1971). 
271. 255 N.W.2d at 366. This second category of indemnity includes cases in which 
the person seeking indemnity has acted tortiously, but in which the act on its face appears 
to be proper. An example is a case in which a sheriff wrongfully attaches property because 
of the misdirection of the person against whom indemnity is sought. Su Henderson v. 
Eckern, 115 Minn. 410, 132 N.W. 715 (1911). 
272. 255 N.W.2d at 366. The third category involves cases in which the person seeking 
indemnity is held liable on the basis of a non-delegable duty. As an example, it includes 
cases in which a landlord is held liable for failure to keep property free of obstructions 
although the tenant has assumed that obligation. The landlord, held liable on the basis of 
breach of a non-delegable duty to keep the premises safe, would be entitled to indemnity 
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Cases which fall under Rule 4 are of a very different type 
from the others. Aside from cases of contractual indemnity, the 
other rules concern parties seeking indemnity who are without 
personal fault, but who nevertheless are liable in tort. Rule 4, 
however, concerns parties who are themselves culpably negli-
gent but who nevertheless seek to avoid responsibility for the 
injury they have caused. The typical example of this is where 
the party seeking indemnity has failed to discover or prevent 
the negligence or misconduct of another when an ordinarily 
prudent person would have done so. Previously, the rule has 
been interpreted to apply where the negligence of the party 
seeking indemnity was merely 'passive' or 'secondary' as con-
trasted with the 'active' or 'primary' negligence of the other 
tort feasor. 273 
315 
In the court's opinion, category four indemnity cases present a 
trial judge with a "bewildering array of issues" to resolve.274 A 
court is required to determine whether the negligence of the party 
seeking indemnity is passive or secondary275 and whether the 
party's negligence is concurrent with the negligence of the party 
from which indemnity is sought.276 Finally, the Tolbert court noted 
that indemnity cannot be determined by any hard and fast rules, a 
qualification that complicates the indemnity inquiry.277 Abrogat-
ing the rule of indemnity in category four cases, the Tolbert court 
held that in such cases liability must be apportioned according to 
the relative fault of the parties, a result that is tantamount to con-
tribution.278 
b. The Dissenting Opimans 
Justices Kelly and Rogosheske, joined by Justices Todd and 
Yetka, dissented. Justice Kelly's dissent was based on two points. 
from the tenant, who breached a duty to the landlord. Su Minneapolis Mill Co. v. 
Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W. 698 (1883). 
273. 255 N.W.2d at 366-67 (footnote omitted). 
274. Id. at 367. 
275. Id. The court noted that the active/passive or primary/secondary distinctions 
may have emerged from dicta rather than from holdings in cases such as Keefer v. Al 
Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971) and Lunderberg v. Bierman, 
241 Minn. 349,63 N.W.2d 355 (1954). 255 N.W.2d at 367 n.6. 
276. 255 N.W.2d at 367. The determination that a party's conduct is concurrent em-
phasizes that his liability is neither derivative nor prompted by the party from whom 
indemnity is sought. Su White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965), OlJer-
TU/~d on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.ll 
(Minn. 1977); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 272 Minn. 217, 136 N.W.2d 677 (1965). 
277. 255 N.W.2d at 367. 
278. Su id. at 367-68. 
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First, he expressed the opmlOn that fundamental fairness and 
sound economic principles required full indemnity when the negli-
gence of the installer consisted only of the failure to discover a 
product defect that was not obvious in the process of installation 
and directly resulted from the manufacturer's breaches of contract 
and warranty to deliver a specified product for a known pur-
pose.279 Second, and somewhat paradoxically, he felt that the flex-
ibility inherent in the common law indemnity approach had been 
destroyed by the majority opinion.280 
In support of his opinion that indemnity should have been 
granted, Justice Kelly emphasized the jury's findings that both de-
fendants were strictly liable to the plaintiff and that both defend-
ants had breached warranties to the purchasers.281 In cases in 
which a defendant's liability is based on strict liability and breach 
of warranty as well as on negligence, Justice Kelly would have 
held that the policies underlying strict liability theory required the 
manufacturer, Gerber, to bear the full loss caused by the plaintiff's 
injuries.282 
As a final matter, Justice Kelly illustrated the difficulties with 
the majority opinion by raising a number of potentially perplexing 
questions that could frustrate the comparative negligence inquiry: 
In this case, both the manufacturer and the installer were 
found liable under theories of negligence, breach of implied 
279. See id. (Kelly,j., dissenting). In arguing that indemnity is the appropriate form of 
relief in cases such as Tolbert, Justice Kelly relied on Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams 
Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975), in which the Illinois Supreme 
Court, emphasizing the strict tort purpose of ensuring that a loss is ultimately borne by the 
manufacturer, allowed a product manufacturer to obtain indemnity from a component 
part manufacturer. 255 N.W.2d at 370-71 (Kelly, j., dissenting). Subsequent Illinois 
Supreme Court opinions appear to have established that responsibility for product-caused 
injuries should be borne by the defendants according to their relative degrees of fault. 
This would allow the manufacturer to obtain contribution from either an employer or a 
party lower in the chain of distribution, at least in cases in which the conduct constitutes 
misuse or assumption of the risk. Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 44, 374 N.E. 2d 
455, 457 (1978) (partial indemnity allowed based on relative degree of employer's misuse 
of product that caused plaintiff's injury); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. 
Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 13,374 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1978) ("there is no valid reason for the contin-
ued existence of the no-contribution rule and [there are] many compelling arguments 
against it')' 
It is not clear whether these cases provide support for Justice Kelly'S opinion. Rather 
than disagreeing with Liberty Mutual, these subsequent cases provide more liberal rules of 
loss allocation. 
280. See 255 N.W.2d at 371-72 (Kelly, j., dissenting). 
281. Id. at 370 (Kelly, j., dissenting). 
282. Id. at 368-72 (Kelly, j., dissenting). 
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warranty, and strict liability, and the majority holds that only 
contribution is allowed. What if the case had been submitted 
on strict liability alone? What if one or both parties had 
breached an express warranty? What if breach of an express 
written contractual provision were involved? Regardless of any 
problems posed by such questions, the majority would presume 
to do justice in all future cases by allowing a jury discretion in 
allocating losses, a result, I predict, which will cause a greater 
spreading of loss among tortfeasors at the expense of economic 
and social policies favoring complete shifting of liability.283 
317 
Justice Rogosheske dissented for similar reasons. He agreed 
with the majority opinion as to the desirability of apportionment 
when liability is predicated solely on negligence; however, given 
the facts of Tolbert, Justice Rogosheske suggested that the findings 
of strict liability and breach of implied warranty should result in 
the granting of full indemnity to Voldco against Gerber.284 He 
assumed that the majority opinion would be confined to cases in 
which both the manufacturer and retailer or installer are found to 
be negligent: "If my assumption is incorrect and apportionment is 
to be extended to defective product cases where liability is based 
on breach of warranty or strict liability, apportionment of fault 
would require a wholly different comparison of the fault-produc-
ing relationship between the parties."285 Justice Rogosheske seri-
ously questioned whether an intelligible rule or jury instruction 
could be fashioned that would permit a jury rationally to appor-
tion liability. In such cases, the question of indemnity would, in 
his opinion, be one for the court.286 
2. Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 
The Minnesota court had an opportunity to reconsider its 
Tolbert decision in Frey lJ. Montgomery Ward & CO.2B7 In Frey the 
plaintiffs brought suit against Montgomery Ward to recover for 
damages to their chinchilla herd allegedly caused by the overheat-
ing of a space heater purchased from Montgomery Ward for use in 
a house trailer where the chinchillas were bred and raised for com:-
mercial purposes. Plaintiffs received no warnings or instructions 
concerning operation of the heater in a confined space. Montgom-
283. Id. at 371-72 (Kelly, j., dissenting). 
284. Id. at 372 (Rogosheske, j., dissenting). 
285. Id. (Rogosheske, j., dissenting). 
286. Id. (Rogosheske, J., dissenting). 
287. 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977). 
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ery Ward initiated a third-party action against McGraw-Edison, 
the manufacturer of the space heater, and McGraw-Edison im-
pleaded Robertshaw Controls Co., manufacturer of the space 
heater control unit. The trial court granted a motion for a di-
rected verdict in favor of McGraw-Edison and a motion for dis-
missal in favor of Robertshaw, in addition to directing a verdict 
against Montgomery Ward on the negligence issue.288 
a. The Majoriry Opinion 
The supreme court reversed the directed verdict as to McGraw-
Edison and held that the determination of McGraw-Edison's neg-
ligence for failure to warn of the dangers of using a space heater in 
a confined area was properly a question for the jury.289 
One of the additional issues before the court concerned the 
proper allocation of responsibility between McGraw-Edison and 
Montgomery Ward.290 Because the liability of both parties might 
be predicated on negligence, should the jury so find, the court left 
it to the trial court to determine whether category four indemnity 
was applicable, in which case Tolbert would be dispositive291 or, as 
suggested by Justice Kelly in his concurring opinion, whether the 
case fell within category three, "Where the one seeking indemnity 
has incurred liability because of a breach of duty owed to him by 
the one sought to be charged. "292 
b. . The Concumng OPinion 
Justice Kelly concurred in the result reached by the majority, 
but attempted to provide some guidance for the trial court if it 
would be required to apportion negligence between Montgomery 
Ward and McGraw-Edison. Although Justice Kelly had no 
problems equating the negligence of Montgomery Ward with that 
of McGraw-Edison in failing to warn of the danger, at least with 
respect to the plaintiffs, he was of the opinion that the analysis 
would differ when the question involved the apportionment of 
288. Id. at 784. 
289. Id. at 788. 
290. Id. 
291. /d. at 788-89. 
292. Id. at 791 (Kelly, J., concurring specially) (quoting Hendrickson v. Minnesota 
Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 373, 104 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1960), overruled in pari on 
other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68, 368 n.ll (Minn. 
1977». 
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negligence among the defendants.293 
On appeal Montgomery Ward argued that McGraw-Edison 
breached an implied warranty of merchantability of fitness for the 
ordinary purposes for which such goods are sold by failing to warn 
of the dangers of using the space heater in a confined space. 294 
Justice Kelly assumed that because the majority opinion contained 
no statement to the contrary, Montgomery Ward would be enti-
tled on remand to prove a breach of implied warranty by Mc-
Graw-Edison. He also stated that because of reliance on the 
expertise of McGraw-Edison, Montgomery Ward should be able 
to prove that, as between McGraw-Edison295 and itself, little or no 
culpability was attributable to Montgomery Ward, even though 
Montgomery Ward did participate to some extent in the design 
process.296 Justice Kelly commented further that were it not for 
Tolbert, he would have held that Montgomery Ward was entitled 
to indemnity from McGraw-Edison as a matter of law. 297 
Justice Kelly noted that although a retailer might be liable to a 
consumer for failing to inspect a product, the retailer might not be 
similarly liable to the manufacturer because the retailer may have 
reasonably relied on the manufacturer's warranties and exper-
tise. 29B In such situations, Justice Kelly was of the opinion that 
category three indemnity would be appropriate.299 
Justice Kelly's concurring opinion was joined in by Justices 
Todd and Yetka, as in Tolbert, but not Justice Rogosheske, one of 
the Tolbert dissenters. There are important points about the opin-
ions of Justice Kelly in Tolbert and Frey and Justice Rogosheske's 
opinion in Tolbert that must be considered. 
3. To What lYpes oJ Cases Will Tolbert App{y? 
a. Retailer Negligent; Manufacturer Stnct{y Liable 
Tolbert abrogated indemnity in category four cases, but only 
when both the retailer and manufacturer are negligent. This hold-
ing has the effect of overruling cases such as Bjorklund v. Hantz, 300 as 
293. 258 N.W.2d at 790-91 (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
294. Id. at 789 (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
295. Id. at 790 (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
296. /d. (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
297. Id. (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
298. /d. at 790-91 (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
299. Id. at 791 (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
300. 296 Minn. 298, 208 N.W.2d 722 (1973) (per curiam), olJmu/ed in parI, Tolbert v. 
Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977). 
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the court made clear in its opinion. Less certain is its impact on 
other combinations of liability, including the situations presented 
in Fa" v. Armstrong Rubber CO.30) and Sorenson v. Saflty Flate, Inc.302 
The key inquiry raised by Tolbert is whether the rules of contri-
bution or indemnity will be applied when the manufacturer is 
strictly liable and the retailer is negligent. This issue was raised by 
Justice Rogosheske's dissenting opinion in Tolbert, in which he as-
sumed that the majority opinion would be limited to cases in 
which both the retailer and manufacturer are negligent. 
In spite of the dissent, there are several reasons why the Tolbert 
court's abrogation of category four indemnity should be extended 
to such cases. First, the result seems to be dictated by the court's 
subsequent opinion in Busch v. Busch Constroction, Inc. 303 In Busch 
the strictly liable manufacturer, General Motors, was allowed con-
tribution from Busch, a negligent plaintiff and codefendant.304 
Because the claim was for contribution it seems clear the contribu-
tion would have worked in favor of Busch as well as General Mo-
tors. If a strictly liable manufacturer is able to obtain contribution 
from a negligent party outside the chain of distribution, or a negli-
gent party outside the chain can obtain contribution from the 
strictly liable manufacturer, there is no reason why contribution 
would be inappropriate to adjust losses between a negligent re-
tailer and a strictly liable manufacturer. 
Although the assumption was made in Justice Rogosheske's dis-
sent in Tolbert that the nature of the fault comparison would be 
substantially different if theories other than negligence were in-
volved, Busch seems to have resolved that problem by recognizing 
that strict liability and negligence can be compared. The compar-
ison of fault between a negligent retailer and strictly liable manu-
facturer should be no more difficult than comparing the fault of a 
negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable manufacturer. 
A second reason for extending Tolbert to such cases is the policy 
underlying abrogation of category four indemnity. Indemnity in 
category four cases was abolished in Tolbert because the court per-
ceived a significant distinction between that category of indemnity 
and the first three indemnity categories; unlike those seeking in-
demnity in the first three categories, the retailer is culpably negli-
301. 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.w.2d 64 (1970). 
302. 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974). 
303. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
304. Id. at 393-94. 
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gent. In addition, the court was concerned with the difficulty 
involved in making the indemnity determination, which presented 
the trial judge with "a bewildering array of issues" to consider. 
The same reasons should apply in cases in which the manufacturer 
is strictly liable. The negligent retailer is just as culpable and the 
indemnity determination is just as difficult, whether the manufac-
turer is strictly liable or negligent. 
Finally, as a matter of logical consistency, the rule of Tolbert 
should be extended to such cases. If Tolbert is not applied, thus 
preserving category four indemnity in cases in which the retailer is 
negligent and the manufacturer strictly liable, a curious result 
would arise. A greater burden would be imposed on the manufac-
turer even though it is less culpable than if found negligent. 
In summary, the court's decision in Busch, the policy of Tolbert, 
and logical consistency would seem to compel the extension of 
Tolbert to cases in which the retailer is negligent and the manufac-
turer strictly liable. 
b. Retalter Strictty Liab/~· Manufacturer Stnd/y Liable 
The Tolbert rationale in eliminating category four indemnity is 
to preclude the shifting of the full loss, as a matter of law, from a 
retailer to a manufacturer when the retailer has been negligent in 
causing the plaintiff's injury, either in failing to discover the defect 
or in some other respect. In a case such as Fa" D. Armstrong Rubber 
CO.,305 in which there has been no negligent misconduct on the 
part of the retailer, the justification for eliminating the right of 
indemnity, at least as specified in Tolbert, disappears. The justifi-
cation for eliminating category four indemnity when the retailer is 
negligent is based upon a dislike of the rule of indemnity when it 
allows a retailer who has been negligent to recover and a dislike of 
complex determinations involved in making the indemnity deter-
mination. The first reason for eliminating category four disap-
pears when the retailer is not negligent. The second reason, the 
complexity of that determination, is also eliminated when there is 
no negligence or active misconduct on the part of the retailer. 
There are good reasons from the majority's opinion in Tolbert to 
believe that it was not intended to cover situations in which the 
retailer or installer is not negligent. First, in criticizing the 
305. 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970). For a discussion of Fa", see text accompa-
nying notes 243-44 supra. 
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problems created by the active-passive dichotomy, the Tolbert 
court referred only to cases that have drawn the distinction when 
the party seeking indemnity has been determined to be negli-
gent.306 Second, in referring to cases that are overruled by Tolbert, 
the court made no reference to chain of distribution cases in which 
the retailer was not negligent. 307 The specific omission of cases 
such as Farr from that listing provides further support for the con-
clusion that indemnity continues to apply in such cases. 
c. Retazfer Liable on Express Warranty/ Manufacturer Strictly Lzable 
Tolbert provides no clear guidelines as to the propriety of grant-
ing a retailer indemnity in cases in which the retailer is held liable 
on the basis of breach of an express warranty, in addition to im-
plied warranty or strict liability, and the manufacturer is deter-
mined to be strictly liable or negligent. In criticizing the difficult 
distinctions that must be made in deciding if indemnity is appro-
priate, the Tolbert court cited Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc. ,308 in 
which distributors who were held liable on the basis of breach of 
express warranty were allowed indemnity against strictly liable 
and negligent manufacturers because of the secondary nature of 
the distributors' liability in relationship to that of the manufactur-
ers.309 
If indemnity is allowed in such situations, the result that is 
reached is somewhat anomalous because the standards used to de-
termine the propriety of indemnity are the same standards the 
court criticized in Tolbert. In a case in which a retailer is held lia-
ble on the basis of express warranty, the indemnity determination 
turns on whether the retailer's conduct can be labeled secondary in 
relationship to the conduct of the manufacturer. 
In light of the apparent limitation of Tolbert to cases in which 
the retailer has been negligent, however, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the rule of indemnity would be abrogated in such cases. 
This leaves cases in which breach of express warranty is deter-
mined to be primary or concurrent with the manufacturer's fault. 
In such cases, contribution would be the appropriate remedy. Al-
though Tolbert on its face does not extend to such situations, logic 
again compels the conclusion that contribution would be appro-
306. Su 255 N.W.2d at 367 & n.6. 
307. Send. at 368 n.11. 
308. 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974). 
309. /d. at 361,216 N.W.2d at 864. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 323 1980
1980] THE ANATOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 323 
priate, and that the fair shares of the parties would be determined 
on a comparative fault basis.310 
In summary, the key factor in deciding if comparative fault 
principles apply should be the nature of the retailer's liability. 
The basis of the manufacturer's liabilty may be important in allo-
cating loss, but it should be irrelevant in deciding if comparative 
fault principles apply. If a retailer is negligent, in whatever re-
spect, or if the retailer has breached an express warranty and that 
breach is determined to be concurrent with the manufacturer's lia-
bility, contribution would be appropriate and the shares of the 
parties should be determined on the basis of comparative fault 
principles. If the retailer is not negligent, but is held liabile on the 
basis of strict liability or implied warranty, or express warranty 
when the breach is not concurrent with the manufacturer's liabil-
ity, indemnity should be the appropriate remedy. 
1. Classijication Problems 
Justice Kelly's dissenting opinion in To/bert 311 and his concur-
ring opinion in Frey312 raise further complications in the interpre-
tation of the majority opinion in Tolbert. In Tolbert Justice Kelly 
took the position that Gerber's breach of warranty with respect to 
Voldco should justify an award of indemnity, despite Voldco's 
negligence.313 The negligence finding was labeled superfluous by 
Justice Kelly in light of the breach of warranty by Gerber.314 In 
Frey Justice Kelly again raised the implied warranty, this time 
running from McGraw-Edison to Montgomery Ward, as a justifi-
cation for an award of indemnity.315 In addition, he indicated 
that the presence of a breach of warranty plus the potential breach 
of a duty to warn by McGraw-Edison would place the case in cate-
gory three indemnity.316 
Justice Kelly's analysis was apparently accepted by the majority 
310. The feasibility of apportioning fault in cases in which some of the parties are held 
liable on the basis of breach of express warranty is illustrated in Sorenson v. Safety Flate, 
Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974). It would be anomalous to find contribution 
appropriate in cases in which the retailer is negligent or has breached an express warranty, 
but to determine the fair shares of the parties in the former situation on the basis of com-
parative fault and the latter on a pro rata basis. 
311. 255 N.W.2d at 368-72 (Kelly, j., dissenting). 
312. 258 N. W. 2d at 789-92 (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
313. 255 N.W.2d at 369 (Kelly, j., dissenting). 
314. See id. (Kelly, j., dissenting). 
315. 258 N.W.2d at 789 (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
316. Id. at 791 (Kelly, j., concurring specially). 
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in Frey because of the statement that on remand the trial court, 
assuming McGraw-Edison was found to be negligent, would have 
to determine whether the case fit within category three "as sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Kelly,"317 or within category four in which 
case Tolbert would apply.318 
The difficulty with this analysis is that in most cases, including 
one such as Tolbert, there usually will be reliance on the expertise 
of the manufacturer. It is arguable that the non-delegable duty 
concept embodied in category three indemnity cases fits the prod-
ucts liability context. However, that duty would exist in virtually 
all cases. Even in cases in which the retailer is negligent, as in Frey, 
that reliance may be justifiable. Application of the non-delegable 
duty concept transforms category four cases into category three 
cases. If the analysis suggested by Justice Kelly is followed it seems 
clear that the majority opinion in Tolbert could be significantly 
limited. 
Following Justice Kelly's analysis, a judge must first determine 
whether the facts establish that the retailer's reliance on the war-
ranties and expertise of the manufacturer is reasonable. If so, the 
case would fall within the third categoy of indemnity, even though 
the retailer is negligent. If not, the jury would apportion fault and 
that apportionment would determine the fair shares of the parties 
on the contribution issue. 
In effect, the same determination that the Tolbert majority indi-
cated would present courts with a "bewildering array" of factors to 
consider would be utilized. It is the exact sort of analysis the court 
sought to avoid. If the rule announced in Tolbert is to remain via-
ble, the position advocated by Justice Kelly will have to be re-
jected. If not, the Tolbert rule will have to be reconsidered. 
C. Summary 
The Minnesota court's decisions in Lambertson and Tolbert give 
rise to a number of interpretive problems. The problems of the 
. workplace injury can be given separate consideration because of 
the peculiar problems involved in the interplay between products 
liability law and the workers' compensation statute. The primary 
problem involved in interpreting Lambertson concerns the method 
to be used in determining to what extent contribution will be al-
317. Id. at 788 (majority opinion). 
318. Id. at 789. 
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lowed to a third party. The court's decisions in Johnson v. Raske 
Budding Systems) Inc.,319 and Cronen v. Wegdahl Cooperative Elevator 
Assocz"atzon 320 should resolve most of those problems, although 
those decisions must be scrutinized to determine if their implica-
tions are consistent with the basic policy of limitation established 
in Lambertson. 
The decision in Tolbert was clear: the rule of indemnity in cate-
gory four cases was rejected. The problem is in determining what 
the implications of the decision are. The court's decision in Busch 
seems to mandate an extension of Tolbert because of the inability to 
restrict the logical implications of the Busch decision. What this 
means is that the court has come close to adopting comparative 
fault principles for purposes of determining contribution between 
multiple defendants, whether those defendants are inside or 
outside the chain of manufacture and distribution.321 
Other problems, such as those raised by Justice Kelly in his sep-
arate opinions in Tolbert and Frey, are more difficult to resolve. 
Because his opinions, if followed, create the possibility that indem-
nity will prevail, even in situations in which Tolbert would other-
wise appear clearly to apply, the views of Justice Kelly will have to 
be scrutinized carefully to determine whether they are consistent 
with the majority opinion in Tolbert. 
It also seems to be the case that indemnity, even without Justice 
Kelly's opinions, will be the appropriate remedy in some situa-
tions, such as when the conduct of the party lower in the chain of 
distribution can appropriately be labeled passive or nonculpable. 
The means of making the distinctions necessary to isolate those 
cases in which indemnity will be appropriate were, to an extent, 
discredited in Tolbert, but only in situations in which the retailer's 
or installer's conduct was negligent. It would seem, therefore, that 
indemnity will continue to prevail, except in those cases in which 
319. 276 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1979) (procedure for apportionment requires third-
party tortfeasors to pay entire verdict to plaintiff; employer then contributes amount in 
proportion to its negligence, not exceeding amount of workers' compensation benefits, to 
third-party tortfeasor, and plaintiff reimburses employer pursuant to workers' compensa-
tion statute). 
320. 278 N.W.2d 102, 101 (Minn. 1979) (employer's no-fault insurer entitled to be 
subrogated to claim of employee's survivors against third parties' amount paid to insurer 
properly deducted from total third-party recovery). 
321. The Minnesota Legislature adopted a comparative fault act partially in response 
to the Legislature's perception that comparative fault principles already had been adopted 
judicially. See' Tape' of He'(lnng on H.F. .338 Bifore' the'Mtnne'Sot(l Smole' Judiciary Subcommittu on 
Judicial Admlnistr;atlon, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 1, 1978). 
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the retailer or installer has been negligent, or when breach of ex-
press warranty is deemed to be concurrent with the fault of the 
manufacturer. 
IV. A SYNTHESIS OF Loss ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 
Loss allocation has previously been considered in isolated con-
texts. Busch D. Busch Construction~ Inc.322 concerned the apportion-
ment of fault between a negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable 
manufacturer;323 Lambertson D. Cincinnati COrp.324 involved contribu-
tion between a negligent manufacturer and a negligent em-
ployer;325 and Tolbert D. Gerber lndustries~ Inc. 326 involved 
contribution between parties in the chain of distribution.327 
In previous sections of this Article, these decisions and their 
ramifications have been analyzed. Integrated, the decisions indi-
cate that Minnesota has moved close to a full comparative fault 
procedure that permits the allocation of negligence, strict liability, 
and breach of implied and express warranties as components of 
"fault." In this section, the three decisions are placed in a more 
practical context-submission of the comparative fault question to 
juries. This section also deals with the resolution of indemnity 
claims following the comparative fault determination, and a new 
issue in comparative fault cases; the problem of aggregation. 
A. Jury Standards 
If the Minnesota court's decisions concerning loss allocation in 
the products liability context are viewed in isolation, special fac-
tors important to allocation may be distilled. The factors relevant 
to apportioning fault among parties in the chain of distribution 
were detailed by Justice Kelly in his concurring opinion in Frey D. 
Montgomery Ward &I CO.328 Justice Kelly focused on the degree of 
reliance by a retailer on a manufacturer's skill and expertise as 
demonstrated by inquiries into whether the manufacturer fulfilled 
its obligation to warn of dangers associated with the use of the 
product and whether implied warranties were given to the retailer 
322. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
323. Id. at 393. 
324. 312 Minn. 114,257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). 
325. See ld. 
326. 255 N.w.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). 
327. See ld. 
328. 258 N.W.2d 782, 789-91 (Minn. 1977) (Kelly, J., concurring specially). 
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by the manufacturer.329 An additional factor is the degree to 
which the retailer may have encouraged use of the product apart 
from the manufacturer, such as through the giving of an express 
warranty to the purchaser of the product.33o 
The comparison of the fault of users and consumers or employ-
ers to the fault of parties in the chain of distribution is based on 
similar factors. The degree of knowledge of the product's charac-
teristics and performance may differ between the ordinary con-
sumer and an employer, but the degree of justifiable reliance on 
the manufacturer's skill and expertise is important as is the ability 
of the consumer or employer to avoid the injury by exercising rea-
sonable care to prevent injuries from occurring. In addition, there 
will have to be a focus on the product and the conduct of parties in 
the chain of distribution with respect to that product. Aside from 
the negligence inquiry, the strict liability inquiry involves the same 
factors that are considered in determining if the product is defec-
tive.331 
Irrespective of the specific context, whether employer-manufac-
turer, retailer-manufacturer, or consumer-manufacturer, the fac-
tors involved in fault apportionment are substantially similar. But 
in asking a jury to apportion fault it is questionable whether de-
tailing the factors that a jury may legitimately rely on in making 
their apportionment will be of any meaningful assistance to the 
jury without complicating the process.332 
Given the subjective nature of the determination involved in ap-
portioning fault it should be recognized that attempts to provide 
detailed guidance for juries are likely to be illusory.333 Drawing 
the jury's attention to specific facts influencing the comparative 
fault determination is more legitimately a function of closing argu-
ment rather than jury instruction. 
The comparative fault inquiry should be no more complicated 
than that involved when negligence alone is being apportioned. 
The only necessary addition would be to define for the jury the 
term "fault" so that conduct constituting strict tort liability or 
329. S~e ld. at 790 (Kelly, J., concurring specially). 
330. S~~ Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974). 
331. Su Steenson, supra note 82, at 28 n.131. 
332. As is the case with establishing detailed guidelines for a jury in deciding if a prod-
uct is defective, se~ ld. at 57 n.218, it is questionable whether the factors could be quanti-
fied for a jury. 
333. Se~ ld. 
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breach of warranty may be taken into consideration in making the 
apportionment. 
The following suggested instruction adopts a comparative fault 
approach and is presented with the idea of simplifying the com-
parative fault determination for jury submission: 
The law requires that fault be apportioned among those par-
ties found to be at fault in causing the plaintiffs injuries. Fault 
consists of negligence, strict tort liability, and [breach of war-
ranty]. If by your answers to questions - and - you have 
determined any of the parties to be at fault and that their fault 
was a direct cause of plaintiffs injuries, you must apportion 
fault among those parties. 
Assuming that the jury has affirmatively answered the special 
verdict questions covering the theories of liability that have been 
asserted against every defendant, and that fault has been allo-
cated, two additional problems remain. One concerns indemnity 
and the other the problem of aggregation. 
B. Indemniljl 
Although the comparative fault question would be submitted to 
a jury, a judicial determination would still have to be made 
whether indemnity is appropriate. At least in cases in which the 
retailer or other party lower in the chain of distribution is found to 
be liable solely on the basis of strict liability in tort, indemnity may 
be appropriate. The jury's answer to the fact question would be 
conclusive. But if the jury finds that the retailer has made and 
breached an express warranty, the determination would have to be 
made by the trial judge whether the warranty representations were 
inconsistent with those implicit in the product itself. As in Sorenson 
v. Safiljl Flate, Inc. 334 that determination would control the indem-
nity issue.335 
C Aggregation 
When multiple parties are involved in a lawsuit and fault is ap-
portioned among those parties, the question arises whether the 
plaintiffs fault will be compared to the fault of each individual 
defendant or to the combined fault of the defendants. As an ex-
ample, assume that a plaintiff is determined to be forty percent at 
334. 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.w.2d 859 (1974). 
335. See' notes 253-59 supra and accompanying text. 
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fault, a defendant retailer and manufacturer are each thirty per-
cent at fault, and that the findings as to the retailer and manufac-
turer are based upon the jury's conclusion that they were strictly 
liable. Will the plaintiff be entitled to recover against the retailer 
and manufacturer, or will he be denied recovery? 
The comparative negligence statute provided as follows: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action 
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, 
if the contributory negligence was not as great as the negligence of the 
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. 336 
The aggregation question has not arisen in the products liability 
context in Minnesota, in part due to the rule of indemnity ordina-
rily applicable to products liability cases premised on strict liabil-
ity,337 and in part because of the absence of a comparative fault 
procedure applicable to strict liability cases.338 The court's deci-
336. Act of May 23,1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069 (emphasis added) 
(current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978». 
337. Because indemnity would be the ordinary remedy in cases involving the appor-
tionment of loss among parties in the chain of distribution, there would be no necessity of 
making a comparative fault apportionment. &e Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 
353,359-61,216 N.W.2d 859, 862-64 (1974); Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298, 301-02, 
208 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1973) (per curiam), overruled z'npart on other grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber 
Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.ll (Minn. 1977). 
338. Strict liability and comparative negligence have developed independently. See 
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 
380,385 (1978). Only recently have mergers of the two separate theories taken place. In a 
pure comparative fault system, such as that adopted by the California Supreme Court in 
Daly, the aggregation issue becomes important for purposes of deciding contribution ques-
tions, but not for purposes of deciding whether the plaintiff will be entitled to recover. 
In Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973), 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court intimated that an aggregation rule would be adopted in 
products liability cases. The case involved damage to a fire truck that overturned because 
of a defective wheel. Suit was brought by the city against the company that handled the 
sale of the truck chassis, Badger Ford, the manufacturer of the chassis, Ford Motor, and 
the manufacturer of the truck wheels, Gunite Division of Kelsey Hayes. Taking 100% as 
the total negligence involved in the case, the jury was asked what percentage of negligence 
should be assigned to the city and to the defective product. The jury determined that the 
city was negligent but that its negligence was not causally related to the accident. One 
hundred percent of the negligence was thus attributed to the defective product. Only 
after negligence is apportioned between the plaintiff and the defendant would questions 
concerning the apportionment of negligence among multiple defendants in the chain of 
distribution become relevant, and then only for purposes of contribution. &e z'd. at 649, 
207 N.W.2d at 871. The controlling finding in deciding if the plaintiff will be entitled to 
recover is the comparison of the plaintiff's negligence to the negligence attributed to the 
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sions in Busch lJ. Busch Construction, Inc. 339 and Tolbert lJ. Gerber Indus-
tries, /nC. 340 now directly present the problem. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has considered the aggregation 
problem twice, in Krengel lJ. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc. 341 and in 
Marier lJ. Memorial Rescue Service, Inc. 342 In Krengel the plaintiff was 
injured when she tripped on the riser of an automatic photo booth 
in a dime store. Suit was brought against the dime store, the photo 
booth distributor, and the servicer of the machine. The jury deter-
mined that the plaintiff was forty percent at fault, and that the 
dime store, distributor, and servicer were thirty, twenty, and ten 
percent negligent respectively. Because the defendants were en-
gaged in a joint venture, with shared control over the profits from 
the photo booth enterprise, their percentages of negligence were 
aggregated and compared to the plaintiff's negligence, allowing 
the plaintiff to recover sixty percent of her damages.343 Had her 
negligence been compared against each defendant individually, 
she would not have been entitled to recover because her negligence 
was greater than the negligence of the individual defendants. 
In Maner the plaintiff was injured in a truck-ambulance colli-
sion. The plaintiff brought suit against the ambulance service and 
the truck driver. The jury found the plaintiff and defendants each 
to be one-third at fault. Because the plaintiff's negligence was 
equal to the negligence of each of the two defendants, recovery 
would be denied unless aggregation was permitted. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court distinguished Krengel, stating that the aggre-
gation rule would be limited to situations in which joint ventures 
defective product. See I'd. The Wisconsin procedure thus accomplishes aggregation among 
parties in the chain of distribution. 
With the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in May v. Skelly Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 
30, 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978), abolishing the rule of aggregation will, of course, have an 
impact on products liability cases, as illustrated in the context of a workplace injury in 
Soeldner v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 473 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Wis. 1979). 
In Soeldner a ladder manufacturer found to be eight percent negligent as compared to the 
plaintiff who was found to be 32% negligent, was held liable. The manufacturer's liability, 
however, was limited to its percentage of liability, but only in the context of this workers' 
compensation/third party action. See 473 F. Supp. 753, 756-57 (E.D. Wis. 1979). The 
decision is not the result of any peculiar products liability aggregation rule, as in Fran/clin, 
but the general rule allowing aggregation, which the court in May indicated it would 
adopt. 
339. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
340. 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). 
341. 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.w.2d 841 (1973). 
342. 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.w.2d 706 (1973). 
343. 295 Minn. at 208, 203 N.W.2d at 846. 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 331 1980
1980] THE ANATOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 331 
are involved.344 
Products liability cases will fit somewhere between Krengel and 
Marier. The usual marketing arrangements will not involve joint 
ventures. Yet, the nature of the marketing relationship distin-
guishes products liability cases from Marier based upon two fac-
tors. First, in products liability cases, the actions of two or more 
parties in the chain of distribution are not likely to be the unre-
lated, concurrent acts of negligence that existed in Maner. Second, 
the law of strict liability, with its broad social and economic poli-
344. 296 Minn. at 246, 207 N.W.2d at 709. 
Minnesota's comparative negligence statute, Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 
Minn. Laws \069, \069-70 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978)), was based on 
the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute up to the time of the adoption of the Min-
nesota comparative negligence act in 1969. Su Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 
296 Minn. 242, 245, 207 N.W.2d 706, 708 (1973). Wisconsin has traditionally refused to 
aggregate percentages of negligence of defendants, see Chille v. Howell, 34 Wis. 2d 491, 
500, 149 N.W.2d 600, 604 (1967); Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 
535,252 N.W. 721, 727 (1934), absent some sort of joint duty. See Reber v. Hanson, 260 
Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952) (joint duty of supervision of parents over child justified 
aggregating parents' negligence). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated its intent to abandon the rule against 
aggregation in an appropriate case. See May v. Skelly Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 264 N.W.2d 
574 (1978). In Soeldner v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 473 F. Supp. 753 
(E.D. Wis. 1979), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
followed the court's ruling in May and allowed the plaintiff to recover against a defendant 
found to be less negligent than the plaintiff. In Soeldner the plaintiff, an employee of Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. was injured when he fell from a ladder manufactured by defendant White 
Metal. The jury found the plaintiff 32% negligent, Sears 60% negligent, and White Metal 
eight percent negligent. Because Wisconsin law made workers' compensation the em-
ployee's exclusive remedy against his employer, the employer could not have been held 
liable for contribution by White Metal. See 473 F. Supp. at 754. An untempered applica-
tion of Mty' would have obligated White Metal to pay 68% of the plaintiffs damages, even 
though it was only eight percent negligent. In the interest of fairness, the court held that 
White Metal's liability would be limited to eight percent of the plaintiffs damages. How-
ever, the court limited its holding "to those instances in which a plaintiff has a separate 
remedy against his employer via the workman's compensation process." 473 F. Supp. at 
756. 
Mty', of course, would not be controlling in Minnesota. The rationale for the use of 
Wisconsin law set out by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Marier is inapplicable to cases 
decided by the Wisconsin courts after the date of the adoption of the Minnesota compara-
tive negligence act. This does not detract from the persuasiveness of the decision in Mtg', 
however. In fact, Mty' provides support for judicial latitude in construing the Minnesota 
act. For a criticism of May, see Comment, Change 0/ the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence 
Statute in Multl~De.fendant Suits: May v. Skelly Oil Co., 62 MARQ. L. REV. 227 (1978). 
In cases arising after the effective date of the Minnesota comparative fault act, see Act 
of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40, Mty' would be irrelevant given 
the clear legislative intent to deny the rule of aggregation. See notes 352-420 infta and 
accompanying text. 
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cies, was obviously inapplicable in the Marier situation.345 
Although technical arguments may be made that would support 
aggregation by analogizing products liability cases to other cases 
involving joint duties,346 the question is ultimately one of policy. 
Indemnity in products liability cases has traditionally considered 
the liability of a party lower in the chain of distribution to be de-
rivative, secondary, or passive.347 Thus characterizing the distrib-
utor's conduct allows the distributor to obtain indemnity from the 
manufacturer. Part of the justification for the adoption of strict 
liability in tort as applied to product manufacturers is based upon 
a recognition of the rule of indemnity that allows the loss to be 
shifted through the chain of distribution until the manufacturers 
ultimately become responsible for the loss.348 The rule of strict lia-
bility is made applicable to retailers and other parties lower in the 
chain of distribution, with the recognition that the retailer may 
not be able to shift the loss to the manufacturer.349 The obligation 
of the parties in the chain of distribution is a special responsibility 
to bear the loss arising from injuries due to defective products. It 
is, in effect, a joint obligation to market safe products. 
Following Tolbert there now exists a mechanism for apportioning 
loss among parties in the chain of distribution in most situa-
tions.35o The fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted 
a method ofloss allocation does not mean, however, that the fun-
damental nature of the relationship of parties in the chain of dis-
tribution to injured users and consumers is altered. The supreme 
court has developed a more equitable means of loss allocation be-
tween those parties, not a means of fragmenting what seems to be 
a dual or joint responsibility to manufacture and sell non-defective 
products.351 
345. q: Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 532, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742 
(1971) (rejecting strict liability in the automobile accident context). 
346. See, ~.g., Reber v. Hanson, 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952) (parentalobliga-
tion to protect child held to be ajoint duty); Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 
437 (1938) (in. party wall collapse, joint obligation imposed on two owners of one of the 
adjoining buildings). 
347. See Prosser, supra note 110, at 1123-24. 
348. See ld. 
349. See Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974); Farr v. 
Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970). 
350. See notes 303-18 supra and accompanying text. 
351. In cases in which indemnity is appropriate, as in vicarious liability cases, it would 
be inappropriate to split into two shares what should be a single responsibility. &~ Mar-
tindale v. Griffin, 233 A.D. 510, 253 N.Y.S. 578 (1931) (automobile driver and owner held 
liable for a single share). Following Tolb"t, indemnity would continue to be the appropri-
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If a plaintiffs liability is compared to the fault of each individ-
ual defendant, then recovery will depend on the complexity of the 
marketing arrangements made for selling the product. The more 
complex the chain of distribution, the greater the dispersion of 
fault among the defendants, and the less likely that a plaintiff who 
is partially at fault will be entitled to recover for his injuries. 
It is questionable whether loss allocation should be structured so 
as to disallow recovery in such a situation. The objective of strict 
liability, encouraging greater manufacturer and seller responsibil-
ity and providing compensation for those injured by defective 
products, will be diluted to the extent that losses that should ordi-
narily be borne by those profiting from the sale of defective prod-
ucts are shifted to the consumer. 
D. The Comparative Fault Act 
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in Busch, 
Tolbert, and Lambertson moved Minnesota close to a comparative 
fault approach, reservations in those decisions placed Minnesota 
law just short of a full comparative fault procedure.3s2 Because of 
those limitations, the impact of the recently adopted comparative 
fault act3S3 (Minnesota Act) on loss allocation principles is likely to 
ate remedy in vicarious liability cases, which thr court regards as encompassing the first 
three categories of indemnity. In these situations it would seem that fault would not be 
apportioned among the defendant whose active fault caused the accident and the defend-
ant who is vicariously responsible. The defendants would be jointly reponsible for a single 
share. Strictly speaking, percentages of fault are not being aggregated. Rather, fault is 
not being apportioned among defendants who in fairness are jointly responsible for a sin-
gle share of liability. 
In post- TO/h"' products liability cases in which indemnity is appropriate, such as 
cases similar to Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353,216 N.W.2d 859 (1974), the 
same rationale might apply. Because indemnity would be appropriate, the liability of 
distributor and manufacturer would be joint for purposes of comparison to the plaintiff'S 
fault. 
The nature of the relationship between distributors and manufacturers that prior to 
TO/h"' caused the supreme court to apply the rule of indemnity would not seem to be 
altered solely because the court decided that fault could be apportioned among parties in 
the chain of distribution. If fault would not be apportioned in a case such as Sormson, 
because the rule of indemnity applies, but would be apportioned in a case such as Bjork-
lund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298,208 N.W.2d 722 (1973) (per curiam), OlJn-ru/ed in par' on o,h" 
grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977), when the 
retailer is negligent, then the plaintiff's right to recover could well depend on the degree of 
culpability of the retailer. In either case the relationship of the parties in the chain should 
. be treated the same. 
352. Su notes 319-21 supra and accompanying text. 
353. See notes 355-420 infia and accompanying text. 
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be substantial. 
The section-by-section analysis of the Minnesota Act that fol-
lows will explain the general operation of the Minnesota Act and 
specifically analyze the impact of the Minnesota Act on the court's 
decisions in Busch and Tolbert. Before beginning, however, a brief 
word on the derivation of the Minnesota Act is in order. The Min-
nesota Act was modeled in part on the Uniform Comparative 
Fault Act354 (Uniform Act). The Uniform Act and the Senate 
floor debates over the Minnesota Act were relied upon heavily in 
the analysis that follows. 
1. Section 601. 01 
a. SubdilJlslon 1 
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any 
person or his legal representative to recover damages for fault 
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the con-
tributory fault was not greater than the fault of the person 
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attrib-
utable to the person recovering. The court may, and when re-
quested by any party shall, direct the jury to find separate 
special verdicts determining the amount of damages in propor-
tion to the amount of fault attributable to the person recover-
ing.355 
Subdivision 1 of section 604.01 makes two significant changes in 
the comparative negligence statute. First, the statute provides for 
the comparison of "fault" rather than "negligence." Second, it 
changes the cutoff point for determining liability. Under the com-
parative negligence statute, a plaintiff would be entitled to re-
cover so long as his negligence was not equal to the negligence of 
the party against whom recovery was sought. 356 The Minnesota 
Act bars recovery only if the plaintifPs fault is greater than the fault 
of the person against whom recovery is sought. Otherwise, the 
Minnesota Act retains the comparative negligence approach re-
quiring a comparison of the fault of the claimant to the fault of the 
person against whom recovery is sought. The impact of this lan-
354. See Tape of Hearing on H.F. 338 Before the Minnesota Smate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Judicial Administration, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 1, 1978). 
355. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (amending MINN. 
STAT. § 604.01(1) (1976». 
356. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069-70 (current 
version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978». 
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guage on the important question of aggregating the fault of multi-
ple defendants will be reserved until the statutory provisions 
governing loss allocation in section 604.02, subdivision 3 of the act 
are discussed.357 
b. Subdivision J a 
The term "fault" is defined in subdivision la of section 604.01: 
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure 
negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor 
or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The 
term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assump-
tion of risk not constituting an express consent, misuse of a 
product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to miti-
gate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply 
both to fault as the basis for liability and contributory fault. 358 
The breadth of the definition of fault raises a number of ques-
tions concerning the impact of the definition on the allocation of 
fault among a plaintiff and defendant. The effect of the Minne-
sota Act on the court's decision in Busch v. Busch Construction) Inc. 359 
must be analyzed and, since the Minnesota Act goes significantly 
beyond Busch, the implications of the statute for loss allocation 
must be analyzed. 
Because the definition of fault includes "acts or omissions that 
are in any measure negligent or reckless" including "unreasonable 
assumption of risk not constituting an express consent" and "mis-
use of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to 
mitigate damages" it becomes apparent that the Minnesota Act, 
although consistent with Busch, expands the definition of appor-
tionable plaintiff misconduct. The inclusion of assumption of the 
risk in the Minnesota Act is consistent with Busch, but there is no 
provision in the statute for the preservation of the Busch exception 
preventing consideration of contributory negligence consisting of 
failure to discover a defect.360 The inclusion of "acts or omissions 
357. St-e notes 405-17 infta and accompanying text. In addition, subdivisions 2-5 of the 
comparative negligence statute, dealing with settlements, are retained without change. 
Compare Id. with MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978). 
358. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. § 604.01 (I)(a) (1978». 
359. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
360. Although it is clear the Legislature was aware of Busch, St"e Tape o.f Hearing on HF 
338 Bifore the Minnesota Smote Judiciary Subcommlitu on Judicial Administration, 70th Minn. 
Legis., 1978 Sess. (Feb. 6, 1978), there is no express provision precluding consideration of 
negligent failure to discover a defect. An argument for preservation of the Busch exception 
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that are in any measure negligent or reckless" seems to override 
the Busch exception, allowing for the consideration of any plaintiff 
negligence, even if it consists of failure to discover a product de-
fect. 
By including "misuse of a product" as a defense, the same dis-
tinctions concerning misuse already adopted by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court seem to be continued.361 The Uniform Act pro-
vides a clear indication of how misuse is to be treated. Although 
the Uniform Act varies slightly from the Minnesota Act by includ-
ing as a defense "misuse of a product for which the defendant 
otherwise would be liable," the variance is insignificant as the 
comment to the Uniform Act indicates: 
The meaning in this Section is confined to a misuse glvmg 
rise to a danger that could have been reasonably anticipated 
and guarded against. The Act does not apply to a misuse giv-
ing rise to a danger that could not reasonably have been antici-
pated and guarded against by the manufacturer, so that the 
product was therefore not defective or unreasonably danger-
ous.362 
When an unforeseeable misuse is made of the product a manufac-
turer will owe no duty to the product user. Misuse as a defense 
thus encompasses misuses that the manufacturer should reason-
. ably have anticipated. 
The Minnesota Act seems to anticipate a merger of the defenses 
of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and misuse.363 
Specific enumeration of those defenses in the statute is designed to 
could, however, be constructed by reference to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Sec-
tion 1 (a) of the Uniform Act provides as follows: 
In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to 
person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant 
diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for 
an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar re-
covery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law the claimant's contrib-
utory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under applicable legal 
doctrines, such as last clear chance. 
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 (a). The Comment makes it clear that the Uni-
form Act is intended to reach conduct that would not previously have been a bar, includ-
ing "ordinary contributory negligence in an action based on strict liability." Id., 
Comment. 
Section I(a) of the Uniform Act was not included in the Minnesota Act. One may 
argue that because this section was excluded from the Minnesota Act, ordinary contribu-
tory negligence is not a defense, preserving that aspect of the Busch holding. 
361. See notes 29-34, 86-91 supra and accompanying text. 
362. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § l(b), Comment. 
363. &.,. Wade, supra note 44, at 383 nn.38 & 39, 394. 
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ensure that they will be considered as aspects of a plaintiffs con-
tributory fault. The Minnesota Act does not seem to anticipate 
that the defenses would be given separate consideration. Up to 
this point, the treatment of defenses under the Minnesota Act ap-
pears to be consistent with the approach under the court's decision 
in Busch, with the exception of the treatment of negligent failure to 
discover a product defect. 
The Minnesota Act goes beyond existing law in including 
breach of warranty in the definition of fault. 364 With this inclu-
sion, the statute resolves the question left open in Chatfield v. Sher-
win- Williams Co. 365 and Wenner v. Gu{f Oil Corp. ,366 in which the 
supreme court reserved decision on the applicability of the com-
parative negligence statute, as interpreted in Busch, to breach of 
warranty claims.367 However, the Minnesota Act is limited to 
claims involving personal injury or property damage, excluding 
actions involving solely economic loss.368 
Because of the breadth of the definition of fault under the Min-
nesota Act, the question arises as to how claims based on the 
breach of a statute are to be treated. Under the comparative neg-
ligence statute, the supreme court excluded the defense ofcontrib-
utory negligence in cases involving the breach of statutes designed 
to protect a particular class of individuals. In Zerby v. Warren ,369 a 
case involving the sale of toxic glue to a minor in violation of a 
Minnesota criminal statute, the court held that the defendant 
could not raise the defenses of contributory negligence or assump-
tion of the risk, the comparative negligence statute notwithstand-
ing, and that contribution against the minor purchaser of the glue 
would not be permitted.370 Although the Minnesota Act provides 
no guidance as to how breach of a statute is to be treated, the 
364. Su MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (I)(a) (1978). 
365. 266 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1978). 
366. 264 N.w.2d 374 (Minn. 1978). 
367. Su 262 N.W.2d at 393-94. 
368. The Comment to Section I of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides in 
part as follows: 
An action for breach of warranty is held to sound sometimes in tort and 
sometimes in contract. There is no intent to include in the coverage of the act 
actions that are fully contractual in their gravamen and in which the plaintiff is 
suing solely because he did not recover what he contracted to receive. The re-
striction of coverage to physical harm to person or property excludes these 
claims, however. 
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I'-Comment. 
369. 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973). 
370. ld. at 140-43,210 N.W.2d at 62-64. 
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Uniform Act appears to resolve the question. The applicability of 
the Uniform Act to cases involving statutory breaches has been 
acknowledgedYI The comments indicate, however, that courts 
will still have latitude in deciding if defenses to a statutory breach 
will be permitted: "A tort action based on violation of a statute is 
within the coverage of the Act if the conduct comes within the 
definition of fault and unless the statute is construed as Intended to prolJlde 
for recovery of/ull damage irrespective of contributory fault."3 72 
The final inclusion in the Minnesota Act's definition of "fault," 
"unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate dam-
ages,"373 may create problems in application. It is intended to en-
compass the doctrine of avoidable consequences that will justify 
barring or reducing the plaintiff's recovery for damages that he 
could, in the exercise of reasonable care, have avoided. Professor 
Wade's example illustrates the intended operation of the section in 
the Uniform Act: 
[S]uppose the plaintiff was driving a new car with due care, 
when due to a defect the left front wheel locked, causing him to 
swerve and hit a tree. Plaintiff had not buckled his seat belt 
and as a result his head hit the windshield and his face was 
damaged. His leg was broken, but this would have happened 
even if the seat belt had been buckled. He would not consent 
to medical treatment of the broken leg and the bone has not 
knit together. His recovery for both the facial injury and the 
untreated leg will be diminished, but for separate reasons 
(avoidable injury, and failure to mitigate damages). The dam-
ages to his car will not be mitigated.374 
One of the primary purposes of the section appears to be to ensure 
that the "seat belt defense" will be considered in apportioning 
damages.375 While seat belt evidence is inadmissible in Minne-
sota,376 the principle of avoidable consequences set out in the Min-
nesota and Uniform Acts will have other applications. The intent 
is to reduce the plaintiff's damages according to the percentage of 
371. Set" Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947). 
St!~ also Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920). 
372. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I, Comment (emphasis added). 
373. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (Ia) (1978). 
374. Wade, supra note 44, at 386. 
375. Set" id. 
376. Set" MINN. STAT. § 169.685(4) (1978) ("Proof of the use or failure to use seat belts, 
or proof of the installation or failure of installation of seat belts shall not be admissible in 
evidence in any litigation involving personal injuries or property damage resulting from 
the use or operation of any motor vehicle."). 
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contributory fault chargeable to the particular injury the plaintiff 
could have avoided. 377 
The defendant would carry the burden of proof of establishing 
that the plaintiffs fault contributed to each element of damage 
sustained by the plaintiff. Proof that the plaintiffs misconduct 
contributed to the damage would require the application of com-
parative fault principles. Administration of the rule would require 
the use of special verdict forms that would, when appropriate, ask 
for a separate fault determination as to each type of damage, at 
least when it reasonably appears that there is a basis for distin-
guishing between types of damages.378 
2. Section 601. 02 
a. Subdivision J 
"When two or more persons are jointly liable, contributions to 
awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributa-
ble to each, except that each is jointly and severally liable for the 
377. The Uniform Act contains a provision stating that: "In an action based on fault 
seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or harm to property, any contrib-
utory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as 
compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but 
does not bar recovery .... " UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 (a). The intent of 
the quoted language is to ensure that there is a requirement of a causal relation between 
the plaintiff's conduct and the particular damage suffered. 
Although this section was not made part of the Minnesota Act, there is no reason to 
expect that the requirement of a causal relation between the plaintiff's damage and the 
particular damage would be inapplicable. 
The distinction between contributory negligence and avoidable consequences has 
been questioned by Prosser. Seoeo W. PROSSER, supra note 109, § 65, at 423. The distinction 
drawn is that contributory negligence is plaintiff negligence arising before any injury or 
damage occurs, whereas avoidable consequences comes into being after the wrong has 
taken place, but while there is still time to limit damages. Seoeo z'd. Prosser has suggested 
that the reason for the distinction is the difficulty, in the avoidable consequences situation, 
of assigning a part of the damages to the defendant's negligence. Seoeo z'd. Making the rule 
of avoidable consequences part of the comparative fault determination precludes the use 
of that rule as a complete bar to recovery by supplying a means of apportioning responsi-
bility for a particular injury. Given the reason for the development of the rule, its absorp-
tion by the comparative fault act seems to be logical. 
378. In cases in which the rule of avoidable consequences applies, it has been held that 
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the damages can be apportioned. If no 
basis for apportionment could be established, the plaintiff's fault would bar all recovery. 
Seoeo W. PROSSER, supra note 109, at 473 n.70. Even in pre-comparative fault cases, it is 
difficult to understand why the plaintiff would bear the burden of proving separability. If 
the plaintiff is at fault it would seem that the defendant should bear the burden of proving 
that the plaintiff's fault contributed to the separate elements of damages. 
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whole award. "379 
Subdivision 1 makes it clear that the general rule that contribu-
tions to awards shall be made in proportion to the percentage of 
fault attributable to each of the parties when there is joint liability, 
but that each individual defendant remains jointly and severally 
liable for the whole award has been preserved. This continues the 
practice under the comparative negligence statute380 by ensuring 
that the responsibility of a defendant will not be limited to his 
percentage of fault and that each defendant will bear the burden 
of the uncollectibility from the other, except in cases covered in 
subdivision 2, in which the claimant (plaintiff) is at fault, and 
must bear part of that risk. 381 As an example, if two defendants 
are found to be at fault, the first twenty percent and the second 
eighty percent at fault, and if the defendant who is eighty percent 
at fault is insolvent, the defendant who is twenty percent at fault 
will be responsible for the entire award to the plaintiff. 
Subdivision 1 also requires contributions to an award to be de-
termined on the basis of the percentages of fault assessed against 
the defendants. From a products liability defendant's perspective, 
fault will include negligence, strict liability, and breach of war-
ranty. The broad definition of fault directly raises the question of 
how the comparative fault act will affect the court's decisions in 
Lambertson 382 Tolbert 383 Frev 384 and Busch 385 More specifically , '=-". , 
the issue is whether indemnity will be appropriate under the Min-
nesota Act, and if so, under what circumstances. There is no ex-
press provision in the Minnesota Act stating how indemnity claims 
are to be treated, raising a question whether any of the rules of 
indemnity as summarized in Hendndcson 386 and modified in 
Tolbert387 are still valid. 
The Uniform Act, like the Minnesota Act, provides that contri-
butions to awards shall be made according to the percentage of 
379. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. § 604.02(1) (1978»; 
380. Su Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069 (current ver-
sion at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978». 
381. MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2) (1978). 
382. 312 Minn. 114,257 N.w.2d 679 (1977). 
383. 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). 
384. 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977). 
385. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
386. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), overru/~d in pari, Tolben v. Gerber Indus., 
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). 
387. 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). 
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fault of the parties but that the rule of joint and several liability is 
retained.388 The comment to section 2 of the Uniform Act, provid-
ing for loss allocation, further indicates that "[i]n situations such as 
that of principal and agent, driver and owner of a car, or manufac-
turer and retailer of a product,"389 the court may "under appropri-
ate circumstances find that the two persons should be treated as a 
single party for purposes of allocating fault."390 
The Uniform Act does not provide specifically for the treatment 
of indemnity claims, other than in this comment. But the com-
ment illustrates at least two situations in which indemnity should 
be appropriate. In the case of an automobile owner and driver, or 
of principal and agent, the liability of the automobile owner and 
the principal is vicarious. Because of the derivative nature of the 
liability of those parties, there is no basis for apportioning fault 
among a principal and agent or an automobile owner and 
driver. 391 Because the illustrative situations in the comment are 
not meant to be exclusive, the first three rules of Hendriclcson could 
still be preserved, given the supreme court's interpretation of those 
rules as involving derivative liability on the part of persons who 
are without personal fault. 392 
Because the comments to the Uniform Act describe situations in 
which indemnity is appropriate, the inclusion of the products lia-
bility case involving a retailer and manufacturer might seem puz-
zling. However, the comment, in addition to describing situations 
in which indemnity might be appropriate, as in the case of princi-
pal and agent or automobile owner and driver, also describes situ-
ations in which loss, if it must be reallocated in the event of 
uncollectibility of a judgment from one of the responsible parties, 
such as the automobile owner or the principal, should be borne by 
the remaining party, such as the automobile driver or the agent. 
Loss will be shifted from the automobile owner/driver combina-
tion, or principal/agent, only if the judgment is uncollectible from 
either party. Because of the inability to separate the fault of the 
388. Compare MINN. STAT. § 604.02(1) (1978) wzth UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT 
Acr § 2(c). 
389. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, Comment. 
390. Id. 
391. Su Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 
843 (1960) (rule 1), ()vn-ruled in part on othn- grounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 
N.w.2d 362 (1977). 
392. Su Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977). 
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parties, they are jointly responsible for their share of the judgment, 
as determined by the comparative fault allocation. 
Although the liability of a manufacturer and retailer may not be 
deemed to be derivative or vicarious, the inclusion of such a case in 
the comment indicates that the liability of the retailer and manu-
facturer should be considered joint. Treating the re-
tailer/manufacturer combination like the principal/agent or 
automobile owner/driver combinations, then, leads to the conclu-
sion that loss will be reallocated to other parties in the litigation 
only if neither the retailer nor the manufacturer are able to satisfy 
their joint portion of the judgment. This concept is embodied in 
section 604.02, subdivision 3 of the Minnesota Act, which provides 
that in the event a portion of a judgment is uncollectible from a 
party in the chain of distribution or manufacture, that portion 
shall be reallocated to the other parties in the chain. 
The comment, ifit were read as an intent in the Uniform Act to 
provide for indemnity in chain of distribution cases, would be in-
consistent with the statute's express purpose of apportioning loss, 
according to the percentages of fault assessed against the parties, 
whether the fault consists of negligence, strict liability, or breach of 
warranty. The intent of the Uniform Act to abrogate the rule of 
indemnity in products liability cases is bolstered by reference to 
Professor Wade's comments indicating that one of the purposes of 
the Uniform Act is to ease a manufacturer's burden by providing 
for the shifting of loss from the manufacturer to other responsible 
parties.393 As applied to the Minnesota Act, this rationale would 
seem to make clear the intent to override the rule of indemnity in 
products liability cases. In the end, the argument rests upon the 
inconsistency between a true comparative fault act and the rule of 
indemnity, which, if applied, would of necessity override the com-
parative fault determination. 
If indemnity is preserved following Tolbert it would be limited to 
cases such as Sorenson 394 and Farr,395 in which the liability of the 
retailer is based solely ori strict liability or breach of an express 
warranty, and in which the warranty is not inconsistent with the 
representation of safety inherent in the product. Because the defi-
nition of fault reaches all bases of liability, however, including 
strict liability and breach of warranty, the clear implication of the 
393. See' Wade, supra note 44, at 389. 
394. Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216 N.W.2d 859 (1974). 
395. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970). 
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Minnesota Act would seem to be that even the limited reservation 
of indemnity following Tolbert would have to give way. 
The court's decision in Lambertson, abrogating the employer's 
workers' compensation immunity from contribution claims, how-
ever, remains unchanged. In Lambertson the third party manufac-
turer and employer were both negligent. The Minnesota Act 
makes it clear that a third party held liable on the basis of strict 
liability or breach of warranty would also be entitled to contribu-
tion, a result that the supreme court made apparent by its decision 
in Busch. 
b. Subdivision 2 
Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is 
entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a 
party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from 
that party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among 
the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to 
their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability is 
reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any 
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.396 
Subdivision 2 of section 604.02 is a new provision providing for 
loss reallocation in the event of uncollectibility of a judgment. If it 
is determined, upon motion made not later than one year after 
judgment is entered, that all or part of a party's equitable share of 
the obligation is uncollectible from that party, the portion that is 
uncollectible will be reallocated among the remaining parties to 
the lawsuit, including the plaintiff.397 The loss reallocation provi-
sion overrides the principle of joint and several liability to the ex-
tent that the uncollectible share of a defendant will not be borne 
solely by the remaining defendant or defendants. An example will 
clarify the operation of the section: 
Assume that a plaintiff is found to be ten percent at fault, 
defendant one is forty percent at fault, and defendant two is 
fifty percent at fault. 
396. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. § 604.02(2) (1978)). 
397. This provision of the Minnesota Act is based on section 2(d) of the Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act. The Uniform Act does not state how the determination of uncollecti-
bility is to be made. It would seem to require a showing of more than nonpayment of the 
defendant's share of the judgment. More probably, it would require a showing that the 
usual creditors' remedies are ineffective because the defendant lacks assets that can be 
reached. 
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Further assume that the damages sustained by the plaintiff are 
$10,000. Assume also that defendant two is insolvent and his por-
tion of the judgment is uncollectible, as established by motion of 
defendant one. Under prior law, the plaintiff would be entitled to 
collect $9,000, the total damages reduced by his percentage of 
fault, from defendant two because of the effect of joint and several 
liability.398 Because of the loss reallocation provision, however, de-
fendant two's portion of the judgment, fifty percent of the dam-
ages ($5,000), must be reallocated among the plaintiff and 
defendant one. 
The plaintiff's and defendant one's equitable shares would be 
ten percent and forty percent, respectively, providing a common 
denominator of fifty percent. Defendant one would thus bear 
four-fifths of the uncollectible $5,000, or $4,000. The remaining 
$1,000 would be reallocated to the plaintiff.399 Should defendant 
two become solvent, he is subject to a contribution claim by de-
fendant one and to continuing liability to the plaintiff on the judg-
ment.4OO 
The reallocation provision, however, does not have any impact 
on the principles governing liability at the outset. In order for a 
defendant to be held liable, it will still be necessary to establish, as 
required by section 604.02, subdivision 1, that the plaintiff's fault 
was not greater than the fault of the defendant against whom re-
covery is sought. For example, if a plaintiff is found to be twenty-
five percent at fault, defendant one is twenty percent at fault, and 
defendant two is fifty-five percent at fault, the plaintiff will not be 
entitled to recover against defendant one because the plaintiff's 
fault is greater than the fault of defendant one.401 Defendant two 
will be required to pay the plaintiff seventy-five percent of plain-
tiff's damages, even though he is only fifty-five percent at fault.402 
398. &e Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069 (current ver-
sion at MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1978». 
399. For other examples of how the reallocation provision would work, see UNIFORM 
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, Comment. 
400. See MINN. STAT. § 604.02(2) (1978). 
401. &e id. § 604.01 (1). 
402. In light of the reallocation provision, see ld. § 604.02.(2), it might seem anomalous 
that defendant one's share of the judgment is not reallocated to the plaintiff as well as 
defendant two. This would be the result under section 2(d) of the Uniform Comparative 
Fault Act if the judgment could not be collected from defendant one. If there is realloca-
tion in the event of uncollectibility, it would seem that there should be reallocation when 
defendant one is not liable. It must be noted, however, that the Uniform Act is a pure 
comparative fault act, and that defendant one would not escape liability because his fault 
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No right of contribution would exist against defendant one be-
cause there is no common liability.403 The only exception would 
be when aggregation is allowed. At least in the context of non-
products liability cases, there will be no aggregation absent a joint 
adventure or joint duty.404 
In considering the impact of the reallocation provisions, it 
should be remembered that in some cases, such as principal/agent 
or automobile owner/driver, two defendants may in combination 
be treated as a single party. Loss would be reallocated to the other 
parties in the lawsuit only in the event that the percentage of the 
judgment allocated to those combinations is not collectible from 
either of the defendants in the combination. 
c. Subdivision 3 
In the case of a claim arising from the manufacture, sale, use 
or consumption of a product, an amount uncollectible from any 
person in the chain of manufacture and distribution shall be 
reallocated among all other persons in the chain of manufac-
ture and distribution but not among the claimant or others at 
fault who are not in the chain of manufacture or distribution of 
the product. Provided, however, that a person whose fault is 
less than that of a claimant is liable to the claimant only for 
that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage 
of fault attributable to him.405 
Subdivision 3 of section 604.02 provides special rules for loss al-
is less than the fault of the plaintiff. Under MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978), defendant 
one cannot be held liable because his fault is less than the fault of the plaintiff. Although 
it could be argued that "uncollectibility" in rd. § 604.02(2) includes cases in which the 
judgment is not collectible because of nonliability, the argument is invalid. The realloca-
tion provision in the Minnesota Act was taken virtually verbatim from section 2(d) of the 
Uniform Comparative Fault Act. As previously explained, under the Uniform Act the 
problem of nonliabiity does not arise because it is a pure comparative fault act. "Uncol-
lectibility" obviously was not intended to encompass nonliability. Thus, although it 
would be equitable for defendant one's 20% of the judgment to be reallocated to the plain-
tiff as well as defendant two, the reallocation provision does not seem to be designed to 
encompass uncollectibility because of nonliability. 
403. Su Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 
(1973). 
404. Su Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 
(1973); notes 341-45 supra and accompanying text. 
405. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. § 604.02(3) (1978)). Subdivision 3 does not have a direct parallel in the Uniform 
Act. However, it appears that the Uniform Act does anticipate such a procedure, as indi-
cated by the Comment to section 2 of the Act, providing that the liability of a retailer and 
manufacturer can be considered together. 
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location among defendants in the chain of manufacture and distri-
bution in a products liability lawsuit. It differs from subdivision 2 
in that any portion of a judgment that is uncollectible from a 
party in the chain will be reallocated among other parties in the 
chain, but not among parties outside the chain. To illustrate, as-
sume the following example: 
Plaintiff is twenty percent at fault. Defendant retailer is 
thirty percent at fault and defendant manufacturer is fifty per-
cent at fault. Damages are in the amount of $10,000. 
If the judgment against either the retailer or manufacturer is un-
collectible, that part of the loss would be reallocated to the other 
party in the chain of distribution. The purpose of this unique rule 
is to ensure that all parties in the chain of manufacture and distri-
bution will insure against risks legitimately attributable to their 
enterprises. 
The most difficult issue in construing subdivision 3 is whether it 
will be permissible to aggregate the fault of parties in the chain of 
distribution. To illustrate, assume the following example: 
Plaintiff is thirty percent at fault. Defendant retailer is 
twenty percent at fault and defendant manufacturer is fifty 
percent at fault. Damages are in the amount of $10,000. 
If section 604.01, subdivision 1 is applied without qualification, the 
defendant retailer would not be liable because his fault is less than 
that of the plaintiff. Unlike subdivision 2 reallocation in non-
products liability cases, however, subdivision 3 contains language 
indicating that the retailer will be held liable. 
Following the general rule on reallocation in products liability 
cases, the last sentence of subdivision 3 states that a person whose 
fault is less than that of the claimant will be held liable only for 
that portion of the judgment representing the percentage of fault 
attributable to him. This seems to encompass the situation in the 
hypothetical in which the claimant's fault is greater than the re-
tailer's. 
Since, as a matter of statutory construction, a statute should be 
read so as to give effect to all its provisions,406 it can be argued that 
subdivision 3 creates a limited exception to the general rule, estab-
lished in subdivision 1 of section 604.01, that a defendant cannot 
be held liable if his fault is less than the fault of the plaintiff. 
The legislative history of the Minnesota Act, however, makes 
406. Su MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (1978). 
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the argument spurious. Subdivision 3 of section 604.02 was con-
structed in stages. At the time the comparative fault bill came to 
the floor of the Senate, subdivision 3 contained only the first sen-
tence and subdivision 1 of section 604.01 was in a very different 
form than the bill that passed. Instead of requiring a comparison 
of the fault of the plaintiff to the fault of the person against whom 
recovery is sought, the bill provided that a plaintiff would not be 
barred from recovery so long as his fault was not equal to or 
greater than the fault of the persons against whom recovery was 
being sought.407 The bill thus would have required a comparison 
of the plaintiff's fault to the aggregate fault of all defendants in-
volved, rather than to the fault of each individual defendant. In 
the products liability context, as well as in tort cases in general, a 
defendant whose fault was less than that of the plaintiff would 
have been held liable. 
With the bill in this form, the last sentence of subdivision 3 of 
section 604.02 was added by an amendment introduced by Sena-
tor Coleman.408 The amendment was a direct response to the im-
pact the aggregation provision in the bill would have had on 
products liability cases.409 Senator Coleman's amendment would 
not have avoided the liability of any such party in the chain of 
distribution whose fault was less than the fault of the plaintiff, but 
it would have limited it to no more than the party's percentage of 
fault. 
The Coleman amendment touched only products liability cases. 
The aggregation principle in subdivision 1 of section 604.01 would 
still have applied to the other torts cases. It was in response to this 
problem as well as the problem of aggregation in the products lia-
bility context that Senator Sieloff offered to amend the aggrega-
tion language of subdivision 1 of section 604.01410 by substituting 
the language that appears in the statute as enacted.411 It requires 
a comparison of the fault of the plaintiff to the fault of the person 
against whom recovery is sought. 
The Sieloff amendment, which was adopted, made the Coleman 
amendment (the last sentence of subdivision 3) irrelevant because 
407. &~ 4 MINN. S. JOUR. 5178 (1978). 
408. &~ ld. 
409. &~ Tap~ of D~ba/~ on H.F. 338 Befor~ Ih~ Minn~sola Sma/~, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 
Sess. (Mar. 16, 1978). 
4\0. &~ ld. 
411. &~ 4 MINN. S. JOUR. 5178 (1978). 
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it eliminated the possibility that a defendant whose fault is less 
than that of the plaintiff could be held liable. Although it is not 
likely that the Sieloff amendment will always require a comparison 
of the plaintiff's fault to the fault of each individual defendant, it 
does eliminate the possiblity that the last sentence of subdivision 3 
can be used as an argument that aggregation should usually be 
permitted in the products liability context. 
Following the Sieloff amendment, the bill was amended once 
more. Senator Davies moved to amend section 604.01, subdivision 
1, to provide that a plaintiff could recover as long as his fault was 
not greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is 
sought.412 The amendment ensures that a plaintiff whose fault is 
equal to the fault of a defendant will be entitled to recover. 
As constituted, it becomes apparent that the Minnesota Act tugs 
in opposite directions. The broad definition of fault in subdivision 
la of section 604.01 ensures that parties lower in the chain of distri-
but ion will bear a greater part of the responsibility in products 
liability cases through elimination of the usual rule of indemnity, 
and subdivision 3 ensures that all parties in the chain of manufac-
ture and distribution will be responsible for any portion of a judg-
ment uncollectible from any other party in the chain. On the 
other hand, the Sieloff amendment limits the liability of parties in 
the chain of distribution and manufacture when a party's fault is 
greater than the fault of the plaintiff. 
The exact impact of the Sieloff amendment is difficult to assess. 
The amendment induced a substantial amount of debate.413 A 
reference to some of the perceived problems justifying the amend-
ment may have a bearing on how the amendment should be read. 
In illustrating the impact of the aggregation rule in the products 
liability context, Senator Sieloff used examples that did not in-
volve exclusively products liability actions.414 As the debate wore 
on, however, there was a strong sense of support for a nonaggrega-
tion rule specifically in the products liability context;415 the para-
digm for discussion became the small retailer, less at fault than the 
plaintiff, held liable for a small portion of a large judgment.416 
412. Set' id.; notes 355-57 supra and accompanying text. 
413. Set' Tapt' oj'Dt'balt' on H.F 338 Bifou Iht' Minnt'sola Smalt' , 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 
Sess. (Mar. 16, 1978). 
414. SUld. 
415. Set'ld. 
416. Su ld. 
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Even if the retailer's liability was limited in accordance with the 
last sentence of subdivision 3 of section 604.02, it was recognized 
that requiring the retailer to pay one or two percent of a large 
judgment would impose a substantial burden on the retailer.417 
The limited scope of the evil addressed provides some insights 
into the aggregation issue. In the first place, it is not likely that the 
Sieloff amendment would disturb situations involving vicarious li-
ability when the nature of the liability of two or more defendants 
is such that there is no logical basis for dividing responsibility. 
The obvious examples are cases involving master/servant or auto-
mobile owner/driver. 
The Sieloff amendment should not be held to apply to situations 
involving joint ventures, the substance of the supreme court's deci-
sion in Krengel D. Mzdwest Automatic Photo Supp{y) Inc. 418 This con-
clusion is supported by the discussion in the Senate floor debates 
on the amendment. On several occasions there were indications of 
a desire to maintain the law of aggregation as it was under the 
'comparative negligence act. 419 Because aggregation was then per-
mitted in cases involving joint ventures,420 there is no reason why 
such decisions should not stand. 
The Sieloff amendment will not affect situations in which the 
retailer is held liable but is responsible for only a small portion of 
the total judgment. If the retailer's fault is equal to or greater than 
the fault of the plaintiff, the retailer will be jointly and severally 
liable with the other defendants in the case. In addition, the first 
sentence of subdivision 3 would be unaffected. It provides that loss 
will be shifted from the parties in the chain of distribution only 
when none of the parties in the chain can absorb the portion of the 
judgment that the chain of distribution combination is liable for. 
Other problems were not considered, including the problem of 
the plaintiff who is denied recovery because of the complexity of 
the marketing chain. Nor was consideration given to the case in 
which there is an integral relationship between manufacturer and 
distributor or dealer. 
While it must be recognized that the aggregation problem in the 
products liability context was considered in the floor debates, it 
417. &.,.id. 
418. 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973). 
419. &.,. Tap.,. of D.,.bal.,. on H.F 338 &.fim ,h.,. Minnuo/a Smal.,., 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 
Sess. (Mar. 16, 1978). 
420. &.,. notes 336-51 supra and accompanying text. 
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also must be recognized that the remedy in the form of the Sieloff 
amendment was not based on a consideration of the variety of situ-
ations in which the problem will likely be presented. Given the 
evil to be remedied by the legislation, it is arguable that it would 
be inappropriate to expand the remedy beyond the problem of the 
independent retailer being held liable for a small percentage of a 
large judgment. 
Although as a general rule aggregation will not be permitted, 
there should be latitude in creating exceptions. Certainly, there 
should be an exception in cases in which there is a joint adventure. 
Less certainly, cases involving intimate tie-ins of parties in the 
chain should be covered. Beyond that, the nonaggregation rule 
should control, given the absence of any principled basis for limit-
ing the rule. 
3. Summary 
The Minnesota Act makes significant changes in the compara-
tive negligence law, even as modified in Busch and Tolbert. With 
its expanded definition of fault, the Minnesota Act takes into con-
sideration all forms of negligent or reckless misconduct. It includes 
strict liability and breach of warranty. 
The impact of the Minnesota Act on Busch is apparent. The 
. statute overrides the Busch exception of contributory negligence 
consisting of failure to discover a defect. Aside from the impact on 
that specific exception, the Minnesota Act seems to be consistent 
with the approach to defenses taken by the court in Busch. The 
Minnesota Act also changes the law of contribution and indem-
nity. Implied indemnity in products liability cases is no longer the 
rule. To the extent that Tolbert can be read as preserving indem-
nity in cases involving nonnegligent, passive conduct on the part of 
a party lower in the chain of distribution, that exception would be 
overridden. 
Aside from adopting a broad approach to fault allocation, the 
Minnesota Act makes new changes in the law governing the reallo-
cation of loss in cases in which judgments are uncollectible from 
one or more defendants. Although the rule of joint and several 
liability is maintained in the statute, in cases involving the uncol-
lectibility of a judgment from one or more defendants, the defend-
ant's share will be reallocated among all parties to the litigation, 
including the plaintiff. Because fault, irrespective of the theory of 
recovery is now compared under the Minnesota Act, the statute 
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attempts to ensure the fairest allocation of loss by reqUlrmg all 
responsible parties to the litigation to bear the risk of uncollectibil-
ity of a judgment according to their percentages of fault. 
In products liability cases, the rule differs. If a portion of a judg-
me~t is uncollectible from a party in the chain of manufacture and 
distribution, that portion of the judgment will be reallocated only 
among other parties in the chain. 
In the products liability context, one of the principal questions 
raised by the Minnesota Act is whether the fault of parties in the 
chain of distribution can under any circumstances be aggregated. 
The legislative history does not provide a clear answer to that 
question. The answer will be worked out in individual cases, keep-
ing in mind not only the purposes of strict tort liability but the 
intent to limit the responsibility of product sellers. 
E The J 980 Legislation 
At the end of the most recent session of the Legislature, a statute 
was enacted limiting the liability of nonmanufacturers in products 
liability suits.421 In order to understand just exactly what impact 
the statute will have on loss allocation it is necessary to understand 
the operation and effect of the statute. The statute reads as fol-
lows: 
Subdivision 1. In any product liability action based in 
whole or in part on strict liability in tort commenced or main-
tained against a defendant other than the manufacturer, that 
party shall upon answering or otherwise pleading file an affida-
vit certifying the correct identity of the manufacturer of the 
product allegedly causing injury, death or damage. The com-
mencement of a product liability action based in whole or part 
on strict liability in tort against a certifying defendant shall toll 
the applicable statute of limitation relative to the defendant for 
purposes of asserting a strict liability in tort cause of action. 
Subd. 2. Once the plaintiff has filed a complaint against a 
manufacturer and the manufacturer has or is required to have 
answered or otherwise pleaded, the court shall order the dismis-
sal of a strict liability in tort claim against the certifying de-
fendant, provided the certifying defendant is not within the 
categories set forth in subdivision 3. Due diligence shall be ex-
421. Su Act of Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 614, § 156, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1256, 1323 
(West) (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 544.41). The effective date of the statute was the 
day following enactment, April 25, 1980. &e itl. § 192, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo at 1337 
(West). 
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ercised by the certifying defendant in providing the plaintiff 
with the correct identity of the manufacturer and due diligence 
shall be exercised by the plaintiff in filing a law suit and ob-
taining jurisdiction over the manufacturer. 
The plaintiff may at any time subsequent to dismissal move 
to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying de-
fendant, provided plaintiff can show one of the following: 
(a) That the applicable statute of limitation bars the asser-
tion of a strict liability in tort cause of action against the manu-
facturer of the product allegedly causing the injury, death or 
damage; 
(b) That the identity of the manufacturer given to the plain-
tiff by the certifying defendant was incorrect. Once the correct 
identity of the manufacturer has been given by the certifying 
defendant the court shall again dismiss the certifying defend-
ant; 
(c) That the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, or, despite due dili-
gence, the manufacturer is not amenable to service of process; 
(d) That the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment 
as determined by the court; or 
(e) That the court determines that the manufacturer would 
be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement 
with plaintiff. 
Subd. 3. A court shall not enter a dismissal order relative to 
any certifying defendant even though full compliance with sub-
division 1 has been made where the plaintiff can show one of 
the following: 
(a) That the defendant has exercised some significant control 
over the design or manufacture of the product, or has provided 
instructions or warnings to the manufacturer relative to the al-
leged defect in the product which caused the injury, death or 
damage; 
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the defect in 
the product which caused the injury, death, or damage; or 
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the product 
which caused the injury, death or damage. 
Subd. 4. Nothing contained in subdivisions 1 to 3 shall be 
construed to create a cause of action in strict liability in tort or 
based on other legal theory, or to affect the right of any person 
to seek and obtain indemnity or contribution.422 
422. Id. The statute was passed as section 156 of a 192 section appropriations bill, on 
April 11, 1980, without benefit of Senate hearings. &e MINN. H.R. JOUR. 7278 (1980); 
HeinOnline -- 6 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 353 1980
1980] THE ANATOMY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 353 
The obvious purpose of the Act is to limit the liability of 
nonmanufacturer defendants in products liability cases.423 The 
Act applies to product liability actions based in whole or in part 
on strict liability in tort. A nonmanufacturer defendant against 
whom a strict liability claim is asserted is entitled to dismissal of 
the strict liability claim upon certifying by affidavit in a responsive 
pleading the name of the product manufacturer.424 
MINN. s. JOUR. 6828 (1980). The manner in which the bill was enacted puts the constitu-
tionality of the bill in question under MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 17, which provides that 
"No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." 
423. The Minnesota statute was taken virtually verbatim from Illinois. See Act of 
Sept. 24, 1979, Pub. Act. No. 81-1056, 1979 III. Legis. Servo 2753 (West) (to be codified as 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 801-804 (Smith-Hurd». The underlying concept is similar to 
statutes in Nebraska, SI!!! NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 181 (Cum. Supp. 1978) and Tennessee. 
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3706(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The concept is also integrated in 
the Model Act: 
(A) A product seller, other than a manufacturer, is subject to liability to a 
claimant who proves by a preponderance of the evidence that claimant's harm 
was proximately caused by such product seller's failure to use reasonable care 
with respect to the product. 
Before submitting the case to the trier of fact, the court shall determine that 
the claimant has introduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable person to 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that such product seller has failed to 
exercise reasonable care and that this failure was a proximate cause of the claim-
ant's harm. 
In determining whether a product seller, other than a manufacturer, is sub-
ject to liability under Subsection (A), the trier of fact shall consider the effect of 
such product seller's own conduct with respect to the design, construction, in-
spection, or condition of the product, and any failure of such product seller to 
transmit adequate warnings or instructions about the dangers and proper use of 
the product. 
Unless Subsection (B) or (C) is applicable, product sellers shall not be sub-
ject to liability in circumstances in which they did not have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to inspect the product in a manner which would or should, in the exercise 
of reasonable care, reveal the existence of the defective condition. 
(B) A product seller, other than a manufacturer, who makes an express war-
ranty about a material fact or facts concerning a product is subject to the stan-
dards of liability set forth in Subsection 104(D). 
(C) A product seller, other than a manufacturer, is also subject to the liabil-
ity of manufacturer under Section 104 if: 
(1) The manufacturer is not subject to service of process under the laws of 
the claimant's domicile; or 
(2) The manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent in that the 
manufacturer is unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary 
course of business; or 
(3) The court determines that it is highly probable that the claimant would 
be unable to enforce a judgment against the product manufacturer. 
(D) Except as provided in Subsections (A), (B), and (C), a product seller, 
other than a manufacturer, shall not otherwise be subject to liability under this 
Act. 
MODEL ACT § 105, repnnted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,726. 
424. See Act of Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 614, § 156, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1256, 1323 
(West) (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2». 
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It seems clear from the Act that certification of the name of the 
product manufacturer only entitles the certifying defendant to dis-
missal of the strict liability claim, not necessarily dismissal of the 
entire suit. If, in addition to the strict liability claim, the plaintiff 
alleges negligence or breach of express warranty or implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose, only the strict liability 
claim should be dismissed. 
If there is a dismissal of the strict liability claim, the plaintiff 
may "at any time subsequent to dismissal move to vacate" the dis-
missal order and reinstate the certifying defendant, if the plaintiff 
establishes one of five conditions: (1) that the applicable statute of 
limitations has run on the strict liability claim against the manu-
facturer; (2) that the certifying defendant has provided the plain-
tiff with the wrong manufacturer's name, although dismissal 
would again be appropriate if the right name is provided; (3) if the 
manufacturer no longer exists, is not subject to jurisdiction in Min-
nesota, or if the manufacturer is not amenable to service of process, 
despite the exercise of due diligence by the plaintiff; (4) if the man-
ufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment as determined by the 
court; or (5) if the court determines that the manufacturer would 
not be able to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement 
with the plaintiff.425 
Subdivision 3 provides that a dismissal order shall not be en-
tered, despite compliance by the certifying defendant with subdi-
vision 1, if the plaintiff can show one of three specified conditions: 
(1) "the defendant has exercised some significant control over the 
design or manufacture of the product, or has provided instructions 
or warnings to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect in 
the product .... "; (2) the defendant had actual knowledge of the 
defect; or (3) the defendant created the defect.426 
The most plausible construction of subdivision 4 is that other 
substantive rights are not to be affected by the Act. The statute 
should, however, have an impact on contribution claims asserted 
by a manufacturer. Under the Minnesota Act, contribution is the 
usual vehicle for the allocation of loss among parties in the chain 
of distribution, irrespective of the theory of recovery under which 
those parties are held liable. To the extent that the 1980 statute 
limits the liability of nonmanufacturers, however, the broad prin-
425. Id. 
426. Id. (to be codified as MINN. STAT. § 544.41(3». 
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ciple of comparative responsibility established in the Minnesota 
Act will be narrowed. If, in situations in which a manufacturer is 
joined or is subject to suit, the nonmanufacturer is not subject to 
liability under a strict liability theory, a manufacturer should be 
precluded from obtaining contribution against the nonmanufac-
turer if the sole basis for the contribution claim is that the 
nonmanufacturer is strictly liable to the plaintiff. Because a 
nonmanufacturer cannot be held liable on a strict liability theory, 
the common liability impediment would preclude contribution.427 
If the contribution right is not limited, so as to allow a manufac-
turer to obtain contribution upon establishing the liability of the 
nonmanufacturer on a strict liability claim, the legislative intent to 
limit the liability of those defendants would be subverted. Accord-
ingly, the new Act should be an impediment not only to the asser-
tion of strict liability claims by plaintiffs against nonmanufacturer. 
defendants but also to the assertion of such claims by manufactur-
ers seeking to establish contribution claims against those defend-
ants.428 
427. St't' Conde v. City of Spring Lake Park, 290 N.W.2d 164, 165 (Minn. 1980); Hart 
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Minn. 1979). 
428. Although the concept underlying the statute may be sound, it i$ a procedural 
nightmare. There are a variety of problems created by the statute. Subdivision 2 states 
that once the plaintiff has filed a complaint against a manufacturer and the manufacturer 
has or is required to have answered or otherwise pleaded, the court shall order the dismis-
sal of a strict liability in tort claim against the certifying defendant, provided the certify-
ing defendant is not within the categories set forth in subdivision 3. Set' Act of Apr. 24, 
1980, ch. 614, § 156, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1256, 1323 (West) (to be codified as 
MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2». Subdivision 2 goes on to say that the plaintiff may at any time 
"subsequent to dismissal" move to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the certify-
ing defendant, provided plaintiff can show one of the specified conditions. Id. The plain-
tiff bears the burden of proof of establishing the conditions. Id. Problems will invariably 
arise in determining just exactly what kind of showing the plaintiff must make in order to 
justify reinstatement. 
Proof that the statute of limitations has run against the manufacturer should be rela-
tively easy to satisfy. Proof of the other conditions will undoubtedly be more complicated. 
Establishing that the manufacturer no longer exists appears to be a relatively simple re-
quirement, but it does not take into consideration the problem of the liabilility of successor 
corporations. Set', t'.g., Leannais V. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Ray V. 
Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous 
Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). If a successor corporation would be held 
liable on a strict liability claim would the statute apply if the original manufacturer has 
ceased to do business, or would the presence of the successor be sufficient to bar the plain-
tiff from asserting a strict liability claim against the nonmanufacturer? 
Deciding whether the manufacturer is subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota is also 
likely to present problems. Will the plaintiff be able to satisfy the burden short of serving 
the manufacturer and waiting for the manufacturer to move to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction? If it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to actually serve the manufacturer, 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The principles of loss allocation in Minnesota have been the 
the plaintiff will be placed in the curious position of attempting to establish facts sufficient 
to disprove personal jurisdiction, something the plaintiff is ordinarily required to prove 
affirmatively. If, for tactical reasons, the plaintiff has determined that the claim against 
the manufacturer does not justify suit against the manufacturer it would seem unreasona-
ble to require the plaintiff to serve the defendant and await a motion to dismiss as a 
condition to reinstatement of the certifying defendant. 
The due diligence aspect should present fewer problems. If service cannot be ob-
tained after reasonable efforts, the plaintiff should readily be able to establish the efforts 
expended in attempting to obtain service on the manufacturer. 
The final two factors are likely to present the greatest difficulty. The certifying de-
fendant will be reinstated if the plaintiff can show "[t]hat the manufacturer is unable to 
satisfy any judgment as determined by the court" or "that the manufacturer would be 
unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with plaintiff." S<!'<!' Act of 
Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 614, § 156,1980 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 1256, 1323 (West) (to be codified 
as MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2) (d)-(e)). Can the plaintiff establish by pretrial motion that the 
manufacturer would be unable to satisfy any judgment or must the case be litigated and 
an attempt made to collect on the judgment before the condition is satisfied? If a pretrial 
resolution is allowed it will be necessary not only for the plaintiff to discover information 
concerning the financial status of the defendant but the likely damages to be awarded. 
Because of the problems likely to arise in obtaining discovery of information concerning 
the manufacturer's financial status, and the uncertainty involved in predicting the 
amount of plaintitrs damages, pretrial resolution would be difficult and time consuming. 
If the plaintiff fails to establish that the manufacturer is not able to satisfy any judgment, 
the case would have to be litigated. If, after judgment, the manufacturer is in fact not 
able to satisfy the judgment the plaintiff would, at that point, be entitled to have the 
certifying defendant reinstated. In all likelihood, several years will have passed. In addi-
tion, because the certifying defendant has been dismissed, the plaintiff would have to re-
prove his case against the retailer. The result is suspect in light of the supreme court's 
decision in Haugen v. Town of Waltham, No. 49964 (Minn. March 28, 1980), holding 
unconstitutional a portion of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act because 
it failed to satisfy MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8, which provides that "Every person is entitled 
to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his 
person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, com-
pletely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws." In 
Haugm the court referred in particular to the requirement that there be "a certain remedy 
in the laws" which shall "completely" allow a person to obtain justice. No. 49964, slip op. 
at 5. The specific provision of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile' Insurance Act at issue 
was MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(1) (1978), which required an offset from any tort recovery not 
only for basic economic loss benefits paid or payable, but also for benefits "which will be 
payable in the future." Id. As the supreme court noted: 
the no-fault carrier of the successful plaintiff in this case is not a party to the 
action. Thus, the plaintiff has no assurance that his insurance carrier will accept 
the amount of damages awarded, let alone that it will accept responsibility for 
such damages. If the no-fault carrier contests these matters, then the successful 
plaintiff must relitigate his claim under the arbitration provisions of his policy. 
No. 49964, slip op. at 5. Finding that "the constitution seems to contemplate a single 
remedy and not a series of remedies," id., the court held the provision unconstitutional. 
Id., slip op. at 5-6. Suffice it to say that similar problems appear to exist with the products 
liability legislation. 
A potential remedy for the problem through construction may exist. The Model Act 
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subject of recent judicial and legislative modification. The con-
trolling principles depend on whether the cause of action arose 
before the passage of the comparative fault act. If before, the prin-
ciples depend on the supreme court's position on the retroactivity 
of its decisions. 
Although there are important differences between pre-compara-
tive fault act and post-act loss allocation principles, the Minnesota 
takes the position that the nonmanufacturer will be subject to a strict liability claim if 
"[t)he manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent in that the manufacturer is 
unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business." MODEL 
ACT § 105(C)(2), repnnted In 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,726. If the Minnesota statute is similarly 
interpreted, at least some of the pretrial uncertainty would be removed and the plaintiff 
would be presented with a more objective standard that could be more readily satisfied. 
The same problems are presented with respect to the final condition of subdivision 2, 
that the manufacturer would be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agree-
ment with the plaintiff. The vagueness of the standard is a good argument for a more 
certain standard. Again, the Model Act could provide a potential solution. 
If the plaintiff is able to show that one of the conditions set forth in subdivision 3 of 
the statute is met, the strict liability claim against the certifying defendant would not be 
dismissed. All of the conditions are likely to present factual issues that will be difficult to 
resolve in a pretrial proceeding. It is clear that the plaintiff has the burden of showing one 
of the conditions. It is unclear just exactly what the burden entails. Does the plaintiff 
have to prove the conditions by a preponderance of the evidence? If so, it is difficult to see 
how the burden could be met in a hearing without violating plaintiff's constitutional right 
to trial by jury. See MINN: CaNsT. art. I, § 4. It would be absurd to require a virtual 
pretrial trial on the merits to determine if the plaintiff can assert a strict liability claim 
againt the certifying defendant. If pretrial trial on the merits would not be feasible, as it 
most certainly would not be, the statute poses a dilemma. If there is uncertainty as to the 
conditions, the plaintiff should be given the benefit of the doubt. In a sense, a reverse 
summary judgment standard would be workable. If there is a genuine dispute as to a 
material fact, which would be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, then 
the case should proceed to trial on the strict liability issue. 
Application of any other standard is likely to lead to additional problems. If a stricter 
standard is imposed on the plaintiff, so that the strict liability claim, and perhaps the 
entire claim against the defendant, is dismissed, the plaintiff could well be placed in a 
position in which it would be impossible to establish his case against a manufacturer. As 
an example, in a case in which it is not clear which of the parties in the chain of distribu-
tion introduced the defect into the product, the absence of the nonmanufacturer defend-
ant may make it difficult for the plaintiff to prove the critical fact of where the defect 
arose. At the very least, the plaintiff's burden would be complicated by the absence from 
the suit of the nonmanufacturer defendant, because of discovery .limitations. 
In response to this problem, the Model Act has suggested that "[t)he non-manufac-
turer product seller be treated as a party for the purposes of discovery under the applica-
ble procedural code. If this step is not taken, the Act may place an undue burden on the 
claimant in his or her attempt to prove the case." MODEL ACT § 105, Analysis, rl!pnnted In 
44 Fed. Reg. at 62,727. 
Overall, it seems clear that the procedures required by the statute will be cumber-
some and time consuming. If the procedures are judicially interpreted in a fashion consis-
tent with the treatment in the Model Act, however, at least some of the major problems. 
can be minimized. 
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Supreme Court took the law to the brink of a full comparative 
fault system with its decisions in Busch D. Busch Construction) Inc. ,429 
Tolbert D. Gerber Industnils) Inc. ,430 and Lambertson D. Cincinnati Corp. 43\ 
Each of the decisions introduces new rules of loss allocation and 
each creates new problems of interpretation. 
The critical questions left open by Busch concern the interpreta-
tion of the specified defenses to strict liability claims, the method 
of loss allocation in strict liability cases, the interpretation of the 
Busch exception, and the relationship of strict liability defenses to 
the defenses to negligence and warranty theories. In understand-
ing the treatment of the separate defenses set out by the court, 
reference to the treatment of those defenses under negligence the-
ory provides assistance. The same merger of defenses that has 
taken place under the court's decision in Springrose D. Willmore432 
should be applied to strict liability defenses. This has the virtue of 
providing a consistent treatment of defenses for two of the poten-
tial theories of recovery. The similarity of strict tort and warranty, 
when the damage consists of personal injury or property damage, 
leads to the easy conclusion that the defenses to all three theories 
should be the same. For purposes of consistency, the Busch excep-
tion should also be applicable irrespective of which theory of re-
covery the plaintiff relies upon. A consistent approach to the 
defenses to products liability claims also points toward the method 
of loss allocation to be used. Although there are a variety of poten-
tial approaches to that question, it is difficult to escape the conclu-
sion that it really is fault that is being compared, no matter how 
the process is characterized. The comparison should prove to be 
workable, just as the comparison of negligence has worked in Min-
nesota over the past decade. 
The final question, that of interpreting the Busch exception, is 
not readily answerable, at least if the search is for some definitive 
means of resolving cases in which the exception will arise. The 
important point is to understand how the exception operates in 
relation to other types of plaintiff misconduct. Beyond that, the 
only thing that can be done is to set out clearly the exception and 
leave it to the trier of fact to resolve. 
The contribution and indemnity decisions of the court also cre-
429. 262 N.w.2d 377 (Minn. 1977). 
430. 255 N.w.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). 
431. 312 Minn. 114,257 N.w.2d 679 (1977). 
432. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971). 
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ate interpretive problems. The principal question involved in in-
terpreting Tolbert is to decide just how far the decision goes in 
abrogating indemnity in favor of contribution. On its face, Tolbert 
extends only to situations in which the retailer and manufacturer 
are negligent. Tolbert and Busch, read in tandem, take the majority 
rule one step further, to situations in which the retailer is negligent 
and the manufacturer strictly liable. The rationale of the opinion 
does not, however, extend beyond such situations. When the con-
tribution rule applies, the same comparative fault principles ap-
plied in apportioning loss among a plaintiff and defendant should 
be equally applicable in apportioning loss among defendants. 
The primary question raised by the court's opinion in Lambert-
son is whether the court intended f~r its opinion to be read so as to 
create the possibility that an employer will be subjected to liability 
beyond its actual workers' compensation liability. Although the 
basic concept established in Lambertson is defensible, the apparent 
extension of that concept by Johnson lJ. Raske Budding Systems~ Inc. 433 
may not be. Because the employer's right to share in the proceeds 
of a tort judgment must be filtered through the statute governing 
the distribution of tort judgments between an employer and em-
ployee, it is possible for an employer to receive less than it is re-
quired to payout on the third party's contribution claim, thus 
creating the likelihood that in most situations, the employer will 
be required to pay more than its workers' compensation liability. 
The approach suggested in this Article has been to avoid the 
undesirable consequence of such an extension by adopting a rule 
that would restrict the employer's net liability to its workers' com-
pensation liability, an approach that the supreme court seemed to 
adopt initially in Lambertson. It is an approach that does the least 
violence to the workers' compensation act, pending legislative reso-
lution of the problem of third party claims. 
The comparative negligence act and the new law established by 
the supreme court in its recent loss allocation decisions are in turn 
altered by the comparative fault act. The Minnesota Act changes 
the percentage of fault necessary to block a plaintiff's recovery. 
Under the comparative negligence act a plaintiff would not be 
barred from recovery unless his negligence was equal to or greater 
than the negligence of the defendant. Under the Minnesota Act, a 
433. 276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979). 
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plaintiff's fault must be greater than the fault of the defendant in 
order to bar his recovery. 
The Minnesota Act should not alter the method of loss alloca-
tion adopted in Busch. It would, however, eliminate the exception 
carved out in Busch for plaintiff misconduct consisting of failure to 
discover a product defect. The broad definition of fault set out in 
the statute also makes it likely that whatever vestiges of the indem-
nity rule remain following Tolbert will be eliminated, imposing in-
creased responsibility on parties lower in the chain of distribution. 
Consistent with this purpose, the Minnesota Act's provision on loss 
reallocation in products liability cases ensures that greater respon-
sibility will be borne by parties in the chain of manufacture and 
distribution by imposing the risk of uncollectibility of the judg-
ment from any of the parties in the chain on the remaining parties 
in the chain. That principle is modified to a limited extent by the 
1980 products liability legislation limiting the liability of 
nonmanufacturer defendants to theories of recovery other than 
strict liability, unless the manufacturer is not subject to suit or is 
not financially responsible. 
Both the court's loss allocation decisions and the Minnesota Act 
create potentially perplexing problems of interpretation. Some of 
the apparent complexity in the decisions and statute are due to 
new terminology. The newness of the idea rubs off quickly, how-
ever, if it is recognized that the defenses to strict liability claims 
and the methods of loss allocation among all parties to products 
liability litigation are not radically different from what has already 
been done in warranty and negligence law. 
